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This thesis considers how a disassociation among children with autism in cognitive
functioning in the domains of psychology and physics might enhance our
understanding of cognitive development in general. Cognition is assumed by many
theorists to develop in a domain-specific fashion. This position holds that children's
intuitive understanding is constructed differently according to the domain of
knowledge. A literature review is reported which indicates that autism could indeed be
a paradigm case for investigating this theoretical perspective.
Study 1 investigated intuitive concepts of psychology, physics and biology by
administering two tasks from each domain to 23 typically developing pre-schoolers, 20
children with autism and 18 children with Down syndrome. Results found that
children with autism performed significantly below the other groups on the intuitive
psychology tasks. However, performance within the domains of physics and biology
did not significantly differ across groups. This disassociated understanding evidenced
between the domains of psychology and physics/biology in children with autism
strengthens the argument that cognition develops domain-specifically.
Study 2 focussed in greater detail on this disassociation by employing three tasks each
comprising a psychological and physical condition to 21 children with autism and three
groups of typically developing children: 21 matched according to chronological age
[CA]; 17 pre-schoolers; 18 seven-year-olds and 17 ten-year-olds. In both conditions of a
picture-sequencing task children with autism were more likely to choose a physical
causal picture than a psychological one to complete the sequence. This finding indicates
that children with autism may prefer to reason about causality in a purely physical
way. In a categorisation task no group differences were identified in the psychological
condition. However, in the physics condition, children with autism and ten-year-olds
were more likely to categorise according to physical features than superficial features.
In a multiple-choice task, children with autism performed poorer than all other
typically developing groups in the psychology condition but better than all comparison
groups except the ten-year-olds in the physics condition. This study not only confirms
initial findings but additionally demonstrates a superior ability to reason about
in
physical phenomena in children with autism. The theoretical and practical implications
of this potential cognitive strength are discussed.
To investigate the nature of physical understanding in more depth, Study 3 compared
both the predictions and explanations offered by ten children with Asperger syndrome
and a CA matched group of typically developing children in respect to four physical
concepts: floating/sinking; balance; trajectory; and vertical movement. Groups did not
differ in the predictions offered in relation to each physical concept. However,
significant group differences in the level of understanding evident in the explanations
used to support their predictions were identified in two concepts: the CA matched
children offered more advance explanations in the floating/sinking and balance tasks.
Overall this study found that children with Asperger syndrome are very capable of
offering predictions and explanations with respect to physical phenomena but their
understanding was not superior to typically developing children of the same age. This
study concludes that children with Asperger syndrome have an intact domain of
physics that allows them to evoke physical causal reasoning.
Together the three studies reported in this thesis provide evidence for the domain-
specific account of cognitive development. A disassociated understanding was
identified between intuitive psychology and physics among children on the autistic
spectrum. Furthermore, this thesis concludes that children on the autistic spectrum
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CHAPTER 1
CHILDREN'S COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES AND THE CHALLENGE OF AUTISM
1.1. Aims of this Thesis
This thesis will argue that children on the autistic spectrum provide an ideal paradigm
for the investigation of domain-general and domain-specific theoretical accounts of
cognitive development. In keeping with this position, the motivation of this thesis is
twofold. Firstly, it aims to examine the evidence used to argue that children on the
autistic spectrum lack an understanding of phenomena pertaining to the domain of
psychology. Secondly, this thesis will investigate the relative strength of this group in
reasoning about physical phenomena. By examining the evidence of dissociation in
cognitive functioning between the domains of psychology and physics, arguably
present in children on the autistic spectrum, an understanding of the structure of
cognitive development among typical and atypical children may be enhanced.
Within current theoretical accounts of cognitive development there is a dichotomy
between advocates of domain-general and domain-specific processes. Despite this, the
developmental picture regarding typical development is becoming clearer and recently,
the accumulating methods and theories have been applied to atypical populations. This
area of work has been described as 'developmental psychopathology' and the strength
of this paradigm is that both contributing fields can complement and enhance
knowledge of each other. Activity in this area has been particularly prolific with regard
to autism. In the latter sections of this chapter, the symptoms associated with a
diagnosis of autism will be described. Presently there are a number of different
cognitive accounts that lay claims to this condition and these will be discussed with
respect to domain-specific and domain-general reasoning. It will be argued that the
impairment among children with autism in understanding psychological phenomena
(to be discussed further in Chapter 2) coupled with an intact ability to reason about
physical phenomena (to be discussed in Chapter 3), may offer a fruitful avenue to




Over the past 20 years, a challenge to the widely held view that the human mind
develops according to domain-general principles has developed across many
disciplines including psychology, anthropology and linguistics (Hirschfeld & Gelman,
1994). The emerging view is that humans simply could not come to understand what
they do in a purely domain-neutral fashion. Within developmental psychology,
discontentment with general learning theories, as well as the impact of Fodor's 1983
book 'The Modularity of Mind', have led many researchers to approach cognitive
development as domain-specific. Whereas before, cognition was thought to bring to
bear general problem solving abilities spanning all areas of knowledge, newer
approaches suggest that cognition is innately specialised to deal with specific types of
information (Wellman & Gelman, 1992). As will become evident, domain-general
accounts propose that knowledge acquisition grows and advances simultaneously
across all subject areas as a result of changes in general cognitive architecture. In
contrast, advocates of domain-specificity argue that several foundational areas of
understanding develop independently from one another as a result of changes within
the knowledge area itself. It will be demonstrated that current theorists do not position
themselves at the extreme ends of this dichotomy; most include some domain-general
and domain-specific development in their theoretical accounts.
1.3. Development from a Domain-general Perspective
Predominant views of child development used to advocate that a few general learning
mechanisms accounted for children's understanding across all areas of cognition. This
position was founded largely on the work of Piaget (1932; 1952) who described the
child as progressing through various stages in their thinking. According to his 'general
stage' theory the child's developmental pathway corresponds to across the board
transformations in the structure of their cognition. He advocated that at any point in
time, the same underlying structures underpin thinking across all subject areas. For
example, a child in the 'pre-operational' stage of development would demonstrate
egocentricism in relation to all situations and all phenomena.
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) points out that adherence to domain-general processes is also
evident in the work of the behaviourist movement influential in the 1950s. They
proposed that an inherited physiological sensory system and a complex set of 'laws of
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association' were all that was needed to account for behaviour and learning (Miller,
1989; Skinner, 1985). As a result, proponents of this approach reduced the acquisition
and development of knowledge across all areas of understanding to these principles.
Even more recent theories of development, such as the information processing
approaches have characterised cognition as involving domain-general processes
(Gilhooly, 1995; Vera & Simon, 1994). According to this stance, development across all
areas of knowledge is a result of increased efficiency in computational processes such
as 'encoding', 'comparing', 'combining' and so forth. For example, Kail (1990) argues
that the child's information processing capacity increases as a result of hard-wired
maturational changes in the brain and it is this that accounts for increasing cognitive
ability, since the child can now hold in mind and think about more things at once.
Evidence from three main strands of research has begun to highlight the inadequacies
of domain-general theories. Firstly, a wealth of research reported that failure on
Piagetian tasks may not be the result of underlying cognition, but may reflect children's
attempts to make 'human sense' of the experimental situation (Donaldson, 1979). To
overcome these problems, new research paradigms were designed to reduce
'experimenter effects' and remove the necessity for verbal responses. As a result, many
key abilities have been demonstrated in children at much younger ages than previously
envisaged on the basis of Piaget's developmental stage model (see Brown, Metz &
Campione, 1996). Moreover, this work showed that knowledge develops differently
according to the particular area under scrutiny. For example, it has been shown that
contrary to Piaget's theory, concrete operations (such as conservation and transitivity)
do not appear at the same age across all knowledge areas (Chapman, 1988).
Secondly, there has been a shift in emphasis from investigating the forward progression
of children's abilities to employing new methodological tools such as 'habituation/dis-
habituation' and 'preferential looking/listening' in order to investigate earlier
competencies in very young infants. Results have shown that in contrast to Piaget's
claims, "infants are far more cognitively advanced than was previously dreamt of"
(Richardson, 1998; p2). For example, two-day-old infants appear to have an inherent
conception of what an object is (Kellman & Spelke, 1983) and can imitate basic actions
such as tongue protrusion (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983). This work has renewed
convictions about the genetic preparedness of the human infant. Additionally, it has
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been suggested that infants have specific constraints on learning that direct attention to
certain stimuli before others, thereby lending support to alternative theories of domain-
specificity in cognitive development (Gelman, 1990).
Finally, many studies have started to investigate the developmental pathways of
atypical populations. This area of research focuses on the mutually informative
relationship between studying typically developing children and atypically developing
children (Burack, Charman, Yirmiya & Zelazo, 2001). It has been shown that among
atypical children reasoning in different areas may develop in a somewhat independent
way, in that contrary to the position held by domain-general theories, their abilities in
one domain of knowledge do not always reflect abilities in another. For example,
Petersen and Siegal (1998) compared understanding of basic physics, biology and
psychology concepts in children with autism, children who were deaf and average pre¬
school children and found systematic differences between the groups on tasks
pertaining to the domain of psychology (this will be discussed further in Chapter 4).
Taken together, these three research trends have given weight to feelings of
discontentment with traditional domain-general theories of cognitive development.
1.4. Development from a Domain-specific Perspective
Theorists of domain-specificity argue that many cognitive abilities are specialised to
deal with specific content areas (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). Proponents of this
approach have likened the mind to a Swiss army knife, conceiving it as constituting a
bundle of functionally specialised neural circuits (i.e. domains), evolved to deal with
evolutionary adaptive problems (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Cosmides, 1997). It must be
noted that specific domains of knowledge are not formed arbitrarily. Instead, research
indicates that well organised content areas may develop in a biologically natural way.
The most recognised of these 'natural' domains is language and it was the
characteristics pertaining to this area that led the linguist Chomsky to develop the first
modern account of domain-specificity. Chomsky (1980; 1988) argued that the properties
of the language faculty are unique, reflect our individual biological endowment and
cannot be attributed to a general set of reasoning abilities. This is perhaps the most
widely known domain-specific argument and has been expanded by various
researchers looking for similarities in other 'natural' knowledge areas. For example,
4
Marr's computational theory of vision is based on domain-specificity (Marr, 1982) as is
Liberman's theory of auditory processing (Liberman & Mattingly, 1989).
The trend towards characterising child development as domain-specific has led to a
wealth of research into what children know and do not know about the world. Many
researchers have been influenced by the fact that our external world can be understood
with reference to psychological, physical and biological phenomena (among others,
Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Wellman & Inagaki, 1997a) and
have concentrated their efforts on investigating these three domains of knowledge in
young children. These areas are thought to encompass the major domains of
understanding in humans and are represented by intuitive understandings
encompassing phenomena such as persons and their mental life, plants and animals
and their characteristics, and physical objects and their movement (Inagaki & Hatano,
2002). A wealth of research documents that young children are very able to make firm
distinctions between and among these three areas of knowledge prior to formal
education (Carey, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Wellman & Inagaki, 1997b). Further,
it has been suggested that this knowledge may have some innate underpinnings. This
stance contrasts with earlier assumptions of child cognition: "Neither the Piagetian nor
the behaviourist theory grants the infant any innate structures or domain-specific
knowledge" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; p7).
It is a measure of how far we have progressed, that today, a substantial proportion of
contemporary developmentalists do not see cognitive development being general or
stage-like as Piaget and the rest of the field once thought (Flavell, 2000). However,
disagreement reigns over just how general or specific cognitive development processes
are. Many conclude that for cognition to operate effectively some general learning
mechanisms must be present (Richardson, 1998) and, as will be demonstrated, most
domain-specific accounts of child development grant the co-existence of domain-
general processes.
Indeed for it (i.e. cognition) not to have any general stage properties at all
would seem counterintuitive: an extreme 'unrelated mindlets' view does not
seem to me any more likely to be right than Piaget's 'grand stage' view.
Flavell, 2000; pl4
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Although the area of work to be focused on in this thesis seems extremely promising
there are still many key issues that remain to be resolved. For example, there is as yet
no agreed definition of what constitutes a 'domain'. Likewise, each individual theorist
has his/her own position regarding what is and what is not 'theoretical knowledge'
and often differ as to when they grant this property to children's understanding.
Moreover, only recently have questions been asked about atypically developing
children's understanding and whether this too is structured in terms of domains and
intuitive theories.
Despite these outstanding issues many researchers, stressing the importance of
developmental data, have tried to explore the child's initial conceptual state and how
this changes throughout childhood. Before the findings from these developmental
studies are introduced this chapter will first consider the various definitions and
characteristics applied to a 'domain' and a 'theory' by different theorists. An
understanding of these basic assumptions is pertinent to the discussion of domain-
specific accounts of cognitive development that will subsequently be presented in this
thesis.
1.4.1. What is a Domain?
In spite of the wealth of research in the field of domain-specific cognition there is no
agreement as to the exact conceptualisation of a domain: "It is easier to think of
examples of a domain than to give a definition of one" (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994;
p20). That being said, it has been argued that to credit young children with specific
domains of knowledge they must use the independent principles of the domain in
question to produce "coherent bodies of knowledge that involve causal explanatory
understanding" (Hatano & Inagaki, 1994; pl20). In order for this characterisation to be
workable, most proponents of domain-specificity suggest that a domain must
encompass mechanisms for singling out appropriate entities that belong to the domain
i.e. they appeal for the presence of constraints. Without constraints, domain-specific
reasoning could not proceed. For example, an advanced system of knowledge about
human behaviour is useless unless one can determine when he or she is faced with a
person in order to apply psychological reasoning in an appropriately constrained way
i.e. constraints are more than just an ontological device.
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It is not thought that constraints grant children with specific knowledge. Instead it is
suggested that they operate within a domain in such a way as to "restrict the range of
hypothesis space to be explored" in order to direct the child's attention to the particular
phenomena in question (Hatano, 1997; p75). The appeal towards constraints is by no
means straightforward. Keil (1981) points out that constraints could be considered as
being in the learner or outside the learner. Even if we focus on those in the learner,
there remains little agreement as to whether they are innate or acquired, probabilistic or
absolute, regarding processes or structures, domain-specific or domain-general.
However, Keil (1991) claims that the evidence supports the presence of domain-specific
innate constraints (environmentally insensitive knowledge structures) and he also
concludes that the presence of domain-specific acquired constraints (environmentally
sensitive knowledge structures) seems inevitable.
It has been argued that if autonomous domains of understanding are to be taken
seriously, a domain must encompass a set of phenomena, ontological commitments and
causal mechanisms that offer explanations and predictions about relevant phenomena
within the domain (Carey, 1985; 1995). These principles enable young children not only
to recognise phenomena as relating to a particular domain but also allows them to
induce a basic form of reasoning pertaining to it (Hatano, 1997).
Within developmental psychology five differing notions of a domain can be found. One
is of particular importance to this thesis in that it proposes that a domain can be
regarded in terms of "naive theories that carve phenomena into differing systems of
knowledge and belief" (Wellman & Gelman, 1992; p340). In keeping with this
definition, Wellman and Gelman (1992) argue for the presence of three domains,
namely psychology, physics and biology. They view a domain as constituting an
overarching framework theory that defines the domain in terms of content area and
allows the child to acquire relevant knowledge or as they describe 'specific theories'. In
a similar way, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) thinks of a domain as an 'umbrella' term for a
collection of corresponding micro-domains. She views a micro-domain as a 'set of
representations' that sustains a specific area of knowledge such as gravity within the
domain of physics.
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This thesis will not argue that any one definition of domain is correct and although
most theorists articulate their definition of a domain in very different ways, there are a
few recurring properties. For the purpose of this thesis it is suffice to support the
commonly-held view (see Carey, 1985; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Hirschfeld & Gelman,
1994) that a domain involves a set of causal explanatory mechanisms (e.g. principles or
theories), a set of phenomena to which mechanisms are applied (i.e. ontology) and
ontological commitments (i.e. rules of application of mechanisms). Moreover, it will be
accepted that domains incorporate specific constraints. These function in order to
promote the development of further understanding pertaining to the particular domain
in question.
1.4.2. Are Domains Theoretical?
The issue of theoretical knowledge is a recurring theme throughout this thesis and is
important because as well as being intrinsically constraining, many accounts of a
domain convey the idea that it comprises a body of theoretical knowledge. In fact,
domains are depicted as being responsible for organising children's knowledge into
structures that are similar in nature to 'scientific' theories. The anthropologist Atran
(1994) opposes this analogy and argues it is fundamentally misleading to describe
cognition using the same terms as scientific thought. However, in the cognitive
development literature, the term theory is often preceded by terms such as 'common-
sense', 'folk', 'naive', 'framework' and 'intuitive'. These definitions indicate the
presence of characteristics distinct from the ones assigned to a scientific theory. On the
one hand, 'intuitive' and 'scientific' theories have been described as "explanatory
structures that characterise causal mechanisms at work in the world" (Carey, 1996;
pl90). However on the other, scientific theories are deemed to be the result of
conscious, institutionalised activity, arising from structured scientific experiments.
These characteristics are not attributable to intuitive theories and, as many have
pointed out, these distinctions cannot be overlooked when dealing with this area of
research (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Keil, 1994).
Intuitive theories are by definition domain-specific: biological theories concerning
reproduction and genetics cannot be correctly applied to physical phenomena such as
gravity. In addition, they make ontological commitments: they specify the type of
phenomena that are included within the domain for example, a domain of biology
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appeals to species and DNA whereas the physics domain appeals to quarks and masses
(Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). Intuitive theories also provide a mode of explanation, for
example, a physical theory of gravity will explain why if you throw a ball into the air it
will fall to the ground. Further, underlying these characteristics of a theory is the
principle of 'coherence' in that it is impossible to consider a theoretical concept in
isolation because its definition is intertwined in a web of other concepts and terms. For
example, an understanding of 'a planet' cannot be considered in isolation of concepts
such as the solar system, comets and asteroids (see Wellman, 1990).
Theoretical knowledge is often discussed with respect to children's explicit and implicit
understanding. Implicit understanding is characterised as being simple, perceptually
grounded and shown via non-verbal behaviours. Explicit understanding is deemed
more flexible and open to conscious awareness and as a result is more coherent and can
be expressed verbally (see Keil, 1999). The distinction between these two types of
knowledge has, for some, provided a boundary whereby implicit understanding is not
seen as being theoretical (i.e. Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) however, others do not draw such
a distinction and argue that both types of understanding can be given theoretical status
(i.e. Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002).
The term theory has been used to describe a variety of conceptual understandings and,
as with domains, there is no universally agreed definition. Theoretical knowledge is
deemed to be embodied within a domain and in-keeping with this suggestion, this
thesis will adhere to the description of a theory as being a coherent, well-organised
system of explanatory beliefs that enable children to explain events and make
predictions (Murphy & Medin, 1985; Wellman, 1990). Throughout the remainder of this
chapter attempts will be made to identify and present each theorist's position with
regard to theoretical knowledge.
1.5. Domain-specific Accounts of Cognitive Development
The idea that children's understanding comprises of domains and theories is relatively
new. As already alluded to, these definitions are intrinsically linked to the premise that
cognition develops in a domain-specific fashion. It is important to note that domain-
specific accounts of cognitive development are not homogeneous. It will be shown in
the following section that they differ widely in the way in which they account for
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development. For example the modular perspective, which will be dealt with first,
views domain-specificity as implying that the child's cognitive architecture is pre¬
ordained before birth. Advocates of this position often concentrate on identifying
specificity in the characteristics of the cognitive architecture regardless of knowledge
area (e.g. Fodor, 1983; Leslie, 1994). Further, their 'nativist' perspective implies that
knowledge is not accumulated and revised to accommodate environmental stimuli. As
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) point out, modules are assumed to lead to predictions
because they are designed to do so.
Flowever, "considering development domain-specific does not necessarily imply
modularity" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; p6) and accordingly, others do not see cognitive
development as being so encapsulated. Although many acknowledge that initial
building blocks may be innate, there is a general consensus that understanding can be
changed and built upon by evidence (i.e. Carey, 1985; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997;
Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Keil, 1994). The work that will be examined subsequently in this
chapter is concerned with these various domain-specific perspectives.
Modular accounts of cognitive development suggest that representations of the world
enter the system in the form of symbols. These are analysed, stored, recalled etc. by
genetically specified hardwired computational processes called modules (Richardson,
1998). Fodor (1983) greatly influenced this theoretical position. He argued that the
architecture of the mind constituted a structured dichotomy between a domain-general
central processing capacity and, domain-specific procedures that are at work in a wide
variety of knowledge areas. Most of the interest in Fodor's theory was a result of his
speculation that the inputs for central processing originate from genetically specified,
independently functioning, special purpose modules. Fodor (1975) argues that these
distinct modules receive unique information from the environment and, in turn, output
data in a common representational format (the 'language of thought') that is suitable
for central (domain-general) processing. According to Fodor (1983) each unique module
is hardwired and encapsulated; thus information that is not specific to the module can
neither influence nor have access to the module's internal workings. This results in
modular processing being mandatory, fast and more importantly, insensitive to
previous experience.
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In keeping with the modular perspective, Leslie (1987; 1994) suggests that the child's
information processing system is organised into an innate specified set of two modules
that can crudely be described as governing the domains of 'physics' and 'psychology'.
He views these modules as an integrated cognitive structure that revolves around a
core notion of Agent i.e. animate object and Agency i.e. its enduring properties (Leslie
& Roth, 1993; Leslie, 1994). The first of Leslie's hierarchical modules is named the
'Theory of Body Mechanism' (ToBy) which is activated around three-to-four months of
age. ToBy distinguishes Agents from other physical bodies and accounts for the infant's
rapid acquisition of knowledge about the non-intentional mechanical properties of
objects and subsequent events i.e. intuitive physics. The second module is called the
'Theory of Mind Mechanism' (ToMM) and is concerned with the intentional properties
of Agents. Its purpose is to represent 'meaning' and provides the child with an intuitive
understanding of the mental states of Agents i.e. intuitive psychology. ToMM has two
sub-components, the first to emerge is ToMM system 1 that embodies knowledge about
Agents and the goal-directed action they produce. It has the function of identifying the
factors that play a role in what the Agent is acting (or trying to act) to bring about.
According to Leslie (1994), this module emerges in development at around six-eight
months. Succeeding this is ToMM system 2, this is concerned with the mental states of
agents and the behaviours they produce. Its role is to relate an Agent's behaviour to
their intentions by constructing a data structure named by Leslie and Roth (1993) as the
'M-representation' (or elsewhere as the meta-representation, see Leslie, 1994). ToMM
system 2 emerges around 18-to-24 months and is signalled with the emergence of
intentional communication such as declarative pointing (Leslie & Roth, 1993) and then
subsequently by the emergence of pretence in young children (Leslie, 1994).
Leslie (1994) does not speculate on the role of domain-general processes. He simply
remarks that in the pre-school period general problem solving abilities are minimal.
The main thrust of his work arises from his belief that the ToBy and ToMM comprise an
important part of the core cognitive architecture and account for development, rather
than being a product of its outcome. He argues that each module corresponds to a
separate independent subsystem that constitutes a specialised way of acquiring and
organising information. He postulates that once the module emerges in development
the information that it rapidly accumulates is the basis for all subsequent conceptual
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understanding. As a result, a theory of bodies (i.e. intuitive physics) and a theory of
mind (i.e. intuitive psychology) are acquired rapidly without much deliberation.
Modular accounts of development are very restrictive and, although many give
consideration to domain-general development, few allow for the process of
development within a module (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). For example, although Leslie
(1994) acknowledges that conceptual change does occur in children's representation of
the mind he attributes it to the activation of ToMM system 2. Likewise, there is no room
for development in Fodor's theory, he describes the internal workings of modules as
being genetically specified at birth and very inflexible. Further, he argues that these
structures do not change throughout development and, that superficial performance
problems are to blame for a young child's poor performance on some tasks in
comparison to an older child (Fodor, 1992). According to these modular accounts,
children's understanding develops as a result of non-conceptual changes in information
processing. This is not achieved through a process of reorganisation or change but is
simply an improvement of core cognitive capabilities that are present from birth.
Karmiloff-Smith (1992; 1999) acknowledges the strengths of modularity but takes a
much more developmental perspective. She dismisses the view of pre-prescribed
modules in favour of what she calls a process of 'modularization' that occurs as a
product of development. This view takes account of the plasticity of early brain
configuration and suggests that subsequent development allow brain circuits to be
selected for domain-specific computations. This view speculates that there are domain-
specific predispositions present from birth that channel and constrain the infant's
attention to relevant environment input (Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1993). As well as these
innate predispositions to attend to certain stimuli, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) proposes that
information is represented in the mind by one of four levels of representation. She
describes these as: 1) Implicit [I] i.e. unconscious analysing and responding to stimuli;
2) Explicit-1 [El] i.e. going beyond innate constraints but not conscious; 3) Explicit-2
[E2] i.e. conscious access without verbal report; and 4) Explicit-3 [E3] i.e. conscious
access with verbal report.
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) argues that knowledge changes as a result of the human infant
being equipped with an innate computational process that 're-describes' initial implicit
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representations making them progressively more explicit. She calls this process
'representational re-description' [RR]. Although the process itself is domain-general, it
is affected by the level of representation that is held by a domain at a particular point in
time, that is, the global process of RR follows the same standard format but it occurs
within domains (and micro-domains) at different points. This view of domain-general
processing contrasts with Fodor's (1983) position. Whereas he sees domain-general
processing as being concerned with an overall cognitive goal, Karmiloff-Smith views
the domain-general process as operating independently in different knowledge areas
thus adhering to the characteristics of domain-specificity. To be more precise, RR does
not invoke simultaneous changes in knowledge across (micro) domains but involves
only changes within (micro) domains. She asserts, "there is no such thing as a phase E2
child. The child's representations are in E2 format with respect to a given micro-
domain" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; p25).
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) argues that the process of RR continues to operate within
domains and micro-domains continually throughout development. This ongoing
process is theory-driven and gradually allows the child to construct theories about the
world. According to her RR model, young children's implicit representations cannot be
described as 'theoretical'. Instead she insists that it is not until understanding can be
demonstrated by the ability to combine successful inferences with verbal justifications
that children can be described as being 'theorists'. She arrives at this conclusion because
in her view to have a theory, knowledge must be encoded in a format that can be used
outside normal input/output relations and this only occurs once knowledge shifts from
being implicit to explicit i.e. from phase I to phase E2/3. The overriding assumption
behind her position is that the dynamic dichotomy between the child's innate pre¬
dispositions and the general process of RR allows the infant to progress
developmentally. She speculates that this is how the human conceptual system
becomes domain-specific.
In a similar vein to Karmiloff-Smith's innate predispositions, Keil (1994; 1995) suggests
that the young infant has innate constraints that yield initial beliefs i.e. they get the
infant started. Keil (1994) calls these innate skeletal constraints 'modes of construal' and
suggests that they account for subsequent learning in the 'most belief-laden' aspects of
cognition, i.e. the fundamental aspects of the world shared by all learners. Keil suggests
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that prior to the development of fully-fledged theories, children's modes of construal
produce general expectations and biases concerning the causal powers of properties.
For example, he demonstrates that when young children are asked about previously
unencountered phenomena, such as natural kinds, they hold biases for some causal
mechanisms of explanation over others. Keil argues that these biases emerge from the
way in which children's cognition is structured and although not initially theoretical, he
does argue that they lead to the construction of theoretical knowledge and in 1991 he
specifically describes these as 'theoretical biases'.
Like Karmiloff-Smith's process of RR, Keil (1994) proposes that modes of construal are
not exclusively tailored to specific domains. Instead he suggests that they give rise to
different sorts of explanation with regard to various sets of phenomena. As a result they
create an early ontology and channel theory construction. For example, a 'teleological'
mode of construal lets us decide (very quickly) if a novel entity is a living thing, an
artefact, a non-living natural kind or a psychological entity. Subsequently all other
properties are invoked in light of the initial decision, i.e. domain-specific theories are
employed (Keil & Silberstein, 1998). For Keil (1995) modes of construal promote theory
construction and consequently categorise input so that domain-specific operations can
be carried out.
In Keil's (1995) view the young child is endowed with six or so causal explanatory
biases (i.e. modes of construal) that emerge early in life and constrain conceptual
growth across all areas of cognition. According to Keil, where the younger child and the
older child differ is in their ability to use these biases but the basic modes of construal
are present, and continue to constrain knowledge in the same way, across all ages. In
this respect Keil's thesis is similar to the modular accounts dealt with earlier. He
suggests that development is a product of enrichment that is, learning how to access
and apply biases and constraints in different contexts rather than requiring any
fundamental changes in their form and nature.
Whereas Keil (1995) argues that an innate set of structures constrain the way in which a
child interacts with the world and this eventually leads to domain-specific areas of
knowledge, others are in support of there being a more concentrated collection of
constraints that operate, from the beginning, in a domain-specific manner. As already
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mentioned, Wellman and Gelman (1988; 1992) assert that young children have three
initial 'framework' theories pertaining to psychology, biology and physics respectively.
They postulate that young children appeal to such a structure before showing detailed
understanding of a particular topic or, as they suggest, a 'specific theory' (Wellman &
Gelman, 1992). According to this position very early knowledge is 'theory-like' and,
although this understanding is initially fragile, it becomes strengthened and
consolidated within each domain as children become more consistent in their
understanding. They assert that conceptual development, even in its initial stage,
comprises the task of theory construction.
Another proponent of this position is Carey (1991; 1995). She argues for the existence of
an innate domain-specific system of knowledge governing, from birth, the domains of
physics, number and psychology. In 1995 she referred to these systems as 'framework
theories' (taken from Wellman & Gelman, 1992) and suggests that they guide children's
reasoning about world phenomena and can also be the basis for new framework
theories to develop. According to Carey (1990; 1995) a framework theory (or as she
sometimes calls it an 'intuitive theory') is a cognitive structure that guides perception
and reasoning within a particular domain of knowledge. She conceptualises it as
constituting a single independent knowledge system that is organised around a body of
core (innate) principles, principles that constrain the way in which a child interacts with
their environment. More specifically it is these principles that are responsible for
defining the entities that are covered by a domain, as well as allowing reasoning about
such entities to take place. Carey (1996) argues that innate framework theories form the
basis for future cognitive development. They place the infant on the correct path
towards appropriate knowledge acquisition but are soon overridden as the child
interacts with his/her environment and becomes involved in the process of conceptual
change. Conceptual change involves overriding core principles within a domain with
new principles that are 'incommesurable' with the old. In turn these become the
foundations for new framework and specific theories. Carey views the development of
knowledge as sometimes involving a radical overhaul of the initial conceptions within a
domain and accordingly, she argues that the theories held by older children and adults
in our culture differ qualitatively.
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Gopnik and colleagues (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994) also posit
that initial conceptual structures can undergo radical restructuring during the course of
development. Their theoretical account of cognitive development asserts very forcefully
that children's knowledge is theory-driven from the start. On the basis of this premise
they have named their account 'theory theory'.
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) account for conceptual development by suggesting that at
birth the child is equipped with a modular peripheral system and an innate collection
of 'starting-state' theories. In 1997 they discuss three theories; a theory of appearances
(i.e. physics), a theory of action (i.e. psychology) and a theory of kinds (i.e. object
categories). Gopnik and Meltzoff see the make-up of a theory as including general
constraints regarding an underlying causal structure of the world. However, unlike
Keil's view of constraints, the constraints in this system are not static. This position
asserts that new theories override old ones and thus constraints change; "as we learn
more, we also learn new ways to learn" (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; p44).
In addition to starting state theories, 'theory theory' lays claims to an innate (domain-
general) theory making mechanism that revises initial theories on the basis of new
evidence i.e. it is the mechanism for theory change (Gopnik, Capps & Meltzoff, 2000).
According to this perspective, the domain-general theory change process yields a
collection of facts that posses many regularities, however, this type of information is
according to the authors, not theoretical and is instead referred to as 'empirical
generalisations'. Empirical generalisations produce limited and shallow explanations
i.e. piecemeal and context specific knowledge. It must be noted that Gopnik and
Meltzoff (1997) state that cognitive development is best explained in terms of theory
formation and not specifically in terms of this domain-general mechanism.
It is suggested that theory formation starts as a result of the accumulation of evidence
that cannot be explained by the child's present theory (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997;
Gopnik et ah, 2000). At first children try to ignore counter evidence however, they
eventually are forced into developing 'ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses' which are used
until a new theory fully develops. Once the new theory is put into place, it is used in
what Gopnik and Meltzoff call an "intense period of experimentation and/or
observation" (1997; p40) and eventually the process of theory formation will start again.
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Theory formation is a continual process and implies that the things that children know
(or think they know) are always open to further revision (Gopnik, 2000). This process
continues until the theory a child holds at a particular time can explain and predict a
wide range of phenomena (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik et al., 2000). As a result
"children are never in a dry dock; they never get a chance to construct their theories
from scratch" (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; p68).
According to theory theory, theory change starts almost immediately after birth and
continues throughout the initial period of a child's life. Additionally, it is argued that
cognitive and semantic development within a domain are intrinsically linked. They
conclude that in contrast to a strict modular theory "what seems more plausible is that
evolution selected for a cognitive capacity to revise concepts on the basis of evidence,
that is, a theory making ability" (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; p284). Theories are
considered to function in order to predict, interpret and explain a variety of evidence.
Thus 'theory theory' grants young infants with very well equipped innate structures
designed to promote conceptual development. Recently Gopnik (2001) has suggested
that causal reasoning is the primary driving force for theory change and she attributes
this to human evolutionary forces.
The preceding discussion illustrates that many researchers have considered children's
knowledge acquisition as involving domain-specific rather than purely domain-general
processes (e.g. Fodor, 1983; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Keil, 1999). The theoretical accounts
presented differ in terms of how they characterise theoretical knowledge and as well as
how they assign domain-general processes to children's cognitive development.
Nevertheless, they do support the claims that typically, children have innate principles,
often evident implicitly during infancy, as well as explicit intuitive understandings
(often described as theories) that constitute various domains of knowledge (Carey,
2001; Wellman & Inagaki, 1997a).
1.6. Developmental Psychopathology
A number of domain-specific accounts regarding children's cognitive development
have been introduced. As already mentioned, this domain-specific research perspective
has in some cases been extended to include atypical development. Flowever, with
respect to the work presented so far in this thesis, only the theoretical accounts of Leslie
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(Leslie & Thaiss, 1992), Karmiloff-Smith (1992) and Gopnik et al. (Gopnik & Meltzoff,
1997; Gopnik et al., 2000) have been examined empirically in relation to the
development of atypical development. These three positions differ widely in their
capacity to encompass atypical developmental profiles and as a result make specific
predictions about the ways in which anomalies may arise. In Chapters 2 and 3 the
position of these three accounts of cognitive development will be given in relation to
the development of understanding in the domains of intuitive psychology and physics
in typically developing children and children on the autistic spectrum. The approach of
studying both typical and atypical populations is often described as 'developmental
psychopathology'. This paradigm is based on the assumption that "we can understand
more about the normal functioning of an organism by studying its pathology, and,
likewise more about its pathology by studying its normal condition" (Cicchetti, 1984;
pi).
Within the field of developmental psychopathology, children with conditions such as
autism, Down syndrome, Williams syndrome and Fragile-X have been studied
alongside typically developing children. Findings have started to reveal stark
comparisons in the continuity and discontinuity of development. In particular, the dual
existence of strengths and weaknesses in knowledge areas in differing populations has
been identified and linked to the manifestations of cognition. In fact, current theoretical
perspectives of cognitive development are often judged on their ability to encompass
evidence gathered from individuals with autism (Burack, et al., 2001). The symptoms of
autism have proved a challenge to many mainstream accounts of cognitive
development since they arguably demonstrate an impairment among children with
autism in understanding psychological phenomena (see Chapter 2) coupled with a
potentially intact ability to reason in other areas such as physics (to be discussed in
Chapter 3). As this thesis will illustrate, this uneven developmental profile has been
extensively related to domain-general and domain-specific theories of cognitive
development (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Wellman & Gelman, 1992).
1.7. Autistic Spectrum Disorders
The following section will focus on developmental patterns in children with autistic
spectrum disorders. It briefly describes the demographics, symptoms and cognitive
theories associated with the condition in order to argue that investigation into the
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cognitive abilities of individuals with autism may potentially provide valuable insights
into the strengths and weaknesses of current theories of cognitive development.
1.7.1. Diagnosis and Demographics
Autism is an early emerging developmental syndrome with symptoms usually present
before the age of three years (World Health Organisation [WHO], 1993). It manifests
itself in a 'triad of impairments' in social interaction, communication and imagination
(Wing & Gould, 1978), typically accompanied by a narrow and repetitive range of
behaviours. Autism is a spectrum disorder that includes the syndromes originally
described by Kanner (1943) and Asperger (1944, cited in Frith 1991), but is much wider
than these two sub-groups. Clinicians and researchers in the field adhere to two
internationally accepted diagnostic systems that incorporate the triad of impairments
associated with autism as well as other common behaviours linked to the condition.
These are the World Health Organisation's International Classification of Diseases now
in its tenth edition [ICD-10] (WHO, 1993) and the American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual now in its 4th edition [DSM-IV] (American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994). However, autism is a very heterogeneous
condition and diagnosis can be particularly difficult (Medical Research Council [MRC],
2001). Symptoms are presented in a wide variety of combinations, from mild to severe.
A diagnosis on the severe end of the spectrum, often labelled 'low-functioning' autism,
may take the form of highly unusual and aggressive behaviour accompanied by little or
even no communicative speech. In its milder form individuals with autism are labelled
'high-functioning' and exhibit intellectual abilities in the normal range (i.e. IQ between
85-115) with only slight delays in language acquisition.
Individuals at the high end of the autistic spectrum are often described as having
Asperger syndrome. It must be noted that although Asperger syndrome is classified as
an autistic spectrum disorder it is often represented as a distinct sub-group with its
own clinical profile (Gillberg, 1996). Asperger syndrome is recognised in current
diagnostic criteria as similar to autism in terms of marked impairments in social
communication but without any accompanying language or cognitive delay (APA,
1994; WHO, 1993). Despite this apparent separation from the autistic spectrum it must
be accepted that no precise cut off points between autism and Asperger syndrome can
be defined (Wing, 1981; 2000). There is considerable debate (e.g. Schopler, Mesibov &
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Kunce, 1998) regarding whether Asperger syndrome reflects an altogether different
condition to autism (as argued by Klin, Volkmar, Sparow, Ciccetti & Rourke, 1995) or
whether it is simply a more mild variant of the same disorder (see Szatmari, Tuff,
Finlayson, & Bartlucci, 1990; Wing, 1998). In fact even advocates who claim that the
conditions are distinct such as Klin et al. (1995) concede that differences between
Asperger syndrome and high-functioning autism (in for example verbal and
performance IQs) may not be the manifestation of two different conditions. They
acknowledge that Asperger syndrome and high-functioning autism may be one
diagnostic condition that is simply expressed differently, due in part to
neuropsychological endowment, as with the commonalities between low and high-
functioning autism.
It has recently been stated that the reasonable approach to this issue would be to accept
that "although there may be sub-groups that are specific and separate at some level of
discourse, at present these have not been identified" (Wing, 2000; p424). Due to this
ongoing debate and the uncertainties of the diagnostic tools used to identify Asperger
syndrome (Mayes, Calhoun & Crites, 2001) most researchers currently conceptualise
Asperger syndrome as akin to high-functioning autism (e.g. Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill & Lawson, 2001). As a result the current thesis views a
diagnosis of Asperger syndrome as being a variant on the autistic spectrum that is
similar in nature to high-functioning autism. Consequently this thesis will refer to high-
functioning autism as synonymous with Asperger syndrome. The value of studying
high-functioning individuals in whom autism is not confounded with mental
retardation has also been argued convincingly (see Prior, 1979) and this approach has
therefore been adopted in the studies reported in this thesis.
According to recent reviews autistic spectrum disorders affect approximately six in
every 1000 children under eight years (MRC, 2001). Autistic spectrum disorders are
four times more prevalent in boys than girls (Rutter, 1985) and, although females are
less likely to develop them, when they do they are generally more severely impaired
(Lord & Schopler, 1987; Wing, 1981). Current research states that autistic spectrum
disorders have a variety of causes that appear to affect sites in the brain concerned with
social and communicative development (MRC, 2001). Indeed, although an exact
location has not been pinpointed many studies have reported that the brains of
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individuals with autism do manifest abnormalities (Trevarthen, Aitken, Papoudi &
Robarts, 1996). In many cases of autistic spectrum disorders there is strong evidence to
suggest that interacting genetic influences are at play (Bailey, Palferman, Heavey, & Le
Couteur, 1998; Bailey, Phillips & Rutter, 1996; Bolton, MacDonald, Pickles & Rios, 1994).
The genetic basis of autism is believed by researchers to be highly complex, probably
involving several genes in combination (Howlin, 1998; Tsai, 1999). Epidemiological
studies have demonstrated that the probability of both twins having autism is higher if
they are monozygotic (Bailey et al., 1995; Folstein & Rutter, 1977a). Likewise, the rate of
autism in siblings is between 3 and 7%, higher than the rate shown in the rest of the
population (Jorde et al., 1991; Piven et al., 1990). The evidence of a genetic basis is
further reflected in the term 'broader phenotype' that has been introduced to convey
the observation that, within families of children with autism, other relatives are more
likely to exhibit symptoms generally associated with the condition (Baron-Cohen,
Tager-Flusberg & Cohen, 2000; Folstein & Rutter, 1977a; 1977b). Weight is also added to
the genetic argument by the evidence that autism often co-occurs with other conditions
which are genetically determined such as Down syndrome, fragile X, phenylketonuria
and tuberous sclerosis (Blomquist et al., 1985; Gillberg & Forsell, 1984; Hunt & Dennis,
1987). For the purpose of this thesis, it was important that only children with a clinical
diagnosis of autism and no co-morbidity with other conditions were included.
1.7.2. Symptoms
Autistic spectrum disorders are defined by early emerging, qualitative impairments in
communication, social interaction and imagination and the presence of a narrow and
repetitive range of actions. As will be shown in Chapter 2, these symptoms are often
presented as impairments in intuitive psychology. A brief description of the symptoms
will now be presented. However, since autism is a spectrum disorder it is unlikely that
a child with this condition would exhibit all of these behaviours.
With regard to non-verbal communication, typically developing infants, prior to the
onset of language, are capable of communicating with others through the use of gaze,
facial expressions and sounds (see Trevarthen et al., 1996). However, in children on the
autistic spectrum these means of communicating are, if not absent, often limited
(Mundy & Sigman, 1989). For example, they have problems with most types of
imitation, from the basic imitation of smiles, present in typically developing children as
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young as two months, to more advanced imitation such as games like pat-a-cake and
simple gestures, usually present by 12 months (Sigman & Ungerer, 1984; Volkmar,
1985). Other forms of early communicative behaviour such as eye-to-eye gaze is also
absent or at least atypical (Siegel, 1996a).
Language development in children on the autistic spectrum is slow and around half of
the population fail to develop functional speech, with many having little (or no)
understanding of spoken language (Lord & Rutter, 1994). Atypical use of language is
noticeable early, and infants with autism exhibit a limited range and lower complexity
of babbling compared to typically developing children and do not use these sounds as a
means to communicate with others (Howlin, 1998). Children on the autistic spectrum
do not attempt to compensate for their lack of speech by communicating in other ways.
For example, the gestures, facial expressions, head nods, smiles and 'uh-huhs' used to
support communication in typically developing children are usually absent (Ricks &
Wing, 1975).
Not all individuals diagnosed with an autistic spectrum disorder have severe language
impairments and some, usually those diagnosed as high-functioning, can use language
effectively. Flowever these children do not use language in its conventional form and
tend to exhibit atypical patterns of speech. For example, they often use unusual
metaphors and may speak in a formalised manner often referring to themselves as
'you' (i.e. 'you want a biscuit' meaning 'I want a biscuit'), they may also exhibit sparse
verbal expressions and overall, show a lack of spontaneity when speaking (Prior, 1977).
A prominent characteristic in the language used by children with autism is 'echolalia',
speech that consists of the repetition of something heard either at the time or earlier i.e.
delayed echolalia (Siegal, 1996a).
Children with autistic spectrum disorders lack many fundamental social skills that are
present in typically developing children at a young age. For example, they display a
diminished range of emotional expressions and cannot identify emotional states in
others (i.e. no recognition of affect). In addition, the ability to decipher emotions and
discriminate between them is not present in infants with autism and even older
children on the autistic spectrum find this difficult (Hobson, 1983; 1986; Smalley &
Asarnow, 1990). Furthermore, children with autism exhibit an attachment behaviour
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that has been described as 'actively avoident'. They do not cling to a primary caregiver
in new and strange situations (Siegal, 1996a) and have been found to be just as content
in the company of a stranger as they are with a primary caregiver (Volkmar, 1985).
Children on the autistic spectrum tend to keep their distance form other people and
even prefer to sit with a parent side by side when playing (Siegal, 1996a). They are less
responsive to social cues conveyed by eye contact and smiles and tend to cut
themselves off from emotional and communicative transactions with those around
them (Hobson, 1983; 1987; Tinbergen & Tinbergen, 1983). These characteristics lead to a
lack of co-operative play with peers, an impaired ability to develop friendships, and an
inability to understand other people's feelings. Indeed it is not surprising that children
on the autistic spectrum are often described as being in a 'world of their own'. When
individuals with autism do engage in social interactions, the interactions often occur
less frequently and will often be very rigid even when the situation changes (Siegal,
1996a).
In contrast to their peers, children with autistic spectrum disorders lack spontaneous
and imaginative play (Wulff, 1985). When they do play with toys, it is noticeable that
no thoughts and feelings are introduced to the situation and, in more cases than not,
play is often limited to 'non-functional' behaviour such as lining up objects i.e. not
using the objects for their intended purpose (Black, Freeman & Montgomery, 1975).
Many children with autism show an unusual preference for one particular object that
may be stimulating for them and they do not appear to get easily bored with it. In
addition, they are often pre-occupied with one part of an object, being unable or
unwilling to see the object as a whole (Siegal, 1996a).
The repetitive behaviours seen in children with autism may take the form of repeated
body movements, such as hand flapping, twisting, spinning, balancing and rocking. In
addition, they often display repetition in many aspects of their life such as following the
same route, the same order of dressing or the same daily schedule. Many show an
obsessive interest in a single item, idea, activity or person and if changes occur in these
routines, the preoccupied child can become very distressed.
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Many theorists have attempted to link the behaviours associated with a diagnosis of
autism to cognitive theories of development. In the remaining section of this chapter
three cognitive accounts of autism will be presented. At present, these theories can be
divided into those that posit a primary social impairment i.e. the theory of mind
hypothesis, and those that attribute a primary non-social impairment i.e. executive
functioning and central coherence hypotheses (see Zelazo, Burack, Boseovski, Jacques
& Frye, 2001).
1.8. Cognitive Accounts of Autism
The 'social' deficit account, namely the theory of mind hypothesis, is intrinsically
domain-specific and argues that a deficit in 'theory of mind' makes it hard for children
on the autistic spectrum to engage with psychological phenomena. Implicit in this
account is that other areas of cognition will be relatively unaffected (Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Leslie & Roth, 1993). In contrast, the executive functioning and central coherence
accounts of autism can be considered as domain-general theories of autism. Both claim
overarching 'non-social' general cognitive processes are responsible for the behavioural
profile of children on the autistic spectrum, which will inevitably affect learning across
all domains of knowledge (Frith, Flappe & Siddons, 1994; Ozonoff, Rogers &
Pennington, 1991).
The theory of mind hypothesis concerns the domain of intuitive psychology (to be
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2) and refers to the ability to attribute mental states
(e.g. beliefs, desires) in order to predict and explain behaviours. Research suggests that
typical children develop a theory of mind in a basic form in the second year of life and
fully by the age of four years (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). However, this core cognitive
mechanism is impaired (or even absent) in individuals with autism (for a review see
Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). As will be discussed in Chapter 2, children on the autistic
spectrum cannot form a mental image of what goes on in the minds of others. Although
a minority of individuals with autism have been found to pass simple theory of mind
tasks they do, more often than not, fail more complex tasks (Baron-Cohen, 1989a). This
deficit is arguably present in all individuals with autism. Moreover, as autism appears
to be a neurological disorder with a genetic basis many people have suggested that
theory of mind understanding develops from an innate and dedicated neurological site
(Zelazo et al., 2001). However, the theory of mind hypothesis has difficulty in
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explaining some non-social aspects of autism such as the failure to generalise skills and
most notably, the presence of repetitive and stereotypical actions (Zelazo et al., 2001).
These behaviours have been described by more domain-general accounts of cognitive
development that link the development of general cognitive skills with the acquisition
of specific knowledge. The executive functioning hypothesis is one such example.
Executive functioning is a term given to a collection of domain-general skills that are
necessary to control behaviour. These include abilities such as planning future action,
impulse control, inhibition of pre-potent but irrelevant responses and flexibility of
thought or action (Ozonoff et al., 1991). In short, executive functions are needed to
maintain a mentally specified goal and bring it to fruition against other alternatives
(Perner & Lang, 2000). Findings from empirical studies have shown that many children
with autism, even high-functioning individuals, perform badly on tasks of executive
functioning such as the Tower of Hanoi and the Winconsin Card Sorting Task (Hughes,
Russell & Robbins, 1994; Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988; 1990). This deficit in self control
of action is said to account for the repetitive and rigid behaviours witnessed in many
individuals with autism as well as their problems with participating in pretend play
(Jarrold, Butler, Cottington & Jimenez, 2000).
The necessity for executive functioning abilities in meta-representational tasks has been
argued for extensively (see Perner, Stummer & Lang, 1999) and it has been suggested
that the inability to inhibit a pre-potent response to salient external stimuli (due to
executive dysfunction) can account for failure on tasks of theory of mind (Perner &
Lang, 2000; Robinson & Mitchell, 1995; Russell, Saltmarsh & Hill, 1999). In fact,
performance in executive functioning has been shown to correlate positively with
performance on several theory of mind tasks (Hughes, 1996; Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997;
Russell, Mautherner, Sharpe & Tidswell, 1991).
There are problems with the executive functioning account of autism and it has recently
been suggested that executive functioning deficits are common but not a necessary
feature of autism (MRC, 2001). In addition, there is evidence of executive functioning
difficulties not accompanied by social abnormalities in a wide array of developmental
disorders including Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Williams syndrome.
Likewise, individuals with Tourette's syndrome experience executive functioning
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problems without any accompanying impairment in intuitive psychology (Baron-
Cohen & Swettenham, 1997). These findings appear to argue against a causal link from
executive functioning to theory of mind skills.
An alternative domain-general explanation concerns 'central coherence'. Central
coherence is described as an ability that functions to draw together diverse information
in order to construct higher level meaning in context. For example, central coherence
capacities allow us to recognise, with ease, the contextually appropriate sense of the
many ambiguous words in everyday speech i.e. son/sun (Happe, 1994a). The drive for
coherence is an organising principle in normal human cognition and appears 'weak' in
individuals with autism (Frith & Happe, 1994).
Weak central coherence results in a particular cognitive style that has been assigned to
all individuals on the autistic spectrum (Frith, Happe & Siddons, 1994) and, as a result,
it is argued that they are free from contextual constraints. This feature (or lack of it)
may help to explain why children with autism show an advantage on tasks that involve
preferential processing of parts over wholes such as the block design sub-test of the
Weschler Intelligence Scale for Children (Shah & Frith, 1983). However, weak central
coherence would also manifest itself in poor performance on tasks that involve
interpretation of individual stimuli in terms of overall context and meaning, just the
type of ability that is needed in many social situations. As a result, deficits in theory of
mind are seen by some as one consequence of weak central coherence, i.e. inability to
derive high-level meaning from social situations (Frith, 1989). In support of this
argument a negative correlation has been found between theory of mind abilities and
performance on an embedded figures task which taps abilities of central coherence
(Jarrold et al., 2000).
It must be noted that a causal link between autism and central coherence has been
dismissed by the finding that weak central coherence is evident in individuals who pass
theory of mind tasks (Happe, 1994a). In addition, there is evidence that children with
general developmental delay (Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked & Solomonica-Levi, 1998) and
children who are deaf from non-signing families (Petersen & Siegal, 1997; 1998) also fail
tasks of theory of mind and yet have no anomalies in central coherence (see Happe,
2001).
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It has been suggested that one single cognitive abnormality is unlikely to give a full
account of autism. Domain-general accounts (i.e. executive functioning and central
coherence) face the challenge of accounting for some very specific social impairments
and it is hard to see how they could account for the accumulating pattern of deficits on
their own (Happe, 2001). Furthermore, their links to theory of mind deficits make it
hard to disentangle the original cause. Likewise, it has also been argued that the
domain-specific account of autism (i.e. theory of mind) cannot successfully explain the
presence of non-social features such as repetitive behaviours (Happe, 2001). In order to
disentangle these issues further attempts need to be made to incorporate findings and
paradigms from the domain-specific theories discussed previously. For example, if the
difficulty in understanding mental states in children with autism stems from a domain-
specific cognitive architecture, this implies that other domains of thought will not be
impaired. This hypothesis would not be supported by domain-general accounts such as
executive functioning or central coherence.
1.9. Outline of this Thesis
This chapter has shown that many prevalent theoretical accounts of cognitive
development take a domain-specific perspective. The position of developmental
psychopathology has also been highlighted. This approach attempts to integrate
research findings on typical and atypical development and, in-keeping with this
paradigm, the symptoms of autism were described. Autism has been associated with
domain-general and domain-specific theoretical accounts of development. The latter
predicts an uneven cognitive skills profile and for this reason, focus must be turned to
not only the weaknesses but also the strengths of children on the autistic spectrum. If
asynchronous patterns of development were found then this would provide support
for the domain-specific nature of cognition.
Despite many attempts to characterise the mechanisms that are involved in the
development of children's knowledge, present day developmentalists are still often
unable to proceed with confidence. Flavell (1984; pi 89) asserts that this is because
"good theorising about mechanisms is very, very hard to do". As a result, domain-
specific accounts of cognition often emphasise the importance of investigating the
content of children's knowledge, specifically in relation to psychological, physical and
biological phenomena. Wellman and Inagaki (1997b; pi) very eloquently describe this
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knowledge as "both the products and the containers of childhood cognition and
development".
This domain-specific focus on the content of children's knowledge has highlighted that
children on the autistic spectrum demonstrate an uneven cognitive profile whereby
impairments in the domain of psychology are present alongside an apparent ability to
reason about physical phenomena (see Baron-Cohen, 2000a). However, the evidence is
far stronger for claims made with regard to weaknesses in psychological understanding
than it is for relative strengths in physical understanding. As a result there is a real
need to examine whether children on the autistic spectrum can indeed reason about
physical phenomena and if they can, attempts must be made to assess this ability in
relation the developmental pattern found in typically developing children.
In an attempt to shed light on this matter, the following introductory chapters,
Chapters 2 and 3, will focus on the question of what actually develops in relation to
children's understanding of psychological and physical phenomena. They will review
the research with respect to both typically developing children and children on the
autistic spectrum from infancy to upper primary school age. On the basis of this
literature review the two empirical studies reported thereafter (Chapters 4 and 5) will
explore the discontinuity in the development of psychology and physics in children on
the autistic spectrum. Following this, the final study in this thesis (Chapter 6) will
examine in more detail the nature of physical understanding in both children on the
autistic spectrum and typically developing children by looking at the predictions and
explanations they offer in order to reason about four physical concepts. A general
discussion of the findings of all three studies will be presented in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2
INTUITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: UNDERSTANDING IN TYPICALLY
DEVELOPING CHILDREN AND CHILDREN ON THE AUTISTIC
SPECTRUM
2.1. Aims of this Chapter
Chapter 1 outlined key characteristics relating to domain-specific theoretical accounts
of cognitive development. Central to these accounts is the claim that children's
understanding develops independently across knowledge domains. Most researchers in
this field have identified the existence of domain-specific knowledge pertaining to
psychological phenomena (e.g. Carey, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Wellman,
Hickling & Schultz, 1997; 2000) and as a result, many consider a domain of psychology
as being a fundamental part of cognition (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Leslie, 1994). This
chapter will argue that the initial acquisition of psychological knowledge is a result of
innate mechanisms. As will be shown, the main thrust of this argument comes from
experimental work with young infants. Findings identifying a number of 'building
blocks' pertaining to the domain of psychology will be presented. It will be argued that
these support the subsequent development of core psychological concepts. This chapter
will also consider the understanding of intuitive psychology in children on the autistic
spectrum. Attempts will be made to examine the research findings used to demonstrate
the lack of psychological understanding evident in this group.
2.2. Introduction
Research on psychological concepts is far from a new area of investigation. As early as
1932 Piaget looked at children's understanding of belief, intention and lies. As a result
of this work, he concluded that children under the age of seven do not distinguish
between mental and physical realms, preferring to rely exclusively on the physical
world as a means of construing psychological phenomena (Piaget, 1932). Over the years
psychological understanding in young children has become a 'hot' area of research.
Although this new wave of interest has undermined much of Piaget's work, Karmiloff-
Smith (1992; pi 17) points out that "in every case, most of the fundamental issues
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involved were first raised by Piaget, even though his theoretical answers are, for many,
no longer viable".
Today, most of the research in the domain of psychology is concerned with three
assumptions regarding the mind (Lee & Homer, 1999). The first assumption revolves
around the notion of representation, i.e. events occur, the mind can represent these and
different minds can often hold different representations. The second assumption is
concerned with knowing that the mind has other core functions that allow us to explain
and make predictions about other people's actions. These concepts fall under the
domain of 'psychology' and include believing, perceiving, intending and desiring. The
final assumption concerns the causal nature of the mind. This allows us to know that
there are causal relations between mental activities such as seeing leads to knowing,
and between mental activities and behaviours, for example, that false beliefs lead to
misguided actions. The explanatory system encapsulating these three assumptions has
been referred to as naive psychology (Wellman & Gelman, 1992), theory of mind
(Dennett, 1971; Clark, 1987), folk psychology (Stitch & Nichols, 1995), common-sense
psychology (Forguson & Gopnik, 1988), mind-reading (Baron-Cohen, 1995) and
intuitive psychology (Humphrey, 1986). Within the literature, the term 'theory of mind'
is probably the most commonly used description. However, as we will see, this term is
now intricately linked to children's understanding of belief. Belief is only one aspect of
children's psychological knowledge and as such, this thesis will employ the term
'intuitive psychology' to represent the broader basis of an understanding of the mind.
Contrary to Piaget's views, researchers now accept that children as young as three
years can reason comprehensively about psychological phenomena (among others,
Carey, 1985; Estes, Wellman & Wooley, 1990; Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000). This work
has led Karmiloff-Smith (1992) to describe young children as 'spontaneous
psychologists' who are driven to understand basic psychological concepts very early in
life. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) argues that domains function in
order to constrain interaction with one's environment. In the case of psychology, she
believes that constraints guide the infant's recognition of others, allowing them to
identify common behaviours and engage socially. Without an understanding of
intuitive psychology, it would be impossible to predict others behaviour, understand
their beliefs, intentions and desires, interpret statements, gestures or actions, or
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interpret facial expressions (Olson, Astington & Harris, 1988; Stich, 1983). As will be
shown in the following section, a wealth of research supports the premise that an
understanding of the mind is evident from a very early age and possibly arises as a
result of innate underpinnings. According to Fodor (1987; pl32) it is not entirely
surprising that this is the case, he asserts that "if I had been faced with this problem in
designing Homo sapiens. I would have made common-sense psychology innate; that
way nobody would have to spend time learning it!"
2.3. Basic Building Blocks of Intuitive Psychology
Even in the first few days of life human infants specifically orientate themselves
towards social stimuli. This finding is clearly demonstrated in an ingenious experiment
by Johnston and Morton (1991) who presented newly born infants (some no more than
nine-minutes-old) with four boards; three constituting different configurations of the
face and one with a chequered pattern. Results showed that infants preferentially
attend to stimuli displaying the normal configuration of the face. It was concluded that
infants possess innately specified structural information about human faces that leads
to their preferential attention towards them (Johnston & Morton, 1991). At three months
infants can differentiate between a smiling and non-smiling face (LaBarbera, Izard,
Vietze & Parisi, 1976; Young-Browne, Rosenfeld & Horrowitz, 1977). By seven months
they can discriminate between faces of different sexes as well as between different
orientations of the same face (Fagan, 1972; 1976). Furthermore, by 24 months, infants
are able to identify from a choice of three expressions the one that depicts basic
emotions such as 'happy' and 'sad' (Izard, 1971). Not only do infants use face
recognition to identify other people but they also use speech. At birth infants would
rather listen to human speech than other auditory input (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) and by
nine months, infants can recognise that a happy smiling face will accompany a happy
tone of voice (Nelson, 1987; Walker-Andrews, 1997).
As well as attending to stimuli of a psychological nature, young infants can successfully
engage in social interaction. One of the first manifestations of social interaction to be
witnessed in the young infant is imitation. Basic imitation has been demonstrated in
new-borns as young as 42-minutes-old (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983; 1989) and, 12 days
from birth infants can imitate tongue protrusion, mouth opening and lip protrusion
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). Imitation serves to help the infant identify, understand and
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recognise people (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). As such, it has been suggested that
imitation may provide the foundation for subsequent understanding regarding the
mind (Meltzoff & Moore, 2000; Tager-Flusberg, 1989). The initial preference for human
stimuli and the basic need to engage socially appear to facilitate the development of
joint communication between an infant and adult. Joint communicative behaviours
come in many guises, including gaze following, social referencing, non-verbal and basic
verbal communication (Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000). Infants aged eight-to-fourteen
months appear to co-ordinate these behaviours and in general, employ them in order to
share a social experience (Baldwin & Moses, 1994; Carpenter, Nagell & Tomasello, 1998;
Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978).
As detailed in Chapter 1, Leslie (1987; 1994) attributes an understanding of
psychological phenomena largely to the presence of ToMM. He suggests that ToMM
system 1 arrives in development around the age of six-to-eight months and is concerned
with Agents and their goal-directed behaviour. Leslie suggests that the onset of system 1
can be identified by the infant's use of eye gaze. In support, work has shown that from
the age of six months, infants can follow someone else's gaze direction (Scaife & Bruner,
1975). Moreover, infants aged ten-to-fourteen months can initiate gaze alteration
between a caregiver and an object they wish to obtain (Butterworth, 1991). Leslie (1994)
also suggests that ToMM system 1 is employed by infants in situations where Agents
'come together and interact'. A prime example of this is pointing behaviour that
emerges in development between ten and thirteen months (Butterworth, 1991). In its
early stage pointing is characterised as 'proto-imperative' and usually involves the
infant trying to obtain an object. This behaviour assumes an understanding of
intentionality since it requires that the child attributes an internal state towards a
specific object e.g. 'I want that toy' (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). At the age of two years, the
child's pointing behaviour is more sophisticated and 'proto-declarative' actions become
noticeable. This type of pointing behaviour indicates an understanding that people can
be perceptually directed towards the stimuli in question e.g. Took at that toy' (Masur,
1983). According to Leslie (1994), this rapidly accumulating understanding allows
infants to further develop their intuitive understanding of psychology.
As well as being able to attribute their owir intentions towards an object, infants as
young as ten months can successfully seek information from a parent and interpret it in
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terms of the parent's inner emotional feelings. For example, they avoid toys to which
their mother has previously showed disgust (Hornick, Risenhoover & Gunner, 1987). A
further striking example of social referencing skills in infants is that when placed across
a visual cliff, an infant will cross if a caregiver smiles but will not move if the caregiver
appears fearful (Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde & Svejda, 1992; Sorce, Emde, Campos
& Klinnert, 1985). Additionally, infants aged 18 months appreciate not only that they
can be influenced by others, but that others can be also orientated towards objects that
can be experienced as pleasing, scary, desired or undesired (Walden & Ogan, 1988).
These abilities allow young infants to conceptualise the self and others in very different
terms and they start to conceive of people as intentional beings (Wellman & Lagattuta,
2000). A parallel development in infancy involves the ability to differentiate
psychological and physical phenomena. This is pertinent if separate domains of
understanding are to be accepted as components of cognition. Some examples of this
work will now be presented.
Infants can distinguish between human behaviour and behaviour exhibited by physical
objects (Leslie, 1984; Premack, 1990). For example, as early as four weeks infants
demonstrate short spans of attention to their mothers while attending fixedly for longer
at an object (Brazelton, Kolowski & Main, 1974). In addition, they can discriminate
between animate and inanimate movement, overall preferring to attend to the former
(Bertenthal, Proffitt & Kramer, 1987; Bertenthal, Profitt, Spetner & Thomas, 1985). The
ability to view these two types of stimuli as different has important implications for the
future development of intuitive psychology concepts. It allows young infants to
understand people as 'subjects' that are capable of self-initiated action and not as Piaget
(1952) argued, 'objects among other objects' (Karmiloff- Smith, 1992)
By the age of two years, infants can clearly distinguish between psychological and
physical worlds (Leslie, 1987; McCune-Nicolich, 1981). For example, when asked about
a boy who thought about a cookie, and a boy that had a cookie, young children
correctly judged that it is the real cookie that can be seen by oneself and others, touched
and manipulated (Wellman & Estes, 1986). An ability to distinguish between the mental
and the physical world is needed in order to engage in pretend play. Pretend play
requires children to understand their relationship with a primary representation i.e. the
actual objects being played with, and a secondary representation i.e. the content of the
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pretence (see Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). According to Leslie (1994) the onset of pretend
play and the ability to recognise pretend play in others results from the activation of
ToMM system 2 at approximately 18-to-24 months of age. At this age infants also start to
use mental state terms such as 'think', 'remember' and 'know' (Bretherton & Beeghly,
1982; Limber, 1973). Young children use these terms to explain the difference between
the mental and physical worlds; for example, they explain that persons but not rocks or
dolls can see, think, remember and be happy (Gelman, Spelke & Meek, 1983; Johnson &
Wellman, 1982).
Many of the basic psychological concepts that operate in order to allow young infants
to engage in social interaction emerge early and appear spontaneously in typical
development. This level of understanding has been described as implicit knowledge
(see Chapter 1) and because it has been identified, in some cases, among infants no
more than a few days old it has been argued that, "humans are provided with an innate
mechanism for social learning" (Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993; p352). Infants appear to have
a basic drive to engage socially, and from an early age appreciate the distinction
between psychological and physical phenomena. It has been argued that these
foundational skills are 'theory-like' and allow the young infant to gain relevant
information from the environment (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). The resulting
understanding is then used to shape future understanding of core psychological
concepts. It is to these concepts that this chapter will now turn.
2.4. Key Intuitive Psychology Concepts
Many intuitive psychology concepts that develop during the pre-school years can be
neatly described in relation to Wellman's (1990) 'belief - desire' dichotomy. Put simply,
this refers to the understanding that human behaviour is led by the joint existence of
beliefs and desires that in turn affect behaviour. The concept 'desire' involves
motivational states such as wishes, wants and needs. The concept 'belief' encompasses
mental attitudes towards the world such as perceiving and knowing and is also
reflected in the ability to deceive. At present, studies investigating belief are over
represented in the literature. Only recently has attention turned towards other concepts
within the domain, such as desire (Wellman, Phillips & Rodriguez, 2000).
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It has been argued that the concepts within the domain of psychology are independent
yet can be defined in relation to one another. For example, an understanding of belief
may be supported by other intuitive psychological concepts such as desire and
perception (Wellman, Phillips & Rodriguez, 2000). In the next section, children's
understanding of intuitive psychology will be described in approximately the order
that the concepts emerge in typical development. An understanding of the concepts
'perception' and 'knowledge' will therefore be outlined before 'desire' which will be
followed by 'belief' (see Wellman, 1990; Wellman, Phillips & Rodriguez, 2000).
2.4.1. Perception and Knowing
An understanding of perception is a central feature of intuitive psychology because in
many situations, perception anchors a person's mind within the world and provides
information regarding objects that a person may want or desire (Wellman & Lagattuta,
2000). Likewise, understanding the reasons for knowing and not knowing is crucial to a
developing domain of psychology. It has been claimed that an early understanding of
perception and knowledge may provide a model for a later understanding of belief
(Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Perner, 1992). Moreover, as will be shown, the concepts of
perception and knowledge are intrinsically linked.
On the basis of Piaget's work, it was accepted for many years that children under the
age of six were 'egocentric' when asked to take the perspective of others and thus
would wrongly assume that information held by themselves was available to other
people. However, over the years, studies have highlighted that this premise
underestimates the abilities of children. For example, from as early as 12 months of age
linguistic terms intrinsically linked to perception such as 'look' and 'see' appear in
infants' speech (Bretherton & Beeghley, 1982). By the age of two the majority of children
can understand that differing perspectives may lead to differential knowledge
acquisition. For example, when two objects were placed on a table divided by a screen,
they correctly identified the object on their side of the screen, as well as the object seen
by the experimenter on the other (Flavell, 1978), an ability described by Wellman and
Lagattuta (2000) as Level-1 perspective taking. Young children not only appreciate that
one can have a different perspective of a situation but they also understand that 'seeing
leads to knowing' (Flavell, 1977a, 1977b; Pratt & Bryant, 1990). For example, three-year-
old children acknowledge that one must look inside a box and not just be physically
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near it in order to know what is inside (Pillow, 1989). Moreover, by the age of four,
children appreciate that knowledge is interpretative and/or constructive in nature
(Wellman, 1990).
A more developmentally advanced understanding of perception and knowledge can be
demonstrated via children's performance on appearance-reality tasks. The appearance-
reality distinction tests children's ability to engage in perceptual perspective taking.
Success comprises knowing that an object's appearance may not reflect its status in
reality and the task involves presenting children with an object such as a sponge that
looks like a rock (Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1986). Children are asked an appearance
question: 'what does it look like?' and a reality question: 'what is it really?' Using this
paradigm studies have reported consistent failure in three-year-old children who claim
that the object's appearance and reality are indeed the same, even with training the pass
rate did not improve with age (Flavell et al., 1986). It is not until the age of four that
children can correctly grasp the dual representation of the object in question (Flavell,
Flavell & Green, 1983). Flowever, it has recently been shown that given a different set of
test questions children younger than four years can successfully pass the appearance-
reality task. Using the rock-sponge exemplar, Sapp, Lee and Muir (1997) reduced the
linguistic demands of the task and asked children to respond via non-verbal
behaviours. As a result, when instructed to choose an object that would wipe up spilled
water, children aged three correctly chose on the basis of the object's real property i.e.
the sponge. In addition, when asked to choose an item that looked like a rock for a
picture taking session, the children chose the item according to appearance i.e. the rock,
thus clearly appreciating the distinction between appearance and reality.
2.4.2. Desire
In order to reason about another's behaviour an understanding of motivational states
such as desires, wishes, wants and needs is essential (Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000).
Desire is a central concept within the domain of psychology and appears early in
development (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Wellman & Wooley, 1990). In an ingenious
study, Repacholi and Gopnik (1997) showed that infants aged 18 months understand
that people have desires and that these desires can differ and may even conflict. They
presented infants with two bowls of food namely Goldfish crackers and raw broccoli.
The infants were clearly shown to prefer the crackers. Following this, the experimenter
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tasted each type of food and differentiated them by showing a delighted face and
stating 'Yum' to one and making a disgusted face and the comment 'Yuck' to the other.
The bowls of food were then placed in front of the infants who were asked to 'feed' the
experimenter some food. When the experimenter indicated that she loved the crackers
and hated the broccoli all the infants diligently gave her the crackers however, when
the opposite was true i.e. loving the broccoli but hating the crackers, the infants were
presented with a situation where the experimenter's desire conflicted with their own.
Results showed that infants age 14 months always presented the crackers, an action in
accordance with what they wanted. It was not until 18 months that infants correctly
presented the broccoli, even although they themselves preferred the crackers.
Although it has been claimed that research investigating the concept of desire is
currently lacking (Wellman, Phillips & Rodriguez, 2000) studies have shown that from
the age of two children use the linguistic term 'want' in order to talk about their desires
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). Additionally, at two and a half years children know that we
try to get what we want and understand that happiness will occur if we get it but
disappointment will ensue if we do not. Further, they have established that different
people have different desires and more significantly, they can talk about desires
without any accompanying action (Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000). These results suggest
that from the age of two years children can understand the concept of desire as a
genuine mental state (Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Wellman & Wooley, 1990).
2.4.3. Belief
A belief is a mental representation of the world and many mental attitudes including
perceptions, thoughts and expectations are encompassed in this concept. Having an
understanding of belief is considered to be a landmark development in children's
understanding (Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000). However, the concept of belief is only one
of the many milestones that children must appreciate in order to have a fully-fledged
domain of psychology. Despite the vast amount of research dedicated to this concept,
an appreciation of belief is only important because it provides evidence about whether
a child has a basic understanding of the intentional state of the mind (Lee & Homer,
1999). This section will present a brief overview of the main studies investigating the
concept of belief in young children. The vast majority of this research has focussed on
children's understanding in relation to 'false beliefs'. In the following section this work
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will be presented alongside findings from one other paradigm (i.e. deception) Attention
will be given to claims regarding the age at which an understanding of belief is evident
and methodological issues pertinent to work on this conceptwill be discussed.
In order to be credited with an understanding of the mind many researchers argue that
a child must be able to understand that people can be mistaken in their beliefs, i.e. that
people can have false beliefs. Developed by Wimmer and Perner (1983) and modified
most notably by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) false belief tasks have been
employed to provide evidence for the presence of a theory of mind. There are two basic
types of false belief tasks. The first is known as the 'unexpected transfer task'. This task
involves giving participants information about a character's belief then asking them to
predict the character's subsequent action. For example, in the now classic 'Sally/Anne'
experiment, participants are asked to observe a scene acted out with toy dolls named
Sally and Anne. The first action involves Anne placing a marble under a basket and
leaving the room. When out of the room Sally moves the marble from under the basket
and places it under a box. Participants are then shown Anne re-entering the room. To
determine whether participants have an understanding of the mind, children are asked
the key question 'where will Anne look for the marble?' If participants answer
correctly, i.e. the basket, then they have grasped the notion of false beliefs. On the
contrary, if they answer that Anne will look in the box then they do not understand that
beliefs can be mistaken. Results from numerous studies (including Peterson & Siegal,
1998; Surian & Leslie, 1999) have shown that three-year-old children perform poorly on
this task. In contrast, children aged four correctly predict that Anne will look in the
basket, an action that is consistent with her (albeit wrong) belief.
The second type of false belief paradigm that is widely administered is described as the
'unexpected contents task'. Devised by Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner (1986) and
replicated by many others (e.g. Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Perner, Leekham &
Wimmer, 1987) this task requires participants to state what they believe is in a familiar
container such as a 'Smarties tube'. However, when the container is actually opened it
contains something unexpected such as pencils. Following this revelation, participants
are asked to predict what someone else viewing the container for the first time would
think is inside the tube. Children aged four correctly predict that the new person will
think that the tube contains 'Smarties' but most three-year-old children predict that
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she/he will think the tube contains pencils. This answer demonstrates that three-year-
olds do not grasp that the representation held in their mind can be different from that
held in another's and cannot appreciate the often false nature of beliefs.
Developmental findings from false belief tasks are very consistent and indicate that
children under four years cannot represent false beliefs and therefore do not have a full
understanding of the mind (Perner, 1992; Perner et al., 1987). However, a growing body
of researchers claim that standard false belief tasks have methodological shortcomings
and do not accurately tap into the young child's repertoire of intuitive psychology (e.g.
Chandler, Fritz & Hala, 1989; Siegal, 1996b). In order to investigate this possibility
Siegal and Beattie (1991) employed more sensitive research methods in an unexpected
transfer task. They showed that when asked 'where will Anne look first when she
returns?' children aged two to three years correctly reported that she would look in the
basket. The authors suggest that the reported failure of this age group on standard false
belief tasks results from 'conversational rules' implicated in the testing situation. These
factors are also involved in the unexpected contents task. For example, if asked 'before I
opened the box, what did you think was in it?' instead of 'when I opened the box, what
did you think was in it?' the performance of children younger than four years
significantly improves (Lewis & Osborne, 1990). Similar results have been found by
making salient the prior mental state i.e. that the child first thinks it is Smarties in the
box (Mitchell & La Cohee, 1991; Zaitchick, 1991). These studies, and many more
besides, have highlighted that modifications such as minor wording changes (Freeman,
Lewis & Docherty, 1991; Moses, 1993; Surian & Leslie, 1999), introducing memory aids
(German & Leslie, 2000) or making the change of location less salient (Carlson, Moses &
Hix, 1998) yield more positive findings with respect to the ability of children under the
age of four to understand the nature of false beliefs.
A large number of studies have focused on false belief tasks but the concept of
deception can also be used to tap children's understanding of belief. Deception involves
trying to make someone else believe that something is true when it is in fact false and as
such involves an understanding of belief. Without knowing that beliefs can be
manipulated, can be true or false, and people will behave in accordance with what they
believe, the ability to deceive would be impossible. Studies have shown that young
children are capable of basic teasing and deception (Hala & Carpendale, 1997).
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However, as Baron-Cohen (2000a) points out, children's early attempts at deception are
usually clumsy and unsuccessful. For instance, many adults have experienced the child
who claimed not to have eaten the chocolate but had the evidence all over his face!
It has been shown that if an action is in the child's own self-interests, or if their self-
interests are directly threatened, then children aged two years can actively engage in
deceptive talk/action. Chandler et al. (1989) investigated the concept of deception by
asking two, three and four-year-old children to help a doll named Tony hide 'treasure'
from an adult. This scenario involved the doll's footprints leading to the treasure being
evident and the children were instructed to 'think of something' to prevent the treasure
being found. Subsequently the children were asked to explain the deceptive strategy
they employed. Results showed that in every age group children employed four main
deceptive strategies: 1) withholding evidence; 2) destroying evidence such as wiping
the trail; 3) producing false information without destroying evidence; and 4) producing
false information and destroying evidence. Furthermore, it was found that the majority
of children in each age group could justify their deceptive acts. These results provide
convincing evidence that given the correct circumstances, two-year-old children can
deceive in order to create a false belief in another's mind. Further support for this
conclusion was found in a follow-up study which showed that despite failing a
standard false belief task, three-year-old children could correctly predict the false belief
regarding the whereabouts of the hidden treasure held by the adult (Hala, Chandler &
Fritz, 1991). Additionally, young children can comfortably hide their emotions in order
to actively engage in deception (Lewis, Stanger & Sullivan, 1989). In this study, 87% of
three-year-old children, although asked not too, did look at a toy while an experimenter
left the room. Subsequent interviews reported that only 38% of children admitted to
looking with neither facial nor body movements differentiating the truth tellers from
the deceivers. By definition, the ability to deceive must reflect an awareness of belief.
The findings from these studies are therefore in accordance with the premise that
between the ages of two to four years, children come to understand the concept of
belief.
It has been argued that possessing a 'theory of mind' should not be identified solely
with passing false belief tasks (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). Moreover, the empirical
validity of findings from investigations into the concept of belief in young children has
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been debated. Controversy surrounds the age of onset regarding an understanding of
belief and researchers, driven by methodological concerns, have demonstrated an
understanding of belief in children much younger than previously envisaged.
However, questions regarding the exact depth of understanding in children younger
than four years persist (see Bloom & German, 2000).
Regardless of these issues, it is generally accepted that typically, by the age of four
years, children have an impressive understanding regarding belief. They appreciate the
representative nature of belief (Perner, 1991), they have grasped that beliefs can change
and that their beliefs may differ from the ones held by others (Gopnik & Astington,
1988). Additionally, they can predict the actions of others based on false beliefs
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983). However, it is important to note that knowledge acquisition
in the domain of psychology does not stop once an understanding of belief has been
achieved. In the next section a brief overview will be given of other psychological
concepts that develop in later childhood.
2.5. Later Developments in the Domain of Psychology
Although the domain of psychology develops throughout childhood and children
continue to form a deeper understanding in this domain there is still relatively little
research in this area. While children aged four already hold a sophisticated
understanding of the mind that is not dissimilar to that held by an adult, it is
acknowledged that there are differences. However, the differences are said to be
'quantitative' in nature and not radically 'qualitative' (Hala & Carpendale, 1997). In
other words, children develop a more advanced level of understanding but this is
based on the same initial foundations that they have at approximately four years. It has
been argued that domain-general abilities may help children to develop a more 'adult
like' understanding of intuitive psychology. For example, Perner (1991) proposes that
'second order' false belief reasoning (i.e. one person's mental states about other mental
states) involves the increased ability to keep track of the number of recursions with
regard to intentional states. This allows six-year-old children to understand that
someone can have a belief about another's belief.
It has been argued extensively by Chandler and colleagues (for example Carpendale &
Chandler, 1996) that an understanding of interpretation (i.e. the ability to understand
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that people may draw different interpretations from ambiguous stimuli) is missing
from the pre-school child's repertoire of intuitive psychological understanding. Others
such as Perner and Davies (1991) disagree but it has been argued convincingly that the
ability to understand that someone can be right or wrong, depending on the
information they receive (as tested in the false belief task) is distinct from
understanding that a difference in opinion can still manifest itself even if both parties
receive the same information. For example, Chandler and Lalonde (1996) presented
children, via a restrictive window paradigm, with a small area of a large picture, for
example a 'pig'. They asked children if it was possible for two puppets, both receiving
the same information, to form different beliefs about the large picture. Only children
aged six to seven years could appreciate that when give an ambiguous stimuli there are
multiple ways of interpretation. Likewise, McGhee (1979) has shown that it is not until
this age that children can appreciate that a single event may be humorous to some but
not to others. This and other work (e.g. Carpendale & Chandler, 1996; Pillow, 1991)
suggests that an understanding of interpretation is complex and in the course of
development arrives a few years later than an understanding of belief.
The role of 'personality traits' in shaping behaviour is also a more subtle psychological
concept and it is not until the age of six that children appreciate that mental thoughts
about the world can be person-specific, enduring and consistent across situations
(Heyman & Dweck, 1998; Heyman & Gelman, 1998; Miller & Aloise, 1989). In addition,
older children also have a deeper appreciation that the mind is an active interpreter and
constructor of knowledge that can independently be thought of as having a 'mind of its
own' (Wellman & Hickling, 1994). For example, children aged seven appreciate that the
mind is never completely empty of thoughts, and that an adult sitting quietly alone
may be experiencing inner mental images (Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1993; 1998). Only by
the age of eight will children declare that people still 'think' whilst engaging in
activities such as pretending, reading, listening and talking (Flavell, Green & Flavell,
1995; Lillard, 1993).
2.6. Summary
Intuitive psychology encompasses the notion that the mind exists, the mind consists of
various mental states and that there are various causal links between an individual's
mind, external environments and actions (Lee & Homer, 1999). The previous sections
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have outlined the key research findings from work on intuitive psychological concepts
in typically developing children. It has been demonstrated that from birth, infants
demonstrate preferential attention to human stimuli and from as early as eight months
of age clear signs of social interaction are evident (Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000). There is
considerable support for typically developing young infants being 'spontaneous
psychologists' (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). At around 18 months, infants show an
understanding of mental state concepts such as desire (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997) and
by the age of two years the ability to distinguish clearly between mental and physical
phenomena is demonstrated by their engagement in pretend play (Leslie, 1987;
McCune-Nicolich, 1981). During the pre-school period children rapidly acquire key
concepts that pertain to the domain of psychology. These include an appreciation that
seeing leads to knowing (Pratt & Bryant, 1990) and the ability to attribute mental states
to oneself and others (Leslie, 1987). Later developments occurring between the ages of
six to eight years include understanding that opinions can differ even if both parties
receive the same information (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996) and that personality traits
shape behaviour (Heyman & Dweck, 1998).
Discussions regarding children's acquisition of intuitive psychological knowledge often
refer to studies that highlight a lack of understanding of psychological concepts in
children with autism (see Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Gopnik, et al., 2000; Wellman &
Gelman, 1992). This chapter will therefore now turn its attention to empirical studies
that have investigated intuitive psychology in children on the autistic spectrum. This
work describes the difficulties experienced by this group in understanding the
psychological world.
2.7. Intuitive Psychology in Children on the Autistic Spectrum
As discussed in Chapter 1, autism is a condition associated with impairments in
communication, social interaction and imagination (MRC, 2001). It has been claimed
that the impairments in autism can be best understood in terms of a difficulty in
understanding phenomena pertaining to the domain of psychology (Karmiloff-Smith,
1992), a difficulty which has been described as 'early occurring' and 'universal' (Baron-
Cohen, 2000b). The remainder of this chapter will therefore highlight key research
findings from work on individuals with autism during infancy and childhood. Since
the average diagnostic age for autism is five years (Howlin & Moore, 1997), infancy
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work is limited and often based on retrospective interviews with parents. Nevertheless,
this work will be presented since an appreciation of the lack of basic building blocks
that arrive so early and so easily for typically developing children, forcefully highlight
the importance of links between these foundational skills and subsequent knowledge
acquisition.
2.8. The Absence of Basic Building Blocks
Many of the building blocks discussed earlier with respect to typically developing
children are impaired in children with autism. For example, infants with autism do not
preferentially attend to faces (Osterling & Dawson, 1994) or human auditory stimuli
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Moreover, it has been shown that children with autism do not
often make eye contact with their caregiver (Arbelle, Sigman & Kasari, 1994). However,
it has been argued that children with autism do not actively avoid the eye region.
Instead it has been proposed that they are simply unaware of the significance of the
eyes and of eye contact thus do not seek this type of engagement (Frith, 1989). Infants
with autism also display a diminished range of emotional expressions and find it
difficult to interpret them in others (Sigman, Ungerer, Mundy & Sherman, 1987; Weeks
& Hobson, 1987). For example, when presented with pictorial stimuli and asked to
'point to the one that is happy/sad', children with autism performed poorly (Jennings,
1973 cited in Hobson, 1991). In fact, even those with high-functioning autism have
difficulty in identifying complex affective states such as surprise (Baron-Cohen, Spitz &
Cross, 1993; Hobson, 1986).
Children on the autistic spectrum rarely show spontaneous imitation behaviours
(Sigman & Ungerer, 1984; Sigman et al., 1987). When tested on a battery of imitation
tasks including mouth opening, tongue protrusion and hand opening, children with
autism performed more poorly than a group of typically developing children and a
group of children with Down syndrome (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling & Rinaldi, 1998).
Imitation provides a young infant with a rich source of information regarding one's
own internal behaviour and that of others. It has been argued that the absence of this
core ability in children on the autistic spectrum may have implications for the future
development of their psychological understanding (Gopnik et al., 2000).
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Typically developing infants around six to eight months have great motivation to
engage in interactions with people but children with autism appear to lack this need for
social referencing. They rarely (if at all) spontaneously engage in social interactions and
studies have shown that a lack of joint perspective taking skills best discriminated
children with autism from a mental age [MA] matched group of typically developing
children (Mundy & Sigman, 1989; Rogers & Pennington, 1991). In fact, deficits occur in
many joint-perspective taking abilities and this feature is common in infants who
subsequently receive a diagnosis of autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996; Sigman et al.,
1987). Not only do children with autism fail to understand that people have a
perspective that can be shared or directed, they also do not try to attract or direct others
attention to objects in their environment. They rarely use pro-declarative pointing
(Baron-Cohen, 1989b) and make use of hand leading instead. However, unlike children
with hearing impairments, they do not combine looking at the person they are hand
leading with looking at the object in question (Siegal, 1996a). Additionally, in contrast
to children with speech impairments, children with autism rarely use gestures to share
emotional experiences (Dawson et al., 1998; Sigman, Mundy, Sherman & Ungerer,
1986).
In recent years, with the popularity of domestic camcorders and home videos,
researchers have been able to analyse the early behaviour of children who have
subsequently gone on to receive a diagnosis of autism. This work has reported that
during the first and second years of life, children with autism, in contrast to typically
developing children, clearly demonstrate at least five behavioural abnormalities. These
impairments are primarily concerned with basic intuitive psychology and include poor
social attention, lack of social smiling and an inability to use facial expressions
appropriately (Adrien, Lenior, Martineau & Perrot, 1993). In addition, specific
behaviours such as decreased attention to the faces of others, inability to display
pointing behaviour and failure to orientate to one's name, have been identified
(Osterling & Dawson, 1994).
Children on the autistic spectrum are also reported to have difficulty in distinguishing
between physical and psychological phenomena. For example, when told about a girl
who was thinking about a biscuit (mental) and one who was holding a biscuit
(physical), they wrongly projected certain capabilities to the girl who was thinking
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about the biscuit - such as asserting that she could 'eat the biscuit' (Baron-Cohen,
1989a). As already discussed, an ability to decipher between the physical and mental
worlds is required to engage in pretend play and in contrast to their peers, children
with autism exhibit very low frequencies of pretend play (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Ungerer
& Sigman, 1981; Wing & Gould, 1978). Moreover, children on the autistic spectrum give
few responses of a psychological nature and prefer to rely on physical means of
construing phenomena. For example, in contrast to children with Down syndrome and
typically developing pre-school children, children with autism fail to use expressive
gestures to manipulate mental states. Flowever, they freely use instrumental gestures in
order to manipulate physical behaviour (Attwood, Frith & Hermelin, 1988). This
avoidance of psychological responses was also evident in studies where children with
autism were asked about the brain. In contrast to typically developing children,
children with autism responded in accordance with behavioural functions and
overlooked the presence of mental functions such as 'thinking'. It has therefore been
suggested that "much of the autistic children's view of other people is limited to
perception of behaviour rather than mental states" (Baron-Cohen, 1989a; p597).
With the absence of so many vital building blocks, it would not be surprising if children
with autism were also less likely to develop higher level intuitive psychology concepts.
This chapter will now focus on work that has investigated key psychological concepts
in children on the autistic spectrum.
2.9. The Absence of Key Intuitive Psychology Concepts
It is well documented that children with autism, regardless of age, have difficulty in
reflecting on the contents of their own minds and on that of others (Baron-Cohen,
2000b). In the context of this thesis, they can be described as lacking intuitive
psychological knowledge. Central to this claim is that the success or failure of children
with autism on intuitive psychology tasks is distinguishable only by whether the task
involves the domain of psychology or not. Thus it is important that children with
autism have all the necessary domain-general pre-requisites needed to understand the
task, such as competence in language, memory and motivation (Frith, 1999).
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2.9.1. Perception and Knowing
Basic perspective-taking skills have been demonstrated in children with autism. They
can correctly position a doll in order for it to 'see' an experimenter. Furthermore, they
can confidently state a doll's visual perception of a cube with opposing coloured faces
(Hobson, 1984). Likewise, using only eye orientation as a cue, children with autism
correctly identified a series of objects that were being viewed by an experimenter
(Baron-Cohen, 1989b). These findings demonstrate that children with autism
understand the function of eyes in seeing and can appreciate that the perception of an
object is influenced by one's physical positioning in the environment (Baron-Cohen,
1989b). However, although the concepts of perception and knowledge are linked,
children with autism have difficulty with the latter. They find it difficult to understand
the premise 'seeing leads to knowing' (Perner, Frith, Leslie & Leekham, 1989). In fact,
they cannot comprehend what it is to 'know' or 'not know' something. For example,
when given a story about two characters, one who looks inside a box and one who
touches a box, children with autism perform at chance level when asked to declare
'which one knows what's in the box?' (Baron-Cohen & Goodhart, 1994). In a similar
vein, children with autism cannot separate what they know about the world and the
physical appearance of it. A study has shown that in contrast to typically developing
children aged four to six years, children with autism fail appearance-reality tasks. For
example, even after examining a stone that looked like an egg, children with autism
responded similarly to the appearance question ('what does it look like?') and the
reality question ('what is it really?') by declaring that it looked like and really was an
egg (Baron-Cohen, 1989a).
2.9.2. Desire
Children with autism do spontaneously produce linguistic terms related to the concept
of desire in their speech (Tager-Flusberg, 1993). Additionally, some studies have
reported that children with autism have an understanding of desire in line with their
MA (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Tan & Harris, 1991). However, when asked to reason about a
situation where the concept of desire is implicit in the context, children with autism
were shown to be impaired. It has been concluded that children with autism may have
a limited understanding of desire. Their understanding appears to be based on the
concept that people like different things and are happy when they get them. However,
a deeper understanding of desire, involving issues such as desires being/not being
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satisfied and desire change, is beyond their grasp (Phillips, Baron-Cohen & Rutter,
1995).
Although it may be easier for children with autism to reason about desire than other
psychological concepts such as belief, it would appear that their understanding is still
not intact (Phillips et al., 1998). One potential explanation for this impairment is that
children with autism have difficulty-using eye gaze to communicate information about
a person's desire. For example, one study introduced children with autism to a
character named Charlie who was clearly depicted as looking towards a certain brand
of confectionery. They were asked to declare, out of a choice of four, the sweet that
Charlie wanted. Results showed that in contrast to typically developing four-year-olds,
children with autism consistently responded in accordance with their favourite sweet
and clearly failed to infer Charlie's desired choice (Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-
Smith, Grant & Walker, 1995).
2.9.3. Belief
There has been a considerable amount of work investigating the concept of belief in
children with autism. The failure of this group to understand belief has been shown
experimentally in a wide number of studies using different paradigms (among others,
Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Perner et al., 1989). On the basis of this
work it has been concluded that children with autism simply cannot grasp that
different people can hold different beliefs. It is important to note that studies never
show a total failure in the autistic group or a 100% success in the control groups. An
element of chance will always affect an individual's performance, as will factors such as
experience and motivation (Frith, 1999). For example, of the 25% of high-functioning
children with autism who tend to pass, most have a minimum verbal MA of five years
and six months together with a minimum chronological age [CA] of 11.6 years (Frith &
Frith, 2000), however, this criterion does not guarantee success (Leslie & Roth, 1993). It
is the purpose of this section to explore these research findings and raise some of the
methodological concerns and associated issues pertaining to work on this concept.
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) were the first to demonstrate that children with autism had a
difficulty in comprehending the nature of false beliefs. Using the 'Sally/Ann task' they
found that children with autism (with an average CA of 11 years) performed less well
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than both a group of typically developing four-year-olds and a group of children with
Down syndrome (of similar CA but with a lower non-verbal and verbal age). The
failure of the children with autism cannot be attributed to general task demands
because they correctly asserted that Sally put the marble into her own basket, in a
memory control question. Additionally, they knew that the marble was currently under
the box, passing a reality control question. Therefore, despite the ability to comprehend
many parts of the task, they failed to infer the presence of a false belief held by 'Sally'
on her return, responding instead only on the basis of what they themselves knew.
Similar results have been found in tasks using the unexpected contents paradigm. For
example, in contrast to a control group, children with autism fail to reason that a person
viewing a tube of Smarties for the first time would believe that the contents of the tube
would contain Smarties. This was despite the children with autism being older and
having a higher mean verbal age than a comparison group of children with language
impairments also tested on the same task (Perner et al., 1989).
As outlined in previous sections, with respect to false belief tasks work has shown
minor modifications can allow three-year-old typically developing children to reason
correctly about false beliefs (German & Leslie, 2000; Surian & Leslie, 1999). These
findings have helped shed light on what is (not) going on when children with autism
are faced with these tasks. It appears to be the case that failure among three-year-olds
may occur for different reasons. For example, studies have shown that failure among
this group may be attributable to general task demands such as memory rather than
reflecting a cognitive deficit in intuitive psychology (Surian & Leslie, 1999). In children
with autism, however, failure continues to occur even when task demands are reduced
and, this failure is also present in individuals with high-functioning autism (Baron-
Cohen, 1989b).
A proportion of individuals with high-functioning autism or Asperger syndrome are
able to pass false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, 2000b) but their success occurs at a much
later CA than found in typical development (Flappe, 1995). It has been suggested that
they may pass not because they have a theory of mind, but because of the employment
of compensatory strategies based on general reasoning abilities developed with age
(Leslie & Roth, 1993). Thus their perceived 'understanding' will be piecemeal and not
generalisable to different contexts (unlike that of a four-year-old). Supporting evidence
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for this argument shows that in contrast to typically developing six-year-olds,
individuals with Asperger syndrome who pass false belief tasks often fail more
complex second order false belief tasks that involve comprehending that someone can
have a belief about another's belief (Baron-Cohen, 1989c). Additionally, they have
difficulty with more advanced ideas such as inferring complex mental states such as
bluff and double bluff in story characters (Happe, 1994a).
On the whole, individuals on the autistic spectrum find it difficult to reason about false
beliefs. This difficulty appears to be different from that experienced by children under
four years and has been described as an inability to 'mind-read' (Baron-Cohen, 2000b).
This claim is strengthened from results investigating deception, a concept intrinsically
linked to belief. Studies have reported that children with autism have an inability to
deceive (Oswald & Ollendick, 1989; Russell et al., 1991) and find it hard to decipher
when someone is deceiving them (Sodian & Frith, 1992). For example, in a 'penny-
hiding' game, children with autism found it difficult to comprehend that the game
involves closing one's hand in order to deceive an observer regarding the whereabouts
of the penny. Errors demonstrated by children with autism, and typical of children
under the age of four years, included hiding the penny in one hand yet leaving the
other open, and putting the penny out of sight whilst exclaiming 'it's in here'. As a
result of these findings it was concluded that children with autism treated the game as
if it were about keeping things 'out of sight' and 'not out of mind' (Baron-Cohen, 1992).
2.10. Summary
Autistic spectrum disorders manifest themselves in a difficulty in understanding
phenomena pertaining to the domain of psychology (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). This
impairment is 'early occurring' and 'universal' (Baron-Cohen, 2000b) and in infancy can
be demonstrated by the failure to attend to faces (Osterling & Dawson, 1994) and
human auditory stimuli (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). The absence of imitation (Sigman &
Ungerer, 1984; Sigman, et al, 1987), gaze monitoring and proto-declarative pointing
(Baron-Cohen, Allen & Gillberg, 1992; Swettenham, 1996) is also a feature in the early
development shown by many children on the autistic spectrum.
Children on the autistic spectrum also fail to distinguish psychological from physical
phenomena (Baron-Cohen, 1989a), they rarely engage in pretend play (Baron-Cohen,
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1997; Ungerer & Sigman, 1981; Wing & Gould, 1978), they fail appearance-reality tasks
(Baron-Cohen, 1989a) and they find it difficult to understand the premise 'seeing leads
to knowing' (Perner et al., 1989). Additionally, an understanding of concepts such as
desire and belief, typically present by the age of four years, are impaired and in some
cases even absent (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Phillips et al., 1995). Studies have reported
that a proportion of high-functioning individuals with autism can understand basic
intuitive psychological concepts. However, this understanding is limited and they have
difficulty with, for example, more complex scenarios such as second order false belief
tasks (Baron-Cohen, 1989c).
As a result of the findings from all the work reported above, children on the autistic
spectrum have been described as lacking a 'theory of mind'. In contrast it has been
claimed that typically developing children's domain of psychology comprises
theoretical understanding i.e. children can predict, construe and explain in a coherent
and principled manner. However, as already discussed in Chapter 1, the main theorists
in the field offer different criteria for what is and what is not 'theoretical' knowledge.
Consequently there is debate over the age at which children's understanding of
psychological phenomena can be described as being truly theoretical. In addition, there
are different accounts proposed for the pattern of atypical development in children on
the autistic spectrum. This chapter will now briefly present a few cognitive accounts
(previously discussed in Chapter 1) in order to address the notion of theoretical
knowledge in the domain of psychology. Attempts will be made to present these
positions with regard to typically developing children and children on the autistic
spectrum.
2.11. Is the Domain of Psychology Theoretical?
To link this research to one of the broader themes of this thesis the following section
will discuss the theoretical status of psychological knowledge. Chapter 1 stated that a
key characteristic of a 'theory' is the principle of coherence. Therefore, strength for the
assertion that the domain of psychology is theoretical can be found in work showing
that typically developing children's performance on intuitive psychological tasks is
improved when tested in a conceptually coherent context (Gopnik, Slaughter &
Meltzoff, 1994; Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996). For example, when three-year-old children
who had previously failed a false belief task were given prior information regarding
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desire or perception, as well as belief, they demonstrated improved false belief
understanding when compared to children who had not received any training
(Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996). This finding clearly highlights the coherent nature of the
concepts contained within the domain of intuitive psychology. In a similar vein,
consistency has been identified between impairments on tasks of intuitive psychology
in children with autism, for example between poor performance on tasks of deception
and false belief (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Oswald & Ollendick, 1989). These findings show
that the domain of psychology is coherently impaired in children with autism and
strengthens the claim that they do not have theoretical knowledge in this area.
Taking a modular perspective Leslie (1994) tends to speculate about core cognitive
architecture rather than the status of theoretical knowledge per se. He asserts that
children's intuitive psychological knowledge develops around the age of six to eight
months with the activation of ToMM system 1 (see Chapter 1). System 1 represents the
behaviour of Agents and according to Leslie and Roth (1993) this component is present
in children with autism as demonstrated by their use of request-pointing and their
understand of desire. However, Leslie argues that ToMM system 2 is biologically
impaired in autism and as a result, they cannot develop a theory of mind (Leslie &
Thaiss, 1992). He argues that the absence of ToMM system 2 erodes the capacity for
mental representations that are specific to intuitive psychology concepts such as
pretending and believing. However, non-mental representations will remain intact in
children with autism (Leslie & Frith, 1988; Leslie & Roth, 1993).
Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) RR model suggests that theoretical knowledge comprises
explicit representations at phase E2/3. As a result, she claims that children's
psychological knowledge is not theoretical until the age of four years. She argues that
theoretical understanding has to be demonstrated by the ability to combine successful
inferences and verbal justifications - just the sort of ability needed to reason about
another's false belief. Before the age of four, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) suggests that
children are employing El representations in order to, among other things, engage in
pretend play. To recap from Chapter 1, El representations are not available to
conscious access or verbal report and thus are not theoretical. However, Karmiloff-
Smith does argue that they are the foundations on which theories of intuitive
psychology are built. In the case of atypical development she suggests that across the
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board 'normal' intelligence is not a prerequisite for RR to occur in a particular domain.
As a result, the RR model envisages domain-specific deficits as a realistic possibility.
Although Karmiloff-Smith fails to give a direct prediction regarding autism, she does
claim that children with autism are unlikely to have a deficit in theory building per se.
In accordance with her position, it may be the case that they have a representational
deficit solely in the domain of psychology.
Advocates of the theory theory position presented in Chapter 1 (i.e. Gopnik & Meltzoff,
1997) posit that the domain of intuitive psychology comprises theoretical knowledge
from birth. They emphasise the succession of progressively accurate conceptions of the
mind present in children with age. They argue that this development can be attributed
to the process of theory building and, at any point in time, children's understanding of
intuitive psychology is theoretical (Gopnik &Wellman, 1994). In the case of autism, they
suggest that children on the autistic spectrum lack an initial starting state theory of
persons and subsequently this has a "cascading consequence for later development"
(Gopnik et al., 2000: p63). In contrast to Karmiloff-Smith (1992), proponents of theory
theory have recently suggested that, in addition, children with autism may have a
deficit with theory building across all areas of understanding, rather than with theories
of psychology in particular. They suggest that the inability to theorise, evident in
children with autism, leads to failure in understanding the world in a deep, causal
explanatory way (Gopnik et al., 2000) however, this suggestion requires empirical
support.
2.12. Conclusions and Implications for this Thesis
The literature review above aimed to show that sensitivity to socially relevant stimuli in
infancy appears to function as a prerequisite for the development of core psychological
concepts, such as desire and belief. Within this body of work, the manifestation of
understanding in relation to 'belief' is considered to be a core development in children's
domain of intuitive psychology (Lee & Homer, 1999) and generally, research supports
the conclusion that a full understanding of the mind is not typically present until the
age of four years (Perner, 1992; Perner et al., 1987). However, by utilising different
methodology many researchers have reported task success in children aged three
(among others, Chandler et al., 1989; Siegal & Beattie, 1991). These findings suggest that
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three-year-old children's failure on standard false belief tasks is not attributable to a
cognitive deficit in intuitive psychology.
Children on the autistic spectrum continue to experience difficulty in comprehending
that different people can hold different beliefs well beyond the age of three-to-four
years (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Perner et al., 1989). Failure on false
belief tasks in children with autism also occurs even when task demands are reduced
(Surian & Leslie, 1999) and are also evident in high-functioning individuals with autism
(Baron-Cohen, 1989b). Findings from this work point to the presence of an impairment
in the domain of psychology that impinges developmentally on a wide number of
abilities, from early social skills such as imitation to more advanced concepts typically
present in the pre-school period. Pertinent to this claim is that success or failure of
children with autism can only be distinguished from that of typically developing
children by whether the task involves the domain of psychology or not (Frith, 1999).
Therefore, an essential consideration for the studies reported in this thesis is that
children with autism display the necessary abilities in language, memory and
motivation needed to understand the task.
Some authors suggest that with respect to the cognitive foundations of autism there is
only a deficit in the domain of psychology (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Leslie & Thaiss,
1992). If autism does result from specific deficits solely in the domain of psychology,
then a demonstration of competence in another domain would provide strong
supporting evidence for the domain-specific account of cognitive development. In an
initial attempt to explore these issues the next chapter, Chapter 3, will review the
literature concerned with the understanding of intuitive physics in typically developing
children and children on the autistic spectrum.
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CHAPTER 3
INTUITIVE PHYSICS: UNDERSTANDING IN TYPICALLY
DEVELOPING CHILDREN AND CHILDREN ON THE AUTISTIC
SPECTRUM
3.1. Aims of this Chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to present research findings from work investigating
children's understanding of physics. Many argue that intuitive physics is situated
alongside intuitive psychology as a core domain of cognition (i.e. Baron-Cohen, 2000a;
Wellman, Hickling & Schultz, 2000) and, as will be shown, the initial acquisition of
physical knowledge has been linked to innate mechanisms. In a similar way to the
previous chapter, this chapter will present experimental work with young infants that
has identified evidence of a number of early building blocks in the domain of physics.
Likewise, it will be argued that these support the subsequent development of core
intuitive physical concepts.
In contrast to the literature on the development of core concepts in the domain of
psychology (presented in Chapter 2), the literature on children's understanding of
physics is very piecemeal and tends to focus on concepts in isolation from one another.
Children's knowledge of physical phenomena has had attention from both educational
researchers and developmental psychologists, with each discipline tending to approach
the topic in different ways. The former is generally concerned with physical concepts
taught in school, the latter is more concerned with the intuitive ideas that infants and
very young children may have regarding the physical world. It is often therefore the
case that educational findings relate to why children fail to grasp scientific physics
concepts rather than intuitive physics per se (as distinguished in Chapter 1). In an effort
to identify potential candidates for fundamental physical knowledge, both fields of
research relating to children's physical understanding will be explored. As well as
attempting to identify core concepts, this chapter will also attempt to give an overview
of what is known about the development of children's understanding concerning each.
However, due to the vast volume of work in this area, this review is necessarily
selective. Despite many areas having been investigated, no attempt has been made to
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try and integrate work on areas of physical phenomena into an organised structure in
the way for example, Wellman (1990) has in the domain of psychology. As a result, this
chapter imposes a new structure on the literature on children's understanding of
intuitive physics. It will be argued that in broad terms, the majority of research in the
domain of physics falls into three main strands. The first is concerned with physical
objects and their movement, the second with prevalent characteristics of objects, and
the third with how physical/mechanical things work.
As well as presenting findings from research on typically developing children, this
chapter will also examine the ability of children on the autistic spectrum to reason
about phenomena relating to the domain of physics. This work will be scrutinised in
order to investigate the assertion that children with autism can reason effectively (and
possibly even exceptionally) in this domain.
3.2. Introduction
From an early age children interact with the physical world. For example, they lift,
push and roll objects of various shapes and weights, they toss and catch balls and in
general, they exhibit great competence with these activities. Understanding pertaining
to these events can be described as intuitive physics. Adhering to the characteristics of a
domain presented in Chapter 1, the existence of a domain of physics has now been
supported by a number of theorists who assign to it a central role in the ability to
reason about the world (e.g. Leslie, 1994; Wellman Hickling & Schultz, 2000).
In order to reason about physical phenomena children must appreciate that objects
exist and, as a result, the 'object concept' has been identified as a core constituent of this
domain (Wellman & Gelman, 1992). In a similar vein to work in the domain of
psychology, basic building blocks pertaining to intuitive physics, such as the object
concept, are believed to be present from birth (see Carey & Markman, 1999). However,
this was not always considered to be the case, Piaget (1955) claimed that infants
younger than four months could not differentiate an object's existence from their own.
Moreover, although he postulated that infants aged six months do show some partial
recognition that objects exist, he argued that they lacked the understanding of an
object's enduring existence when out of view. According to Piaget, this lack of 'object
permanence' continues throughout the whole first year of life. As Chapter 1 has pointed
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out, Piaget put forward a theory of domain-general development as the mechanism
underlying growth in understanding. He argued that later developments were a result
of domain-general structural re-organisation. Accordingly, he proposed that it was not
until the end of the sensori-motor phase of development (at two years) that children
fully develop an understanding of object permanence. With respect to physical
causation, Piaget (1954) proposed that it was not until approximately 12-to-15 months
that infants are able to understand that object's can behave independently from their
own actions. In fact, he argued that a fully representational understanding of causality
emerges at 18 months and it is only then that an infant can act upon an object in the
physical world and observe the effect in a non-egocentric fashion.
In sharp contrast to Piaget's theory, more recent theorists maintain that children have
an early conception of physical properties that is the result of innate pre-dispositions to
view physical aspects of the world in a certain way. This viewpoint is has emerged
from the vast amount of work carried out on young infants and as a consequence,
Piaget's (1955) idea that cognitive representations do not emerge until 24 months of age
has long been disregarded. However, although the picture of what children know is
becoming clearer, this chapter will highlight that disagreement still reigns in regard to
the mechanisms that drive growth in infants' physical understanding. This
disagreement relates to the differing theoretical positions that were discussed
previously in Chapter 1.
3.3. Basic Building Blocks of Intuitive Physics
Researchers taking a modular perspective assert that infants are born with substantial
innate beliefs about objects. One proponent of this viewpoint is Elizabeth Spelke, a
pioneer of modern infant research. She asserts that young infants are constrained from
birth by a number of domain-specific principles that guide infants' perception and thus
subsequent reasoning about objects and their movement. This implicit understanding is
thought to constitute an early theory of objects, rather than merely a perceptual
organisation of current sensory experiences (Spelke, 1988).
Spelke and her colleagues have reported implicit intuitive physics concepts in typically
developing infants from a very early age (Carey & Spelke, 1994; Spelke, Breinlinger,
Macomber & Jackson, 1992). According to this work, infants aged four months can
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make specific assumptions about the nature of objects that cannot be attributed to
experience. At the base of these assumptions are three key principles, often collectively
described as 'core knowledge'. These constrain infants' perception of object motion and
by extension, their reasoning about the physical world (Spelke, Phillips & Woodward,
1995). According to the principle of cohesion, objects are connected and bounded bodies
and furthermore, these connected and bounded features remain intact throughout
object movement. For example, many studies have demonstrated that infants expect all
parts of an object to move on connected paths over space and time and that, unlike
liquids, moving objects do not transform as they move (Spelke, 1988; Spelke, Von
Hofsten & Kestenbaum, 1989; Spelke & Van de Walle, 1993). The second principle is
that of continuity. This asserts that objects exist and move continuously on connected
paths. Studies have shown that infants expect objects to move on the same connected
path and that they never expect two objects to occupy the same place at the same time
(Baillargeon & De Vos, 1991; Leslie, 1994; Spelke et al., 1992; Xu & Carey, 1992). Thirdly,
infant reasoning is also guided by the principle of contact. This relates to the expectation
that objects can only act upon each other if they have made contact. Numerous studies
have replicated the finding that infants' understand that objects will act on one another
if they come into contact but will not act on one another if there is no contact (Leslie,
1982; 1984; Spelke & Van de Walle, 1993).
It has been argued that a single system of knowledge encompasses these three
principles of cohesion, continuity and contact (Carey & Spelke, 1994; Spelke et al., 1995).
Furthermore, it has been argued that since this system is robust and general in infancy,
the principles are not learned but innate. These concepts (or building blocks) are
thought to serve as the basis for all subsequent learning about inanimate objects and are
responsible for directing infants' attention to relevant physical elements in the visual
field. This knowledge will eventually be elaborated as development proceeds but
Spelke (1991) argues that core knowledge is neither abandoned nor replaced. As
discussed in Chapter 1 modular accounts view development as the result of non-
conceptual changes in information processing. Accordingly Spelke et al. (1992) have
shown that the principles which determine infants' initial reasoning about physical
entities in the world are central to the concepts held by adults. This, they argue, is
evidence to support the view that cognitive development is not a process of
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reorganisation or change but simply an enrichment of core cognitive capabilities that
are present from birth.
Spelke and colleagues have shown that young infants do not understand all physical
events. They suggest that the principles of gravity and inertia are learned since an
understanding of these develops more slowly and in a somewhat piecemeal fashion
compared to the principles contained in core knowledge (Kim & Spelke, 1999). For
example, four-month-old infants do not appreciate the principles of gravity but by six
months they start to show surprise when an object stops in mid air without support.
The authors argue that this knowledge, while not present at birth, does result from
innately specified mechanisms that require minimal experience with objects to induce
understanding (Spelke et al., 1992).
Along similar lines to Spelke, Leslie (1994) proposes that infants have a specialised
learning mechanism named Theory of Bodies Mechanism [ToBy], that enables them to
create conceptual knowledge of the physical world (see Chapter 1). To support his
position he has, through a series of experiments, shown that young infants have an
early appreciation of mechanical/physical causation that can be attributable to ToBy.
As a specific example, Leslie habituated two groups of six-month-old infants to either a)
a film of a direct launching event where one object collides with and launches a second
object, or b) a variation of this event whereby a time delay was imposed between the
impact of the first object and the movement of the second. Infants were then shown the
same event in reverse whereby film a) showed a reversal of the roles i.e. the cause is
now the effect, and film b) showed no reversal of roles therefore providing no causal
regularity. Leslie predicted that if infants understood mechanical causality then they
should find the direct launching effect in reverse to be more interesting and, this is
exactly what his results showed (Leslie, 1982; 1994; Leslie & Keeble, 1987).
In contrast to the strict modular accounts, Baillargeon and her colleagues suggest that
infants are born with highly constrained, innate learning mechanisms that guide the
acquisition of knowledge regarding objects (Baillargeon, Kotovsky & Needham, 1995;
Baillargeon, 2000). This conclusion is a result of substantial work concerning certain
aspects of physical events whereby a developmental pattern has been found to recur
across ages and phenomena (for a review see Baillargeon et al., 1995). This work shows
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that infants succeed in detecting some physical laws before others. According to
Baillargeon this reflects their predisposition to form an 'all or none' concept about novel
physical events whereby discrete and continuous variables/ that with experience are
subsequently found to affect the phenomena in question, are continually added into the
child's developing concepts (Baillargeon, 2000). For example, when judging whether a
box resting on a platform is stable, infants initially focus on the contact between the
box's bottom surface and the platform thus treating symmetrical and asymmetrical
boxes alike. However, by 12 months of age they have revised their concept to take into
account the shape of the box (Baillargeon, 1986).
These modern accounts of development suggest that innate constraints lead to implicit
understanding in infants younger than postulated by Piaget. For example, infants age
three-to-four months can represent the existence of an object that is currently invisible
thereby displaying evidence of 'object permanence' approximately eight months earlier
than Piaget predicted (Baillargeon, Spelke & Wasserman, 1985). Furthermore, infants of
this age were shown in the same study to demonstrate an understanding that objects
are solid and substantial. This seminal work involved habituating infants to a display in
which a screen continually rotated through 180° towards and away from an infant.
Once the infant had habituated and no longer attended to the display, a box was placed
in the path of the screen. Following this, they were shown one of two events: a possible
event where the screen rotates until it makes contact with the box and comes to rest,
and an impossible event where the screen rotates and appears to pass straight through
the box. Results revealed that infants who were shown the impossible event attended to
the display for longer thus indicating that they were surprised when the screen passed
through the apparently solid object. This finding suggests that the infants expected the
box to continue to exist even when occluded by the screen. Further work using this
'violation of expectation' technique has highlighted that not only do young infants'
represent hidden objects, but that they can represent some of their properties. For
example, infants have demonstrated an understanding of whether an object is
compressible (e.g. a wooden block versus a sponge) as well as whether it is taller or
shorter than the screen (Baillargeon, 1987a; 1987b). Thus it appears to be the case that
very young infants possess many of the same fundamental beliefs about physical
objects as adults (Baillargeon, 2000).
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As this section has shown, accumulating work demonstrates that very young infants
have an implicit understanding about the nature of the physical world and most
researchers in this area now agree with Anderson's assertion that "learning of intuitive
physics start in the cradle" (1983; p252). From an early age infants have the building
blocks that are necessary to understand that objects exist. In addition, they have
intuitive ideas regarding the laws that constrain the movement of these objects and
further, they actively seek causal explanations for physical events (Bullock, Gelman &
Baillargeon, 1982; Shultz, Pardo & Altman, 1982; Smith, Carey & Wiser, 1985; Wellman
& Gelman, 1992). As a result, by the time children reach the ages of three-to-four years
they understand a great deal about the nature of physical phenomena.
3.4. Key Intuitive Physics Concepts
The work to be presented below is concerned with children's developing
understanding of physical phenomena. This field of research is very fragmented and in
an attempt to draw together distinct areas of work this chapter will present work
classified within three research strands. The first involves objects and their movement
and comprises reasoning regarding the properties that govern object motion in the
physical world, such as the causes of non-agent initiated events (Baron-Cohen, 1997;
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Dennett, 1978). The second involves fundamental object
properties such as the ability to reason about concepts such as size and weight. The
third strand is associated with how things work and is linked to the term 'mechanics',
encompassing ideas about how physical/mechanical objects work (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001; Disessa, 1998).
3.4.1. Object Movement
When reasoning about object movement, it is argued that children adhere to the idea
that a cause will produce an effect by transmitting a force or restraint to it, or that a set
of forces will cause trajectories, accelerations and so on (see Wellman & Gelman, 1992).
Research investigating causal inferences will be discussed followed by a section on




Research has shown that the ability to make causal inferences develops between the
ages of three-to-four years (Das Gupta & Bryant, 1989; Gelman, Bullock & Meek, 1980)
and is based on an understanding of four causal principles (Shultz et al., 1982). The first
principle is based on priority i.e. a cause will precede (or co-occur) with an effect
(Bullock & Gelman, 1979). The second principle is concerned with co-variation i.e. if an
effect has multiple causes then the true cause will be the one that shows most regular
co-variation (Shultz & Mendelson, 1975). The third is based on temporal contiguity
whereby causes and effects must be linked by an intervening chain of contiguous
events (Sedlak & Kurtz, 1981). Finally the fourth is based on the principle of similarity
whereby the similarity of potential causes and effects must be used when making
deductive inferences about physical causation (Goswami, 1998). These principles are
employed by children as young as three years to reason about basic physical movement
involving two-and-three-term causal chains (Baillargeon & Gelman, 1980; Shultz et al.,
1982).
VerticalMotion
Young children's intuitive theories about the nature of falling objects comprise the
belief that 'all unsupported objects fall straight down' (Kaiser, Proffitt & McCloskey,
1985). This is clearly illustrated using a 'tube task' whereby children aged two-to-four
years were shown a ball being dropped into one of three opaque tubes (Hood, 1995).
Unknown to the children, the tubes were designed to form an interwoven maze and
task difficulty was increased through adding more tubes and increasing the complexity
of the interconnectedness. As a result, a reliance on the 'straight down rule' would lead
the children to search in the wrong place. This is exactly what was found, with children
aged two-to-four years consistently opting to search in the location directly beneath the
point at which the ball was dropped. The presence of 'gravity errors' occurred at all
levels of difficulty and continued to be present despite extensive training. Training did
encourage the children to develop a growing understanding of the constraints of the
tubes on the movement of the falling objects but the 'gravity error' recurred in children
when tested using a different paradigm. These findings suggest that believing all
objects fall straight down is an intuitive way of reasoning for children and, in most
cases this intuitive understanding, albeit occasionally wrong, serves them quite well
(Hood, 1995).
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The tendency of young children to adhere to the belief that all objects fall straight down
constrain their interactions with moving objects (Krist, 2001). This is shown when they
are required to integrate information about objects that are moving forward and falling
at the same time. This paradigm is evident in two cases: 1) rolling objects, such as a ball
that rolls off a table, and 2) carried objects, such as bomb dropped by an aeroplane or a
ball dropped by a person walking. Research using these exemplars has shown that
young children ignore movement cues and focus on the absence of support thus
predicting that the object will fall straight downward. Furthermore, they stick to this
prediction even when the ball's horizontal momentum is made more salient (Kaiser,
Proffitt & McCloskey, 1985). To some extent this understanding does develop with
respect to rolling objects. In this case children first predict that the ball will move in an
'inverted L-shaped path' before correctly choosing a parabolic path at the age of eight
years i.e. that the ball will move both forward and down at the same time. However,
there are no age improvements in understanding the parabolic motion of objects falling
from carried objects. In this case children aged eight still exhibit the straight down
belief and it is not until the age of 12 that they identify a parabolic trajectory (Krist,
2001) and, even at a later age, their understanding is piecemeal and not evident in all
situations. For example, when asked to predict the path of a 'bomb dropped from an
aeroplane', only 65% of college students, the majority of whom had taken high school
physics, answered correctly (Kaiser, Proffitt & McCloskey, 2000).
The Effect of 'Force' on ObjectMovement
It is well documented that most children (and many adults) hold erroneous ideas about
the nature of projectile motion that support a collection of ideas associated with
'impetus theory'. Impetus theory, first postulated by the Greek astronomer Hipparchus,
is the idea that a force inside an object causes it to move. Although Newton laid to rest
this idea in 1687 many people still find the notion of impetus intuitively reasonable.
Surprisingly, young children aged four can correctly reason about object motion but
children a few years older, when questioned about the same phenomena, repeatedly
reply according to impetus theory. Therefore despite having implicit expectations of
object movement from birth, and despite initially predicting the correct path of objects,
many school age children hold 'misconceptions' about inanimate motion (Kaiser,
McCloskey & Proffitt, 1986).
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Inhelder and Piaget (1958) suggested that children have little idea of the forces that
oppose motion. In their work, explanations given for cessation included the extinction
of force imparted by the initial push, object fatigue, or by the objects tendency to rest.
This study and one by Twigger et al. (1994) found that it is not until the age of 12 that
friction and air resistance (i.e. drag) are considered to be appropriate explanations for
the stopping of an object in motion. In a further attempt to investigate the concept of
force, Howe (1998) showed children aged six-to-fifteen years a picture of a rolling ball
and asked them 'what will happen to the ball's speed?' Results demonstrated
increasing knowledge with age but young children gave non-physical responses with
many related to impetus theory. They often predicted that an internal reduction of force
would make the ball stop for example, one six-year-old child stated that the ball would
stop when it got tired. Children of all ages referred to variable external forces that
opposed motion, often asserting that 'the bumps and the cracks will slow it down'.
However, the most sophisticated explanations, relating to constant external forces that
oppose motion, rarely occurred in children under ten years.
Inherent misconceptions based on impetus theory have also been shown in relation to
predictions made about the path a ball will take when it exits a curved tube. Across a
group of pre-school children, primary aged children and adults, a U-shaped
developmental curve was found. Children aged seven-to-twelve years consistently
predicted that the ball would acquire a curved impetus and thus follow a curved path
after it emerges from the tube (Kaiser et al., 1986). Only pre-school children and college
students answered correctly that the ball will follow a straight path in accordance with
the Newtonian principle that objects move in a straight line unless deflected by an
external force. Interestingly, the researchers noted that the pre-schoolers were confused
at the suggestion of a curvilinear path. The authors dismiss claims that the young
children are employing a heuristic that all 'objects move in a straight path'. Instead,
they conclude that children of this age have no overall theory of motion and answer on
the basis of their experience. Kaiser et al. (1986) suggest that it may be the case that
older children think about motion in a 'theoretical' way and their errors are a result of
the systematic over-generalisation of a motion theory.
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3.4.2. Object Properties
As well as investigations into physical movement, a small body of work has
concentrated on children's understanding of the intrinsic properties of physical objects
(such as weight). A key focus of this work has been on the development of children's
ability to attend simultaneously to more than one property when trying to reason about
physical phenomena.
Material Kind
With regard to material kinds, Smith, Carey and Wiser (1985) showed that young
children aged three-to-four years identify 'kind' in terms of the most salient physical
property of the material in question, for example, being heavy or light or being rough
or smooth. This study also showed that pre-school children make use of gross
generalisations between weight and material kinds, such as maintaining that all steel
objects are heavy and all wooden objects are light. To illustrate, when presented with
one piece of play-dough and one piece of clay of differing weight, and asked if the
weight difference would still be maintained if the material was continually halved until
very small, the pre-school children randomly responded in (what the authors describe
as) an 'unprincipled manner'. Likewise, children aged five-to-seven years, who initially
claimed that the clay was heavier, judged both materials when cut into small pieces, to
weigh the same. It is not until children reach the ages of eight-to-nine years that they
can correctly identify clay and play-dough as being different materials that continue to
be so no matter how small the pieces are into which they are cut.
To further investigate children's understanding regarding material kinds, Smith et al.
(1985) employed the 'grinder test'. This asserts that if materials are run through a
grinder, they will still maintain their properties (i.e. sand in sand out: wood in wood
out) however, this is not the case for objects (i.e. table in wood out). Results showed
that all of the children tested aged between three-to-nine years knew that cut up objects
were no longer the same kinds of objects but were the same kind of material. However,
age differences in justifying answers about material kinds were found. For example,
children aged four-to-seven years mentioned only perceivable properties such as 'it's
shiny' whereas, older children aged seven-to-nine years gave a more sophisticated
justification, defining a material kind as a core constituent of an object i.e. 'cutting does
not affect the material'.
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Size and Weight: Density
Piaget & Inhelder (1974) reported that children employ a single concept encapsulating
size and weight thus make their judgements about these concepts interrelated. In
contrast, recent work by Smith et al. (1985) has shown that pre-school children have
independent concepts of size and weight. Further, they argue that young children can
make initial generalisations about these concepts, and that the concepts radically
change over development.
In an extensive study, Smith et al. (1985) showed that at the core of the three year-olds
weight concept is 'felt weight' as shown by their preference to judge weight by lifting
objects. Young children see weight as a physical property of an object that causally
affects the object's interactions rather than something intrinsically related to the object's
size. For example, all children in this study judged that a heavy object (regardless of
size) would make a foam rubber bridge collapse. Young children also failed to associate
weight as a property of small objects. For example, children aged four-to-six years
declared that a piece of styrofoam weighed nothing at all and, that the addition of one
grain of rice would not make a pile of rice any heavier. On the other hand, older
children, aged eight-to-nine years demonstrated a more sophisticated understanding of
weight in which it was categorised as a property of matter. The majority of this age
group stated that 'everything has to weigh something', correctly judging that a piece of
styrofoam did weigh something and that one piece of rice would make a pile of rice
heavier. Children of this age believe that if an object has matter it must have weight.
According to Smith et al. (1985), children's early concept of weight does not include the
notion of density. In fact, their study showed that children aged three-to-four years
have to cope with a massive intrusion of weight concepts into density judgements. It is
only between the ages of five-to-seven years that the idea of 'heavy for size' was
included in reasoning about weight. The notion of density has been further investigated
using the floating and sinking paradigm. These studies have shown that many children
intuitively adhere to the variable weight as being the key as to why objects float and
sink and that the idea of relative density is not often entertained until approximately 11
years (Indhelder & Piaget, 1958; Laurendau & Pinard, 1962; Piaget, 1930). A study by
Biddulph (1983) reported a range of variables associated with floating, the most
common being lightness, having air inside, being of buoyant material and/or being
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non-compacted. The variables commonly associated with sinking were being heavy,
having no air inside, being solid and/or being absorbent. In a more recent study Howe
(1998) reported that children aged between eight and twelve years mentioned an
astonishing 135 variables associated with floating and 115 variables associated with
sinking (80% of the children mentioned at least ten). Furthermore, the author concluded
that no child mentioned a combination of variables that could be interpreted as an
understanding of relative density, even although the oldest children in the study were
at an age at which understanding had been found in other studies (i.e. age twelve, as in
work by Piaget, 1930; see also Laurendau & Pinard, 1962; Piaget & Indhelder, 1958). In
fact, no robust clusters were found in the data with regard to children aged eight-to-
twelve years. However, between the ages of ten-to-eleven, irrelevant variables were
decreasing and relevant variables were increasingly found in children's explanations.
3.4.3. How Things Work
The need to integrate information about different object properties is central to
understanding 'how things work'. Within the literature understanding of many
mechanical items has been investigated but this chapter focuses on only two namely the
balance scale and gearwheels as these illustrate examples of the physical concepts
examined in studies contained in this thesis.
The Balance Scale
In order to reason about a balance scale children are required to integrate information
about weight and distance. Studies employing this task have shown that young
children can identify the physical features of pegs (i.e. weight, size, colour) that may (or
may not) influence the workings of a balance scale. However, they have little
understanding of the effect of spatial features (Amsel, Goodman, Savoie & Clark, 1996;
Metz, 1993). For example, studies have reported that the judgements of pre-schoolers
are based solely on the number of objects on each arm (i.e. weight). However, this is not
due to lack of cognitive ability to understand more than one variable since they do not
dismiss all other variables as non-causal. Rather, it seems to reflect children's rather
piecemeal evaluation of the factors influencing a balance scale whereby they firstly
reason about the physical properties of objects placed on the arm before expanding
their understanding to include spatial features (Amsel et al., 1996).
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In a comprehensive study, Siegler (1976) investigated the different rules that children
employ in their judgements regarding which arm of the scale would descend when one
variable (weight or distance) was held constant and the other varied. His results
indicted that children used one of four rules (or five if chance guessing was included)
whereby each emerging rule builds on fundamental components of the preceding one
but includes additional information that contributes to a progressively more accurate
solution. The majority of children aged five-to-six years exhibited Rule I considering the
dimensions of weight and distance separately and always judged that the arm with the
most weights would descend. Children exhibiting Rule II considered distance
information but only when the same number of weights were present on each arm.
Children aged 13-to-14 used Rule III whereby they considered both variables, but only
when the two did not conflict. In fact, performance on such 'conflict-weight' problems
(when one side had a greater weight and the other a greater distance) was no different
to that expected by chance guessing. Only by the age of 16-to-17 was the movement
towards Rule IV evident, as shown by the correct integration of weight and distance
information. However, Wilkening and Anderson (1991) argued that Siegler's
methodology led to the gross underestimation of children's ability to integrate
information about two variables. When asked to balance a set of weights in accordance
with both weight and distance variables, children aged nine (using Rule II in Siegler's
study) were able to integrate information regarding both. However, young children still
adhered to the intuitive belief that equal weight on both sizes would allow the scale to
balance.
Gearwheels
Metz (1985) investigated children's problem solving in the domain of physics using a
gearwheel task. This task involves presenting to children twelve round gears
(alternatively known as cogs or wheels) of varying size and a Velcro board. Two of the
gears are marked with a man and the children are asked to arrange the gears so that
when a knob is turned clockwise, the men do 'feet first somersaults'. The solution to the
task involves knowing the parity of gear elements between the marked gears. If there is
an odd number then the two marked gears will turn in the same direction and if there is
an even number then they will turn in opposite directions. However, if there is one
connection with an odd number and one with an even number then the construction
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will jam. This study found children under the age of twelve simply could not
understand how to work the system efficiently.
3.5. Summary
Children's reasoning about physical phenomena can be categorised according to three
areas. The first area to be overviewed was an understanding of object movement. This
showed that children aged three-to-four years can successfully reason about causality
using the principles of priority, co-variation, temporal contiguity and similarity (Shultz
et al., 1982). Young children also appear to have an inherent notion of gravity that
allows them to appreciate that all unsupported objects will fall straight down (Hood,
1995; Kaiser, Proffitt & Anderson, 1985). However, young children have difficulty in
reasoning about more sophisticated concepts and have little idea about the forces that
affect object movement. Work has shown that they tend to rely on impetus theory to
make predictions i.e. believing that a force internal to the object causes it to move/stop
moving (Howe, 1998; Kaiser, Proffitt & McCloskey, 1985; 1986).
The second area of research reviewed concerned the intrinsic properties of objects. This
work has shown that children aged three-to-four years focus on the most salient
physical property of the object in question, for example, being heavy or light.
Furthermore, young children make use of gross generalisations between weight and
material kind, such as maintaining that all steel objects are heavy (Smith et al., 1985).
Nowhere in children's early concept of weight is the notion of density (Smith et al.,
1985). Using the floating and sinking paradigm it was found that children focus on the
weight of an object to explain why it may float or sink. An understanding of relative
density has not been found in children under ten years (Indhelder & Piaget, 1958;
Laurendau & Pinard, 1962) and may not be even fully in place by the age of twelve
(Howe, 1998).
The final area discussed briefly addressed the way objects work. The balance scale
paradigm requires children to integrate information about weight and distance.
Findings have shown that pre-school children focus on the number of pegs on each arm
but have little understanding of the effect of spatial features (Amsel et al., 1996; Metz,
1993; Siegler, 1976). With respect to gearwheels, Metz (1985) found that it was not until
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the age of eleven-to-twelve years that children could integrate the relevant physical
variables to complete the task successfully.
3.6. Intuitive Physics in Children on the Autistic Spectrum
Chapter 2 described the difficulties faced by children on the autistic spectrum in terms
of their impairment in the domain of psychology. In contrast to this work, it has been
postulated that children with autism have an intact understanding of intuitive physics
(see Baron-Cohen, 1997; 2000a). In an attempt to explore this hypothesis, the remainder
of this chapter will highlight key research findings on the understanding within the
domain of physics in individuals diagnosed as on the autistic spectrum.
Studies implicating an intact understanding of intuitive physics arose as a result of the
very many investigations there have been into the cognitive abilities of children with
autism. However, apart from work showing that infants with autism can successfully
understand object permanence (Sigman & Ungerer, 1981), there is little investigation
into whether children on the autistic spectrum have the initial building blocks in the
domain of physics that are assigned to typically developing infants. This endeavour has
been made virtually impossible due to the age at which autism is usually diagnosed
(see Chapter 1) and as a result, the research with children on the autistic spectrum tends
to involve children above the age of four years.
It is important to note that at first, this research did not directly investigate physical
understanding as this was simply a side issue in the exploration of the difficulty faced
by this group in understanding psychological phenomena. Consequently, there are real
differences in the nature of the concepts investigated in children with autism and the
ones described earlier that feature in research with typically developing children. For
instance, work on children with autism tends to relate to basic notions regarding the
physical world (such as physical representations), rather than to their knowledge of
explicit physical phenomena (such as motion). This is because many of the studies
relating to children on the autistic spectrum are situated within the cognitive
developmental literature as opposed to the educational literature. Within the field of
cognitive development, the investigative effort is related to the differential
understanding of intuitive physics and intuitive psychology concepts in children on the
autistic spectrum. In general, the educational literature is often linked to concepts that
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are studied at school and few studies include atypically developing children. As a
result, the body of work focussing on physics concepts in children on the autistic
spectrum is still in its early stages and comprises very different research approaches
from those used to explore intuitive physics in typical populations. As a consequence,
points of contact between this work and work with typically developing children are
sometimes limited.
3.6.1. Evidence for Intact Understanding of Intuitive Physics
Although comparatively few in number, some studies do suggest that children on the
autistic spectrum exhibit a superior level of understanding in the domain of physics
(see Baron-Cohen, 2000a). Three main areas of work that will be presented
subsequently in this chapter support this assertion. The first area to be presented is
concerned with family studies of children on the autistic spectrum. Secondly, a brief
overview of work investigating how children with autism interact with physical objects
will be introduced. Finally comparative studies exploring the differentiated relationship
between intuitive physics and psychology will be examined. This area is the one most
strongly associated with the argument for strengths in understanding physical
phenomena in children on the autistic spectrum and thus will be given most
consideration.
Family Studies
It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that there is evidence for there being a heritable link in
autism (i.e. Bailey et al., 1995; Bolton et al., 1994). As a result, it has been argued that if
autism is attributable to genetic factors then one should expect a similar but milder
cognitive profile in family members (Baron-Cohen, 2000a). On this premise, it has been
argued that the broader cognitive phenotype of autism may be characterised by
impairments in the domain of psychology coupled with strengths in the domain of
physics (Baron-Cohen, Wheelright, Stott, Bolton & Goodyer, 1997). Support for this
argument comes from evidence that parents of children with autism demonstrate mild
but significant deficits on adult intuitive psychology tasks (Baron-Cohen & Hammer,
1997). Additionally, studies have started to probe the links to the domain of physics in
individuals who have a close relative with autism. For example, research into the
occupational pathways of close relatives has revealed that fathers and grandfathers of
children on the autistic spectrum compared to fathers and grandfathers of children
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with other disabilities such as Tourette's syndrome, are over represented in occupations
with a strong physics component. In fact, it was reported that 28.4% of children with an
autistic spectrum disorder had at least one relative who was an engineer (Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright et al., 1997). These results were supported and extended by Jarrold and
Routh (1997) who reported that although engineering was over represented in fathers
of children with autism so too was medicine, science and accountancy. Along similar
lines, one study has reported a six-fold increase in autism in families of students
studying subjects in the sciences as opposed to the humanities (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1998). These findings support the premise that genetic links may result in a mild form
of the condition being evident in close relatives of children on the autistic spectrum.
Behaviour with Physical Objects
It has long been noted that children on the autistic spectrum often display repetitive
interests with phenomena of a physical nature. In his seminal 1943 paper, Kanner noted
that the child with autism demonstrates excellent, purposeful and intelligent relations
to objects whilst exhibiting virtually no relations to people (cited in Frith, 1991).
Subsequent work in this area has charted a similar preference for physical phenomena
in children with autism. For example, Wing (1969) found a greater attachment to objects
in children with autism than in other diagnostic groups. Furthermore, it has been noted
that the clinical literature describes hundreds of cases of children on the autistic
spectrum who are obsessed with machines and other physical systems (Baron-Cohen et
al, 2001). Among this group it is common to find strong interests with mechanical
objects such as clocks, vacuum cleaners and washing machines (Hart, 1989) and with
mechanical systems such as light switches (Baron-Cohen, 2000a). It has also been
reported that children on the autistic spectrum often display a strong fascination with
object movement such as spinning tops and the opening or closing of doors (APA,
1994).
In contrast to these accounts, it has recently been claimed that children with autism
have difficulties relating to objects as well as to people and that their interactions with
objects differ qualitatively from their typically developing CA matched peers (Williams,
Costall & Reddy, 1999). This study documents that children with autism manipulate
objects in an unusual way. They prefer to explore and inspect objects in close detail,
often looking at an object, or a single part of it, for an extended period of time.
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Consequently, the authors suggest that children with autism may be impaired in this
area. However, an alternative explanation is that children with autism are profoundly
interested in objects and simply wish to understand better how they operate. Support
for this idea can be found in a content analysis of children's 'obsessions' reported by
Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (1999). It was hypothesised that if repetitive interests
can in some way be reflected by cognitive mechanisms then children on the autistic
spectrum may have interests that are not random with respect to content. In fact, they
may show a preference for phenomena that is associated with their cognitive strengths.
In line with predictions, results showed that children on the autistic spectrum have
obsessions that cluster positively in the domain of physics yet negatively in the domain
of psychology. It was reported that in a sample of 92 questionnaires completed by the
parents of children with autistic spectrum disorders, 84% of children had obsessions in
the domain of physics compared to 5% in the domain of psychology. These figures
were in contrast to a group of children with Tourette's syndrome. In this group 61%
was reported to have obsessions in the domain of physics with 18% in the domain of
psychology. The authors link the strong physical content of obsessions in children on
the autistic spectrum with the argument that they have an intact and perhaps superior
domain of cognitive reasoning pertaining to physical phenomena.
Evidence that children with autism show a preference for reasoning in terms of
intuitive physics has been shown in a recent study concerning different types of object
movement (Bowler & Thommen, 2000). Initial findings indicated that children with
autism could distinguish psychological and physical entities by correctly differentiating
patterns of movement that characterise agents (animate) and non-agents (inanimate).
However, when this was investigated in more depth, children with autism were shown
to have difficulty in describing the actions of two animate agents when their interaction
did not involve contact but they could reason appropriately about interactions that did
involve physical contact. A new interpretation of these results is that even when
reasoning about animate agents, children on the autistic spectrum may employ their
physical reasoning system and when this cannot be employed (as in the no contact
condition) they find any other interpretation difficult.
73
Comparative Studies of Intuitive Physics and Intuitive Psychology
The uneven pattern of cognitive reasoning in children on the autistic spectrum is clearly
evident when comparing performance on tasks that are similar in structure yet
represent two different domains of knowledge. This was first noted by Leekham and
Perner (1991) who administered a 'false photo task' (Zaitchik, 1990) to children with
autism. This task was designed to be similar in structure to the false belief task from the
domain of psychology (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) but focussed on physical
representations rather than mental representations. In the false photo task a camera
records a scene then an object is moved from position A to B. Findings from this study
and subsequent replications (e.g. Peterson & Siegal, 1998) have shown that children
with autism correctly identify the object that will appear in the photo. Thus they have
an intact ability to understand the nature of physical representations created by a
camera, in stark contrast to their poor performance on tasks of false belief. This latter
paradigm involves a person viewing a scene then leaving and whilst absent an object is
moved from position A to B. As discussed in Chapter 2 children with autism
consistently predict that on return the person will look for the object in its present (but
wrong) location. Studies such as those by Petersen and Siegal (1997; 1998) show that
children with autism have an understanding of physical representations that is far more
advanced than their understanding of mental states.
A study by Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith (1986) employed a picture-sequencing
paradigm to directly compare intuitive psychology and intuitive physics. When
instructed to arrange pictures into a pre-determined sequence, twelve-year-old children
with autism were shown to perform poorly on intentional stories that required an
understanding of a character's mental state. On the other hand, they performed
significantly better than a group of four-year-olds and a group of children with Down
syndrome, who had an average CA of 10 years, at sequencing physical causal
sequences. The children with autism were also more likely to produce descriptive
utterances in the physical condition in contrast to the intentional one. These results
suggest that children with autism can utilise knowledge pertaining to the domain of
physics but have little understanding of intuitive psychological concepts.
Some phenomena have characteristics and functions that relate to both psychological
and physical phenomena, a prime example being the brain. Work has shown that
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typically developing four-year-olds attribute mental functions to the brain (e.g.
thinking, dreaming). Only much later, and sometimes not even by 11 years, do children
fully understand that the brain is also necessary for physical behaviour, e.g. walking or
running (Johnson & Wellman, 1982). Baron-Cohen (1989a) extended this work by
asking children with autism (who had an average CA of 14 years) what they
understood about the brain. He found that they were more likely to report physical
functions pertaining to the brain. This was in contrast to typically developing five-year-
olds and a non-specific developmentally disadvantaged group with similar CA, who
both preferred to report mentalistic functions (the most common one being 'thinking').
By referring to the brain in terms of physical attributes, the authors suggested that
children with autism were in fact giving more complex answers than the other two
groups. On this basis it was suggested that they have a precocious understanding of
physical phenomena. However, as they had a higher MA than the comparison groups
in this study this conclusion is perhaps not fully warranted.
In a direct comparison study Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) revealed a striking contrast
between understanding of intuitive psychology and physics in children diagnosed with
Asperger syndrome. The study employed a psychology task that involved participants
being shown photographs of the eye region before being asked to pick from a choice of
four emotions the one that the person is thinking or feeling (adapted from Baron-
Cohen, Jollife, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997). The physics task involved 20 multiple-
choice questions depicting the everyday physical causal world including items on how
things work, motion and balance. Comparison of performance on these two tasks
revealed that in contrast to younger typically developing children (with lower MA),
children with Asperger syndrome were impaired in basic psychological understanding.
However, in comparison to a CA comparison group (with similar MA) they
demonstrated superior performance when reasoning about physical phenomena. This
study appears to offer strength to the claim that children with an autistic spectrum
disorder show superior understanding in the domain of physics. However, it must be
noted that the intuitive psychology and physics tasks in this study were not similar in
structure or procedure therefore, any conclusion reached from a direct comparison of
the two may be misleading.
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3.7. Summary
There has been little investigation into whether children with autistic spectrum
disorders have the initial building blocks pertaining to the domain of physics which
have been identified in young typically developing children. Furthermore, there are
real differences between the concepts researched and the methods used to investigate
these concepts in children with autism and physics knowledge in typically developing
children, making comparisons across the groups difficult. Nevertheless, some studies
do suggest that children on the autistic spectrum exhibit a superior level of
understanding in the domain of physics (see Baron-Cohen, 1997; 2000a).
Family studies have shown that many fathers and grandfathers of children with autism
are more likely to be employed in occupations with a strong physical component such
as engineering, the paradigm occupation for a cognitive profile that reflects strengths in
the domain of physics (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright et al., 1997). Direct work with
children who have autism has shown that they are profoundly interested in objects and
are very keen to understand how they operate (Williams et al., 1999). This may explain
why it has been reported that they have obsessions that cluster in the domain of physics
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelright, 1999). Moreover, when asked to reason about animate
agents, children with autism tend to use their physical reasoning system and if this
cannot be employed find any alternative interpretation difficult (Bowler & Thommen,
2000). Empirical evidence used to support the assertion that children with autism can
reason about physical phenomena includes reports that they can understand the nature
of physical representations created by a camera (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), are good at
sequencing physical causal pictures (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986) and are more likely to
report physical rather than psychological functions when describing the brain (Baron-
Cohen, 1989a). Moreover, using a multiple-choice task, it has been recently shown that
children with Asperger syndrome demonstrate a superior understanding of many
concepts in the domain of physics when compared to a CA matched group of typically
developing children (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001)
This accumulating body of work suggests that children on the autistic spectrum have a
predisposition to relate to physical phenomena. However, Baron-Cohen et al. (2001)
point out that 'the brain basis of folk physics' remains unclear and this is the case for
both typically developing children and children on the autistic spectrum. More detailed
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research is clearly needed therefore to support these initial findings concerning physics
knowledge in children on the autistic spectrum before work on the physiological and
structural bases of these abilities can commence.
3.8. Is the Domain of Physics Theoretical?
A central concern of this thesis is the theoretical nature of intuitive knowledge and in
contrast to the research effort in the domain of psychology, theoretical physics
knowledge is an under reviewed field. As a result, little speculation has been offered
with respect to whether typically or atypically developing children have theoretical
knowledge in this domain. For example, unlike the effort by Slaughter and Gopnik
(1996) in the domain of psychology (see Chapter 2) no attempt has been made to see if
performance on intuitive physics tasks can be improved if tested in a conceptually
coherent context. In order to shed light on this issue this chapter will again present the
three cognitive accounts of theoretical knowledge in typically developing children that
were previously discussed in Chapter 2 with respect to psychological knowledge but
this time in relation to the domain of physics. With the exception of 'theory theory',
speculation will be necessary as to how the theoretical positions included in Chapter 2
might account for what is known about the profile of physical knowledge in children
with autism.
Leslie's explanation for infants' sensitivity to physical causality can be explained by
ToBy, the innate module that is specifically concerned with mechanical events (see
Chapter 1). In Leslie's view ToBy allows young infants to reason about physical objects
in a theoretical way. It achieves this by guiding the infants reasoning through the
notion of 'Agency' which, in the case of ToBy, is wholly concerned with mechanical
'force' relations between objects (Leslie, 1994). This allows the infant to assume that
when objects move they possess or bear force and, when objects contact other objects,
they transmit, receive, or resist force. By deploying this 'force representational system',
the ToBy module allows explicit information about the mechanical properties of objects
and their events be made available to the infant (Leslie, 1994). Leslie does not make any
conjectures about the presence of ToBy in autism and does not discuss whether
children with autism have theoretical understanding of physical phenomena. His idea
that cognition is served by two distinct modules has been linked to autism but in that it
suggests that the module serving the domain of psychology is impaired in autism (see
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Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). It would be plausible to suggest that ToBy is present among
children on the autistic spectrum however this conjecture remains speculative.
As already stated, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) asserts that for knowledge to be theoretical it
must be represented explicitly (phase El or higher). She reports that the understanding
that reflects the physical building blocks reported in infants by for example Spelke, is
not theoretical in status since it comprises implicit representations. She suggests that
physical knowledge develops as a result of initial implicit information being
redescribed into explicit representations. As a result, she postulates that the
understanding evident in children's explicit theories often resembles the constraints
and principles that operate during infancy. She demonstrates that in the domain of
physics children's theories can curtail learning. She shows that they often treat what
should be counter examples as anomalies and in some cases even invent or ignore data
in order to maintain their theoretical commitments. With respect to autism, Karmiloff-
Smith's position would assert that implicit representations pertaining to physical
phenomena would need to be present for explicit theoretical knowledge to develop. If
children with autism have theoretical physical knowledge beyond El then they should
have conscious access to this knowledge and be able to report it verbally. This
theoretical position remains as yet untested and will be a consideration of Study 3
reported in Chapter 6.
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) claim that by the age of 18 months children have a 'theory
of appearances' which encapsulates the coherent web of properties associated with the
properties of objects. They argue that this initial theory pertaining to the domain of
physics allows young infants to understand the laws governing the movement of
objects, properties of objects, the spatial relations between stationary objects and the
laws that govern the perceptual relations between observers and objects. Thus contrary
to Karmiloff-Smith (1992) they assert that young children have a highly structured
understanding of objects, that can be described as theoretical. Moreover, they suggest
that the changes evident in this understanding have the hallmarks of theory change. As
already discussed in Chapter 2, Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) suggest that children on the
autistic spectrum have problems with theory building per se. They suggest that studies
demonstrating successful reasoning in children with autism on tasks of intuitive
physics are erroneous since the tasks employed may not be tapping theoretical
78
knowledge (Gopnik et al., 2000). They argue that the motivation to learn about the
physical world in children with autism may be different from the 'theory-driven'
nature of learning evident in typically developing children. Moreover, they suggest that
children with autism prefer 'things' to people because they can be dealt with in an
atheoretical way without any reference needed to their underlying structure. However,
they offer no empirical evidence to support this assertion.
3.9. Conclusions and Implications for this Thesis
Research in the domain of physics is very fragmented and tends to concentrate on
specific physical concepts in isolation from one another. Very little attempt has been
made to integrate research on children's ideas into a well-defined body of literature.
Nevertheless, work has shown that intuitive physics makes its appearance early in
typical development and encompasses knowledge of solid cohesive physical objects
and the causal regularities they exhibit. These building blocks allow understanding to
expand rapidly during childhood to include an understanding of many physical
occurrences, including advanced causal mechanisms and concepts such as weight and
size (see Wellman & Gelman, 1992). However, in contrast to the domain of psychology,
it appears to be the case that explicit physical principles are more difficult for young
children to grasp. With respect to many concepts, a full understanding does not
develop before the age of ten years and in many cases, formal teaching may be needed
(see Howe, 1998).
If cognition develops in a domain-specific way then a demonstration of competence in
children on the autistic spectrum in a domain such as physics would provide strong
supporting evidence for this position. However, although there is a large amount of
literature on intuitive psychological concepts in children with autism much less is
documented about their understanding of intuitive physics. The fact that research
conducted with children who have autism differs in many respects to the research
carried out on typically developing children in this area further complicates the picture.
This is a result of the differing abilities of the two populations as well as the different
research orientations adopted. This thesis will, however, in the next three empirical
chapters attempt to extend the research on intuitive physics in children on the autistic
spectrum by incorporating the concepts researched in the educational literature with
respect to typically developing children. For example, Study 1, to be reported in the
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next Chapter, investigates the understanding of a balance scale. Study 2 to be reported
in Chapter 5, involves among other concepts projectile motion and Study 3, reported in
Chapter 6, incorporates the concept of density and vertical movement. The findings
from the work to be reported aims to help in the evaluation of the relative strengths of
domain-specific accounts of cognitive development offered in Chapter 1. Additionally
it may also contribute towards the resolution of speculation concerning the theoretical
nature of the domain of physics.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 1: INTUITIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL, PHYSICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE IN TYPICALLY DEVELOPING PRE¬
SCHOOLERS, CHILDREN WITH AUTISM AND CHILDREN WITH
DOWN SYNDROME*1
4.1. Aims of this Chapter
There now exists a wide collection of evidence that shows typically developing children
have intuitive understandings relating to the domains of psychology, physics and
biology (Wellman, Hickling & Schultz, 1997; 2000). Additionally, there is now
accumulating work investigating these three domains of knowledge in atypically
developing children. Despite this there is currently a lack of research systematically
comparing the development of children's understanding across these domains. For this
reason, the study reported in this chapter will investigate concepts relating to the
domains of psychology, physics and biology. In keeping with the aims of this thesis
three contrasting groups of children were studied in order to explore the continuity and
discontinuity of development across domains. Pre-school children were included as an
example of typical development and are an age group where understanding is thought
to be evident in all three domains of knowledge. Children with autism were included
because as shown in previous chapters, numerous studies have highlighted a domain-
specific deficit in intuitive psychology among this group (Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000)
alongside an intact ability to reason about intuitive physics (Baron-Cohen, 1997; 2000b)
moreover, it has recently been suggested that their intuitive biology is less well
developed than that of typically developing children (Gopnik et al., 2000). Children
with Down syndrome were included because they are thought to exhibit domain-
general cognitive deficits (see Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) and, despite within-group
variation, they do not usually progress beyond the cognitive capabilities of a typically
developing six-to-eight-year-old in any area (Wishart, 1999a).
*' The data from this study has been published in the British Journal of Developmental
Psychology (see Appendix E)
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4.1.1. An Overview of Intuitive Psychology, Physics and Biology
As described in Chapter 2, the domain of psychology entails an understanding of
persons and their mental life including core infant knowledge such as shared attention
(Mundy & Crowson, 1997) and developmentally higher-level knowledge such as
personality traits (Heyman & Dweck, 1998). Chapter 3 described how the domain of
physics is typically thought to encompass understanding of physical objects and their
movement, including fundamental knowledge of objects that is present in infancy (e.g.
Baillargeon, 2000; Spelke et al., 1992) and higher-level knowledge of, for example,
density (Howe, 1998). As well as having core domains of psychology and physics, some
researchers have identified knowledge pertaining to biology as constituting a third
primary domain of understanding (e.g. Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; Wellman & Gelman,
1992; Wellman, Hickling & Schultz, 2000). This biological domain is thought to be
concerned with plants and animals and their characteristics, encompassing basic
knowledge about categories of living things (Atran, 1999) and higher-level concepts
such as inheritance (Springer, 1999; Williams & Tolmie, 2000) and illness (Kalish, 1999;
Williams & Binnie, 2002).
Research has shown that typically developing children possess knowledge in each of
these three domains by the age of four years. However, although evidence suggests that
the building blocks of intuitive physical and psychological knowledge are present in
early infancy, there are questions over the age of onset of intuitive biological
knowledge. Understanding in this domain is thought to arise developmentally later
(Carey, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1992) and as a result of the differing developmental
models charted in Chapter 1, debate reigns over the precise nature of the initial
cognitive foundations. For example, Carey (1996) believes that the biological domain is
not distinct at birth and instead emerges under jurisdiction from the domain of
psychology. Others such as Keil (1994) and Inagaki and Hatano (1993; 2002) disagree
and argue it constitutes an independent domain of knowledge from the start.
As already discussed, children with autism demonstrate difficulties in reasoning about
phenomena in the domain of psychology (see Chapter 2). Moreover, it has been
suggested that this deficit in intuitive psychology is exclusive to autism since when
compared to children with Down syndrome who exhibited a lower non-verbal and
verbal MA, children with autism performed more poorly on a task tapping the
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psychological concept of belief (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). However, other studies have
shown that children with Down syndrome and other atypical developmental
disabilities (such as Williams syndrome) perform at a level below typical pre-schoolers,
and similarly to children with autism on intuitive psychology tasks (i.e. Tager-Flusberg
& Sullivan, 2000; Yirmiya, Solomonica-Levi, Shulman & Pilowsky, 1996; Zelazo, Burack,
Benedetto & Frye, 1996). Thus clearly there is a need for further research in this area.
Chapter 3 highlighted research revealing that children with autism can reason
competently about physical phenomena. This is clearly illustrated when comparing
their performance on a 'false photo' task and a standard 'false belief task (see Petersen
& Siegal, 1997; 1998). These two tasks are structurally similar but assess understanding
in different domains. Results show that children with autism pass the intuitive physics
task but fail the intuitive psychology task. However, evidence supporting intact
intuitive physics in children with autism has been heavily reliant on the 'false photo'
task and consequently more research is required to investigate how children with
autism understand other physical phenomena. Additionally, whereas some intuitive
psychology research has included comparison groups (e.g. children with Down
syndrome) this has not been the case in relation to intuitive physics. As a result little is
known of physics knowledge among other groups of atypically developing children.
Further research is thus required to ascertain whether intact physics is particular to
children with autism, and to investigate the development of this domain in children
with other forms of atypical development.
Although the vast majority of research with children on the autistic spectrum is
concerned with the domain of psychology, recently research has begun to consider the
development of intuitive biology knowledge in children with autism (Gopnik et al.,
2000). In a study of high-functioning children with autism in which factual biological
knowledge and biological explanations were explored, the children were found to
apply incorrect classifications when categorising living versus non-living exemplars.
Furthermore, they referred to movement as a defining characteristic of living things
more than comparison children and also referred to biological processes less than
comparison children in their explanations for classifying an exemplar as a living thing.
It was concluded that children with autism may "possess a less well-developed theory
of biology than do typically-developing children" (Gopnik et al., 2000; p68). This
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finding that intuitive biology may be limited among children on the autistic spectrum,
while intriguing, requires further exploration. Research is required to examine whether
difficulties with intuitive biology are specific to children with autism or whether they
are also evident in children with other developmental disabilities (e.g. Down
syndrome). Johnson and Carey (1998) showed that individuals with Williams
syndrome had relatively intact factual biology knowledge compared to typically
developing ten-year-olds but that their 'theoretical' knowledge was at the level of six-
year-olds. However no comparison with children with autism was made in this study.
4.1.2. Comparative Studies Across Domains
The lack of cross-domain comparison within particular groups of children can be
attributed in part to the assumption by some researchers that domains are independent
from one another. It may also be the case that intrinsic methodological difficulties of
constructing tasks that assess equivalent levels of understanding across domains have
led researchers to avoid testing out such comparisons. Evidence also indicates that
intuitive biology may develop over a different time course than intuitive physics and
psychology, thus exacerbating the problems in designing age-equivalent tasks across
the domains of psychology, physics and biology. Despite these difficulties, it is
important to examine the independence of understanding across these domains to fully
address fundamental questions concerning the origins and possible neurological
foundations of domain-specific cognition.
Relatively few researchers have attempted comparative studies of intuitive psychology,
physics and biology. However, one series of studies was conducted by Wellman,
Hickling & Shultz (1997, 2000) who investigated typically developing children's
explanations of events (e.g. movement) and concluded that young children could utilise
causal reasoning from the three domains interchangeably and flexibly. In a similar vein,
Peterson and Siegal (1997) examined the performance of different groups of children
(deaf children, children with autism and typically developing pre-schoolers) on three
tasks. Each task related to a separate domain of knowledge: psychology (false belief,
Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), physics (false photo, Zaitchick, 1990), and biology (innate
potential, Gelman & Wellman, 1991). Their results showed that pre-school children and
children who were deaf from signing families performed better on the intuitive
psychology task than children with autism and children who were deaf from non-
84
signing families. However all groups of children performed similarly on the physics
and biology tasks.
4.1.3. The Present Study
To explore the characteristics of domain-specific knowledge pertaining to
psychological, physical and biological phenomena in typically developing pre¬
schoolers, children with autism and children with Down syndrome, the structure of
Peterson and Siegal's (1997) study was replicated. Similarities and differences within
and between domains of knowledge were explored by employing three further tasks
(one from each domain). The additional tasks were conceptually different to the ones
chosen by Peterson and Siegal, to provide a more robust indicator of children's
understanding within each domain.
As illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3, developmental data suggests that the process of
knowledge acquisition within a domain involves some concepts being understood
before others. For example, young children's early domain of psychology includes
knowledge of desire, perception and emotion but does not include knowledge of belief.
Likewise a four-year-old child's understanding of biology typically includes animals
but rarely plants (Wellman & Gelman, 1992). The pragmatic approach taken to equate
tasks in each domain in the present study was to identify tasks that are normally passed
in typically developing children by the age of four. All tasks employed in this study
were therefore of pre-school level but one task in each domain was chosen to tap
slightly more sophisticated concepts than the other. It was expected that within the
domain of psychology an understanding of perception would precede an
understanding of false belief; within the domain of physics an understanding of false
photo would precede an understanding of balance; and within the domain of biology
an understanding of innate potential would precede an understanding of illness
(Wellman & Gelman, 1992). In each case the latter task assesses more sophisticated
knowledge within the domain in question.
It was hypothesised that the typically developing four-year-old children would pass the
tasks set at pre-school level in each domain, with the children with autism showing
impaired performance on the psychology and biology tasks but intact physics
performance. Based on previous work (i.e. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Baron-Cohen,
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1989b) it was expected that the children with Down syndrome would perform similarly
to the pre-school children on the intuitive psychology tasks.
4.2. Method
4.2.1. Participants
The participants were 60 children from one nursery, three mainstream schools and four
special schools covering a wide range of socio-economic catchment areas in Edinburgh
and the Lothians. Informed consent was sought and ethical guidelines were followed
(see Appendix A). The participants comprised three groups: 23 typically developing
pre-schoolers; 19 children diagnosed with autism according to DSM IV or ICD-10
criteria; and 18 children with Down syndrome. Parents reported the diagnosis of
children with autism and confirmatory checks were made with school records. Table
4.1 details the sample characteristics. All participants were administered the British
Picture Vocabulary Scale [BPVS-II] (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997) to ensure
that they had a receptive vocabulary [RV] above four years. This has been the measure
of choice in a number of studies of children with autism (e.g. McGregor, Whiten &
Blackburn, 1998; Petersen & Siegal, 1998; Perner et al., 1989).
Table 4.1: Number [N], mean CA, mean RV scores and associated ranges (years;
months) of each diagnostic group participating in Study 1
Diagnostic Group N Mean CA Mean RV*
(range) (range)
Pre-schoolers 23 4;4 5;4
(4;1 - 5;0) (4;2 - 6;8)
Autism 19 10;0 5;4
(6;11 -12;0) (4;0 - 7;7)
Down syndrome 18 13;1 4;3




Published tasks were employed and every effort was made to maintain their original
detail. However, these tasks were initially designed for use with typical populations
and therefore some changes were essential. Two main additions were made to ensure
consistency of task demands and to increase their appropriateness for use with
atypically developing children.
Firstly, each of the tasks employed a 'reality control' question [RC] to establish that
participants were attending to the task and a 'memory control' question [MC] to ensure
that failure would not result from memory problems. The control questions were
randomly presented before the test question [TQ]: previous research suggests that this
will not facilitate performance (Zaitchik, 1990).
Secondly, to eliminate the need for verbal answers pictorial response options were
designed to accommodate the preference for non-verbal modes of response in children
with autism and to omit response biases due to short-term memory difficulties
experienced by children with Down syndrome (Freeman & Hodapp, 2000). For each
task, participants were randomly presented with three drawings and instructed to
point to the correct answer. On all the tasks only one option was correct and therefore
the level of success predicted through chance was 33%.
Psychology Tasks
Perception: Slaughter and Gopnik's (1996) perception task was employed, with one
additional change; a toy boat was used instead of a toy cat. Participants were
introduced to a teddy bear and told that 'he is sleepy so sometimes he will nap and
sometimes he will play' he was then placed under the table. While seated at a table
participants were asked to view a green toy boat through a red filter (the boat looks
black). They were then asked to move seats in order to view the toy boat from the
opposite side i.e. not through the filter (the boat looks green). Following this, the teddy
awakes and wants to play. He was placed in the first seat and viewed the boat through
the red filter. Participants were presented with a drawing of a red boat, a green boat
and a black boat and were asked to:
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RC: 'point to the colour of boat that you see now when you are sitting in this chair'.
MC: 'point to the colour of boat that you first saw when you were sitting over there in
that chair'.
TQ: 'point to the colour of boat that the teddy will see when he is sitting over there in
that chair'.
False Belief: Baron-Cohen et al.'s (1985) 'Sally/Anne' test of false belief was employed.
In the standard procedure a girl doll called Sally places a marble under a basket and
leaves the room. Before Sally re-enters the room another girl doll moves the marble,
placing it under a box. Participants were shown three drawings: a box; a basket; and a
container. They were then asked to:
RC: 'point to where the marble is really'.
MC: 'point to where the marble was in the beginning'.
TQ: 'point to where Sally will look for her marble'.
Physics Tasks
False Photo: This task was a version of Zaitchik's false photo task (1990) using a
smaller, child-size Polaroid camera. After pre-training participants in the use of the
camera (see Zaitchik, 1990), the experimenter introduced a baby doll and demonstrated
it being placed in a toy bath, in a toy bed and in a toy pram. The experimenter then
placed the baby doll in the bath and asked the participant to look through the window
of the camera (at the baby in the bath) and take a picture. The picture that was
produced by the camera was placed face down on the table. Once this was completed a
mummy doll was introduced and took the baby out of the bath placing it in the bed. In
line with Peterson and Siegal (1997) the furniture designated for use in the photograph
was varied across all trials. Participants were presented with three drawings of the
baby in the bath, the bed and the pram and were asked to:
RC: 'point to where the baby is now'.
MC: 'point to where the where the baby was when the camera flashed'.
TQ: 'point to where the baby will be in the in the photo'.
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Balance: The balance task was adapted from Siegler (1976) who reported that five-year-
olds respond on the basis of weight but nine-year-olds consider both weight and
distance from the fulcrum. Pilot work with pre-schoolers conducted for the present
study found that all used rule I with a small minority using rule II. As a result the three
choices of responses given to participants were defined as weight (partially correct, rule
I), weight and distance (fully correct, rule II) and wrong.
Participants were first introduced to 'naughty teddy' and told that he wanted to play.
They were then pre-trained in the workings of a balance scale (a large wooden balance
painted in primary colours) emphasising the four equally spaced pegs on either side
and the four rings that were all the same weight. Participants were encouraged to put
the rings onto the balance 'in all the ways you can think of in order to learn how the
balance works'. After approximately three minutes the experimenter fixed the balance
in place with a piece of wood. Participants were told that the balance scale would not
move but that they had to think about how it would look without the piece of wood.
The experimenter proceeded by placing two rings on each of the second pegs from the
fulcrum. The 'naughty teddy' then swooped over the experimental material and
'messes up' the balance scale by moving two rings to the third peg from the fulcrum on
the left-hand side of the scale only. 'Naughty teddy' rather than the experimenter made
the transformation to reduce inferred experimenter demands (McGarrigle &
Donaldson, 1974). Participants were shown three drawings of the balance scale:
balancing; tipping to the right; and tipping to the left. They were then asked (to):
RC: 'has naughty teddy has moved the rings?'
MC: 'point to how the scales looked before naughty teddy messed them up'.
TQ: 'point to how the scales should look after naughty teddy messed them up'.
Biology Tasks
Innate Potential: This task was taken from Peterson and Siegal (1997) and is an
adaptation of an original innate potential task devised by Gelman and Wellman (1991).
Participants were read a story about a baby animal, born to one species but raised by
another: "this is a picture of a baby animal (shown in a 'nondescript embryonic way').
Her name is Edith. This is her mother, the dog (a realistic drawing of a dog is shown).
When she was a tiny baby, Edith went to live with a family of cats. This is the mother
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cat and father cat (a drawing of male and female cat was displayed) who raised her like
their own baby. She lived with these cats all her life until she was grown up and she
never saw another dog again. Now Edith is all grown up". A realistic drawing of a cat,
a dog and a horse were shown and the participants were asked to:
RC: 'point to the animal who gave birth to Edith'.
MC: 'point to the animal who raised Edith'.
TQ: 'point to the picture of Edith now that she is grown up'.
Illness: This task is based on work by Kalish (1998). Efe showed that typically
developing children's understanding of illness causation develops over age from a pre¬
school deterministic theory of illness to a later probabilistic understanding of causation.
Since this study included a number of older participants this developmental trend was
taken into account and the three choices of responses given to participants were defined
as deterministic (partially correct, rule I), probabilistic (fully correct, rule II) and wrong.
Participants were read a story accompanied by pictures: "this is Craig he is happy
playing at home (a drawing of Craig is shown). One day his friend came over to play
(drawing of Craig and his friend playing is displayed). His friend had a cough and a
runny nose, his friend had the cold. Craig played with his friend and his friend sneezed
on him (drawing of Craig's friend sneezing on him is shown). After a while Craig's
friend went home (drawing of Craig waving goodbye is shown)". Participants were
shown three drawings depicting Craig as not having the cold, maybe having the cold
and definitely having the cold. Since the pictures were partly subjective the
experimenter pointed to each of them in turn as the three randomly presented choices
in the TQ were given.
RC: 'did Craig have the cold before his friend came over?'
MC: 'does Craig's friend have the cold?'
TQ: 'point to the picture of Craig after his friend goes home, will he not have the cold,
maybe have the cold or definitely have the cold?'
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4.2.3. Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet setting. In light of Slaughter and
Gopnik's (1996) point that performance on one psychological task may facilitate
performance on another, the two tasks pertaining to each domain were never presented
in sequence in order to reduce this potentially confounding effect. However, it should
be noted that this possibility of reciprocal influence of task performance in psychology
still remains, although to a lesser degree. Within this constraint tasks were
administered randomly. Participants who failed two attempts at the control questions
were excluded from the study. If participants passed both control questions in a task
but failed to answer the TQ it was repeated one more time. All tasks were administered
to a child on the same day, in a single session lasting between 10 and 20 minutes.
4.3. Results
Children were scored as correct on each of the six tasks if they identified the fully
correct answer from a choice of three cards (i.e. mean score for each task is out of 1).
Taking each domain of knowledge separately, children's initial scores were analysed in
a task (task 1 vs. task 2) x group (pre-schoolers, autism, Down syndrome) analysis of
variance [ANOVA], For each task post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests with the observed level of
significance corrected to account for multiple comparisons were carried out.
Additionally, percentage pass rates were analysed non-parametrically to assess
performance against that which would have been predicted by chance using a binomial
distribution (i.e. the McNemar test).
4.3.1 Intuitive Psychology
For the domain of psychology there was a main effect of group (F (2, 57) = 20.08, p <
.05) and an interaction between task and group (F (2, 57) = 3.65, p < .05). Exploring the
main effect of group in more detail, one-way ANOVAs revealed significant group
differences in both the false belief task (F (2, 57) = 20.16, p < .001) and the perception
task (F (2, 57) = 7.34, p < .001).
Table 4.2 shows the mean performance of each group. Bonferroni post hoc t-tests
showed that the performance of the pre-schoolers on the false belief task was
significantly better than the children with autism and the children with Down
syndrome (t (40) = 6.41, p< .001; t (39) = 4.54, p < .001). With regard to the perception
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task, pre-school children and children with Down syndrome (mean = 0.67) performed
significantly better than the children with autism (t (40) = 3.84, p < .001; t (35) = 2.62, p <
.001). The observed interaction effect was due to the children with Down syndrome
performing significantly better on the perception task than the false belief task (t (17) =
2.72, p < .01) whereas, pre-school children performed well on both tasks and children
with autism performed relatively poorly on both tasks.













0.78 0.87 1.0 0.30 0.30 0.13
Autism 0.26 0.16 1.0 0.42 0.32 0.05
Down
syndrome
0.67 0.28 0.94 0.56 0.39 0.33
On both tasks pertaining to the domain of psychology, Figure 4.1 shows the percentage
pass rate of each group. Children with autism and pre-school children performed at
chance level. Children with Down syndrome performed at chance level on the false
belief task but above that expected by chance on the percep tion task (p < .001).
Additionally, the pre-schoolers performed significantly above the 33% level expected
by chance on the false belief task (p < .001) and the perception task (p < .001).
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Figure 4.1: Percentage of children in each group who passed each psychology task
FALSE BELIEF TASKS
' Denotes success above chance at p < .001, one tailed binomial test
PERCEPTION
4.3.2 Intuitive Physics
In relation to physics there was a main effect of task (F (1, 57) = 75.47, p < .001) but no
effect of group and no interaction effect. To explore the identified main effect in detail
analyses were performed on each participant group separately. Post hoc Bonnferoni t-
tests comparing mean task scores (see Table 4.2) showed significantly better
performance on the false photo task than the balance scale task for the pre-school
children (t (22) = 7.09, p < .001) and the children with autism (t (18) = 4.47, p < .001).
On both tasks of intuitive physics, Figure 4.2 shows the percentage pass rate of each
group. Children in all three groups performed at ceiling level on the false photo task,
well above the 33% level predicted by chance guessing (all p's < .001). On the balance
task a correct response was granted if children chose rule II (fully correct). Analysis
showed that children with Down syndrome were the only group found to have
performed above that expected by chance (p < .05).
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FALSE PHOTO TASKS BALANCE
* denotes success above chance at p < .05, ** Denotes success above chance at p < .001, one tailed binomial test
The balance task was also analysed according to the developmental trend highlighted
by Siegler (1976). As shown in Figure 4.3, responses did not differ to that expected by
chance. However, the response patterns show that that children with autism were more
likely to offer responses based on rule I (partially correct) whereas children with Down
syndrome were more likely to offer responses based on rule II (fully correct).
Additionally, children with autism were less likely to be wrong than the other two
groups.
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Rule I Rule II Wrong
* Denotes success above chance at p < .05, one tailed binomial test
4.3.3 Intuitive Biology
In the domain of biology there was a significant effect of task (F (1, 57) = 5.72, p < .05)
but no effect of group or interaction effect. There was an overall trend for all children to
perform better on the innate potential task than the illness task (see Table 4.2 for
means). However, when groups were analysed separately this difference only reached
sigiiificance in children with autism (t (18) = 2.54, p < .001).
Figure 4.4 shows the percentage pass rate of each group on both tasks. Results revealed
that no group displayed a better than chance performance on each task (level predicted
by chance for each task is 33%).
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To explore in more depth the illness task data initial responses were re-coded taking
into account the developmental trends identified by Kalish (1998). As shown in Figure
4.5 Pre-school children and children with autism were shown to judge illness causation
as deterministic. Both groups responded on the basis of the partially correct rule I
significantly more than predicted by chance guessing (p < .001). The children with
Down syndrome performed no different to that expected by chance but overall gave
more rule II responses than the other two groups.
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Figure 4.5: Percentage of children in each group applying different rules to answer the
illness task
4.4 Discussion
The present study found that pre-school children, children with autism and children
with Down syndrome demonstrated different levels of performance in the domain of
psychology whereas understanding in the domains of physics and biology was similar
across participant groups. As predicted, the pre-schoolers performed according to the
four-year-old level in all tasks. Additionally, children with autism revealed impaired
performance in intuitive psychology. The finding that children with autism performed
similarly to pre-schoolers (who had similar average RV as the children with autism) on
intuitive physics tasks was taken as evidence that their understanding in this domain
was intact although not superior. Contrary to that predicted, the performance of
children with autism on intuitive biology was not impaired compared to the other two
groups. The overall pattern of results for children with Down syndrome was not as
predicted as they performed similarly to pre-schoolers oil most tasks apart from the
false belief task where they performed more poorly, and the illness task where their
performance was randomly distributed across possible responses.
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The results from the intuitive psychology tasks confirm the findings of previous
research showing that typically developing pre-school children perform well on both
the perception and false belief tasks. By contrast, children with autism performed
consistently more poorly in the two tasks in comparison to pre-schoolers, despite being
of higher CA and having a similar RV. A slightly different pattern of results was
observed in relation to children with Down syndrome who performed well on the
perception task but often failed the false belief task.
It is well documented that children with autism show poor performance on the false
belief task (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Leslie & Thiass, 1992). However, their lack of
success on the perception task contrasts with other findings (Baron-Cohen, 1989b;
Hobson, 1984; Leslie & Frith, 1988). It is possible that these slight discrepancies may
have resulted from the relatively high executive functioning demands of this task. The
task required participants to inhibit reference to their own perception while answering
a question relating to another's perception. As discussed in Chapter 1, executive
functioning involves the ability to suppress a pre-potent but incorrect response while
holding relevant information in working memory (Diamond, 1991; Pennington et al.,
1997, Russell, 1997). Russell, Saltmarsh & Hill (1999) increased executive functioning
demands in a 'desire' task and found this task adaptation reduced performance of
children with autism to the same level as performance on a false belief task. Taken
together, the results of the present study and those of Russell et al. (1999) suggest that
executive functioning demands might play a role in the difficulty faced by children
with autism on some intuitive psychology tasks.
In contrast to children with autism and pre-schoolers, children with Down syndrome
demonstrated differential levels of performance in the two psychology tasks. They
showed a clear understanding of perceptual role taking, supporting the results of
previous research (Baron-Cohen, 1989b). However, in contrast to the results of Baron-
Cohen et al. (1985), they exhibited great difficulty in understanding the standard false
belief task. Indeed, despite the lack of any linguistic demands in the mode of
responding, and despite subjects having a higher mean RV than the participants in
Baron-Cohen et al's study (4.3 years and 2.11 years respectively), the performance of the
children with Down syndrome was nearly equivalent to that of the children with
autism. This poor performance had not been predicted and is hard to reconcile with the
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findings of Baron-Cohen et al. (1985). However, other studies have highlighted that
participants with Down syndrome are impaired in tasks of intuitive psychology, even
studies which have included participants with a mean CA greater than 20 years (i.e.
Yirmiya et al., 1996; Zelazo et al., 1996). These conflicting results could be the product of
cross-study differences in the range of severity of impairments within the groups of
atypically developing children tested. Another factor to be taken into consideration is
that task success requires both cognitive ability and motivation to comply with task
demands and succeed. Research has shown that children with Down syndrome may
under-perform in testing situations due to motivational factors (Wishart, 1996b). In the
present study considerable effort was made to develop interesting and enjoyable task
materials while maintaining the veracity of the test but perhaps the motivational
demands of the false belief task were comparatively high for this group. Some authors
have stated that standard intuitive psychology tasks can be employed to compare
performance across clinical groups (Charman & Campbell, 1997; Hughes et al., 2000)
but more research is required to explore factors such as motivation that may confound
findings of group differences in ability.
In relation to physics there was a clear difference in performance between tasks across
all three groups of children. Performance on the false photo task reached ceiling level
thus it was not surprising that performance on the balance task was poorer. Taking
each task in turn, the high performance scores on the false photo task found in the
present study are in contrast with previous work reporting much lower pass rates in
typically developing pre-schoolers and children with autism (i.e. Leekam & Perner,
1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Peterson & Siegal, 1998; Zaitchik, 1990). The inclusion of
non-verbal responses and the use of a small child-friendly camera may have facilitated
performance in the present study. In addition, because most of the studies reporting
lower levels of performance were conducted in the early 1990s the superior
performance on the false photo task reported here may reflect an increase in children's
knowledge and experience of using cameras over the past ten years.
A further issue is whether the false photo task is truly representative of the domain of
physics. It might be possible for children to succeed on this task as a result of their
procedural knowledge of using cameras rather than a deeper understanding of the
nature or process of the representation. Likewise, Peterson and Siegal (1998) suggest
99
that the mechanistic nature of a camera draws attention to the encoding process and
that the photograph provides a physical recording of the event thus facilitating
responses. It remains unclear, therefore, whether the task methodology of handling a
camera is responsible for the high success rates rather than a conceptual knowledge of
basic physics.
All groups in this study performed more poorly on the balance task than the false
photo task. Although there was no group differences, children with Down syndrome
performed above the level expected by chance. Detailed examination of re-coded
responses showed that for the pre-schoolers and children with autism rule I and II were
used at chance level. Despite these results clear trends in the data were apparent. A
higher percentage of children with autism than pre-schoolers passed the balance task
and on the whole were less likely than the other two groups to be wrong. This could be
taken as evidence, together with performance on the false photo task, that
understanding of physics was relatively intact in children with autism when compared
to pre-schoolers. However, children with autism were not found to have a superior
understanding of physics as suggested by Baron-Cohen (1997; 2000a) since a higher
number than that predicted by chance would have been expected to achieve rule II
understanding given the considerable age advantage they exhibited. In order to
investigate superiority in intuitive physics in children with autism a typically
developing CA match would be required and consequently will be included in Studies
2 (Chapter 5) and 3 (Chapter 6) of this thesis.
With regard to biology there was a task effect whereby across all three groups of
participants performance was better on the innate potential task than the illness task as
predicted. The similar performance of the groups on each of these tasks is not in full
agreement with Gopnik's (2001) assertion that biological understanding may be
impaired or less well developed in children with autism but is in agreement with the
findings of Peterson and Siegal (1997).
The findings in relation to innate potential resonate well with results showing no
differences between children with autism and pre-schoolers on this task (Peterson &
Siegal, 1997). However, the present study revealed lower performance scores across
groups than those reported by Peterson and Siegal (1997) and in the original version of
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the task (Gelman & Wellman, 1991). These discrepant results may be attributable to the
materials used in this study. Great care was taken to follow the method of Peterson and
Siegal (1997) but it is possible that minor differences could have influenced results. For
example, in the present study the inclusion of a third response choice allowed for
random guessing to be more fully identified, consequently the present results may
differ from previous work but may be a more accurate reflection of children's
understanding.
Turning to the illness task, initial analyses showed that overall children performed at a
lower level on this task than the innate potential task. More detailed analyses of the re-
coded data showed that pre-school children and children with autism were
deterministic in that they chose rule I significantly more often than expected by chance.
However, children with Down syndrome produced a more even response pattern
across the three options that could indicate random guessing. However, they did offer a
higher frequency of responses based on the more developmentally advanced rule II
than the other groups. This may be a result of the relatively high CA of participating
children with Down syndrome (and thus their greater experience of illness) which may
have led to a greater number of participants in this group understanding the
probabilistic nature of illness causation. However a note of caution must be made.
Perhaps it is possible that the children with Down syndrome may have interpreted the
'maybe' option in a manner differently from the other groups. Specifically, research has
shown that children with Down syndrome often use avoidant learning strategies
(Wishart, 1996a) and the 'maybe' option may have led these children to be reluctant to
commit to a 'yes' or 'no' response. Thus these results may not show greater
understanding but more a style of responding to the task by this group. A larger
sample size and a more in-depth task such as the one used by Kalish (1998) should be
used to investigate this issue further.
4.4.1. Conclusions
Taking the findings of the present study together clear task differences and some group
differences have been identified. This research confirms the recurrent finding that
children with autism have a deficit in intuitive psychology, but extends past research in
showing that performance of these children in intuitive physics especially, but also
biology, is relatively unimpaired compared to typically developing pre-school children.
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The differentiated performance demonstrated by children with autism adds weight to
the claim that cognition develops in a domain-specific fashion.
The finding that children with autism can reason about tasks pertaining to the domain
of physics has been the topic of much discussion and it has recently been claimed that
children on the autistic spectrum have a superior ability to reason about phenomena
relating to this domain (Baron-Cohen, 2000a). As a result of this speculation and in part
due to the debate regarding the cognitive foundations of the domain of biology (see
Carey, 1995) Study 2 will focus on the domains of psychology and physics and no
further investigation of biological concepts will be pursued in this thesis.
Baron-Cohen's claims of superior physics reasoning among children on the autistic
spectrum was not identifiable in the present study due to the inclusion of a young
typically developing comparison group. As a result Studies 2 and 3 will compare
children on the autistic spectrum with a CA matched group in order to offer a stronger
age comparison for the superiority claims to be given consideration. Additionally, in
light of the discussion surrounding the false photo task raised in this chapter, Studies 2
and 3 will employ tasks that will tap purely physical reasoning and consideration will
be given to tasks from the educational literature discussed in Chapter 3.
A difficulty raised by the present study is that task structure within and between
domains differed considerably. Study 2, reported in the following chapter, will attempt
to overcome this problem by comparing intuitive psychological and physical
understanding using tasks with two conditions that are similar in structure and differ
only in content. In addition, Study 2 will not only focus on understanding among
participant groups but it will also investigate which domain participants prefer to use
when given a choice of utilising either the domain of psychology or physics.
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CHAPTER 5
STUDY 2: INTUITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSICS IN
TYPICALLY DEVELOPING CHILDREN AND CHILDREN ON THE
AUTISTIC SPECTRUM 2
5.1. Aims of this Chapter
The results of Study 1 showed that there is a dichotomy in understanding pertaining to
intuitive psychology and physics concepts in children with autism. The ability of
children with autism to reason about physical phenomena has been reported elsewhere
(see Baron-Cohen, 1997) but the finding that they can reason competently about
physical phenomena is relatively new. Moreover, it has only recently been claimed that
children with autism have superior reasoning abilities with respect to the domain of
physics (see Baron-Cohen, 2000a). At present there has only been a very small number
of direct comparisons made between the difficulties children on the autistic spectrum
have in relating to people and the relative ease with which they interact with physical
objects (an exception being Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). In an attempt to rectify this
situation the study reported in this chapter investigates both the understanding of
intuitive psychology and physics in typically developing children and children with
autism. It must be noted that this study is not concerned with the precise cognitive
structure of intuitive psychology or intuitive physics. It takes it as given that they are
both 'core domains of cognition' that are established very early in typical development
(Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Wellman & Inagaki, 1997a; Wellman, Phillips & Rodriguez,
2000).
5.1.1. An Overview of Intuitive Psychology and Physics
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, it is widely thought that concepts within the domains
of intuitive psychology and physics comprise fundamental implicit (and possibly
innate) principles. These principles are often evident in early infancy but also
encompass developmentally advanced concepts that emerge in later childhood.
2 The data from this study is in press in Autism: International Journal of Research and
Practise (see Appendix E)
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To re-cap from Chapter 2, the domain of psychology is utilised during interactions with
others and allows feelings, desires, motivations and intentions to be taken into account
when reasoning about human behaviour. Intuitive psychology encompasses basic
communication skills present in infancy such as shared attention (Mundy & Crowson,
1997) and the ability to imitate facial expressions (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). It also
includes more advanced concepts present in typical development by the age of four
years, such as being able to attribute mental states to oneself and others (Leslie, 1987),
having an appreciation that seeing leads to knowing (Pratt & Bryant, 1990) and
understanding emotional causality (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews & Cooke, 1989).
As development proceeds, more complex concepts, such as having an appreciation of
personality traits, emerge (Heyman & Dweck, 1998).
In contrast, despite many physical concepts having been investigated the literature on
intuitive physics is very piecemeal (see Howe, 1998). The study to be reported in this
chapter will focus on the fundamental physical concepts identified in Chapter 3, such as
the movement and characteristics of objects. Intuitive physics initially makes its
appearance in children's knowledge of solid cohesive physical objects and the causal
regularities that they exhibit. The 'object concept' has been identified as a core
constituent of this domain and involves fundamental knowledge found in infants as
young as three-to-four months old (Baillargeon et al., 1985). By extension, the domain of
physics involves reasoning about the physical causes of non-agent initiated events.
More advanced concepts within this domain include the notion that a cause will
produce an effect by transmitting a force or restraint to it, or a set of forces will cause
trajectories, accelerations and so on (Wellman & Gelman, 1992). The ability to reason
about these more advanced object-related concepts typically becomes apparent
between the ages of three-to-four years (Das Gupta & Bryant, 1989; Gelman et al., 1980),
alongside concepts such as object size and weight (Smith et al., 1985). More
developmentally advanced understanding such as knowing how a balance scale works
(Siegler, 1976) and having a theory of motion is thought to be present by the ages of
seven-to-twelve years (Kaiser et al., 1986).
Although typically developing children can employ specific reasoning systems in
relation to psychological and physical phenomena, a large body of research carried out
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on children with autism has shown that they lack an understanding of psychological
concepts (see Chapter 2). Moreover, accumulating work shows that they have a
relatively intact understanding of physical phenomena (see Chapter 3). However,
despite claims regarding superior physics understanding among children on the
autistic spectrum (i.e. Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) Study 1 was unable to clarify the
picture. As a result more detailed research is needed to provide a highly controlled test
of this claim and also give a clearer understanding of the typical development of
physical reasoning.
5.1.2. The Present Study
In order to make a direct comparison between the two domains of knowledge in
question this study employed three tasks, each with an intuitive psychology and
intuitive physics condition. The study examined group differences across conditions in
each task for three groups of typically developing children, children with autism and a
CA matched group. The CA match group was included to provide a direct comparison
group for the children with autism in terms of length of experience of the physical and
psychological worlds. The typically developing children comprised three groups: pre¬
schoolers, seven-year-olds and ten-year-olds in order to provide baseline normative
developmental data on the newly developed tasks. These comparison groups were
designed to allow a full investigation into claims that children on the autistic spectrum
have superior reasoning for physical phenomena.
Three tasks were employed in this study, they required participants to complete a
picture sequence, categorise cards and respond to a number of multiple-choice
questions. The picture-sequencing task gave participants a fixed choice of two options.
It was predicted that children with autism would be more likely to respond with the
intuitive physical rather than the psychological option. The categorisation task aimed to
observe how children would categorise intuitive psychological and physical
phenomena. It was expected that children with autism would choose superficial
features to categorise psychological items but physical features to categorise physical
items. Performance on the multiple-choice task was expected to show children with
autism performing the least well on items involving intuitive psychology. However,
they were expected to perform at least similarly or possibly better than their CA match
group, pre-schoolers and seven-year-olds on the tasks of intuitive physics. The typically
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developing ten-year-old children were expected to perform better than all comparison
groups on both the psychological and physical conditions of this task.
5.2. Method
5.2.1. Participants
The 94 participants in this study comprised 17 pre-schoolers; 18 seven-year-olds; and 17
ten-year-olds, 21 children diagnosed with autism according to DSM-IV or ICD-10
criteria, and a group of 21 typically developing children matched to the children with
autism according to CA and gender. Informed consent was sought and ethical
guidelines were followed (see Appendix A). The typically developing children were
recruited from one nursery and one state primary school in Edinburgh. All children
with autism were being educated within a language unit in one of four mainstream
state schools in Edinburgh. Parents reported the diagnosis of children with autism and
confirmatory checks were made with school records. Inspection of these records
coupled with the details of performance IQ [PIQ] shown in Table 5.1 suggest that these
participants were positioned at the high-functioning end of the autistic spectrum.
The receptive vocabulary [RV] of children with autism was assessed using the BPVS-II
(Dunn et al., 1997) to ensure that they had an age equivalent of at least four years, the
minimum judged necessary to understand task instructions. In addition, all participants
were administered the standard performance sub-test of the United Kingdom edition of
the Wechsler Pre-school and Primary Scale of Intelligence [WPPSI-R] (Wechsler, 1990)
or the Third United Kingdom edition of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children
[WISC-III] (Wechsler, 1992) in order to generate a PIQ score. The sample characteristics
are shown in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Number [N] of participants, mean CA, mean PIQ scores and associated
ranges (years; months) of the diagnostic groups participating in Study 2 and the mean
RV score and range (years; months) of the participants with autism




























*WPPSI-R or WISC-III **BPVS-II
5.2.2. Materials
Picture-sequencing Task
This task compared physical and psychological causation via a picture-sequencing
method modified from the one used by Baron-Cohen et al. (1986). The task included
eight picture sequence trials comprising two conditions: four man made artefacts (e.g.
car) and four natural artefacts (e.g. flower). These two categories were chosen to reflect
a living versus non-living distinction. The former being more psychologically loaded in
contrast to the latter that is more associated with physical attributes (see Appendix B).
For each picture-sequence trial participants were presented with the first and last
picture of a causal sequence. They were then asked to choose, from two pictures
depicting different causal mechanisms, the one that would best explain the sequence of
events. One picture depicted a physical causal mechanism and the other depicted
psychological causation.
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The picture-sequence trials were presented randomly. The standard procedure for each
trial involved the experimenter placing the first and last picture of the causal sequence
onto a Velcro board leaving a suitable gap for the intermediate picture. Participants
were told that 'this is the first picture in the story (the experimenter points to the first
picture on the Velcro board) and this is the last picture (the experimenter points to the
last picture)'. The two intermediate pictures were placed randomly on the table beside
the Velcro board avoiding any positional cues that might lead to a systematic bias in
responding. Children were then instructed to Took at these pictures' (the experimenter
points to the two intermediate pictures being careful to avoid any cues that might
influence the participants choice) and were asked 'which one will go in the middle to
tell the best story?' They were then invited to attach their choice to the Velcro board.
Responses to each condition were scored according to the type of causation chosen on a
scale from 0 (all items completed with physical causal pictures) to 4 (all items
completed with psychological causal pictures).
Categorisation Task
Employing similar methodology to previous categorisation studies (e.g. Savitsky &
Izard, 1970; Weeks & Hobson, 1987) this task comprised a psychological and physical
condition. In order to examine the degree to which fundamental features of faces (i.e.
emotional expression) and fundamental physical laws (e.g. gravity) are salient for
participants, these features were combined with a more superficial feature (that did not
relate to core psychological or physical principles) in all tasks.
There were four trials for the psychological condition and four trials for the physical
condition. Every trial consisted of eight cards that varied in terms of the combinations
of fundamental and superficial features (for examples see Appendix C). The
fundamental features in the psychological condition comprised four emotional
expressions (i.e. happy or neutral, sad or neutral, angry or neutral and surprised or
neutral) (expressions were taken from Howlin, Baron-Cohen & Hadwin, 1999). The
fundamental features in the physical condition comprised cards depicting one of four
physical laws (i.e. floating or sinking, gravity or no gravity, balance or imbalance and
object contact or no contact). In both conditions the superficial features were colour
(two colours in each trial). By presenting these combinations of features children could
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categorise cards either in terms of fundamental laws (psychology or physics) or
superficial features (i.e. colour).
All trials followed a standard procedure. A Velcro board was placed in front of the
participant with a piece of white tape running down the middle. Participants were
presented with an introductory task comprising eight cards (four cards depicted a circle
and four a square). They were asked to notice and remember a way in which the cards
differed from each other and were initially asked to sort the cards into two groups and
then place the card groups on either side of the Velcro board. In line with Weeks and
Hobson (1987) this introductory task was designed to test whether the participants
could sort cards while allowing the children, especially those with autism, to assimilate
the task procedure. Following this, the participants were administered the experimental
task. For each randomly administered trial the cards were placed in front of the
children in a random pile. The children were then asked to follow the same procedure
demonstrated in the introductory task.
Responses to each condition (psychology and physics) were scored according to how
categorisation was completed on a scale from 0 (all trials completed according to
superficial features) to 4 (all trials completed according to fundamental features).
Multiple-choice Task
Participants were presented with a workbook comprising 12 questions concerning
intuitive physics knowledge and 12 on intuitive psychological knowledge (see
Appendix D). Each condition comprised of two classes of phenomena that subsumed
two further specific principles (see Table 5.2). In relation to physics, the two phenomena
were 'object motion' with three questions asked about gravity (from Kim & Spelke,
1999) and three questions on trajectory (from Kaiser, Proffitt & McCloskey, 1985) and
'how things work' with three questions on mechanics (from Metz, 1985) and three
questions on balance (from Siegler, 1976). With regard to psychology, the two
phenomena were 'emotion', which included three questions on schematic face
recognition and three questions on desire based emotions (from Howlin et al., 1999),
and 'belief, comprising three questions on simple perspective taking and three
questions on 'seeing leads to knowing' (from Howlin et al., 1999). Each sub-category
was designed to investigate increasingly sophisticated levels of understanding in order
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to accommodate the range of ability in the participant groups and to avoid possible
ceiling effects. For example, the variables considered in the balance scale task were
weight, distance and weight combined with distance.
Table 5.2: Classes of phenomena employed in each condition of the multiple-choice task
Condition Category Sub-category
Physics Object motion Gravity
Trajectory
How Things Work Mechanics
Balance
Psychology Emotion Schematic face recognition
Desire based emotions
Belief Simple perspective taking
Seeing leads to knowing
The experimenter read out each question from the workbook and subsequently asked
the participants to choose from three illustrations the 'best' answer. In order to make a
response participants were instructed to 'tick the box under the picture that you think
best answers the question'. Psychology and physics questions were randomly
presented in a standard sequence to participants. The total number of questions was 24
and correct responses were summed to give a score out of 12 for each condition.
5.2.3. Procedure
The picture-sequencing, categorisation and multiple-choice tasks were administered
randomly to participants in a quiet room with no single session taking longer than 35
minutes. In accordance with this time constraint RV and PIQ assessments were often
split over two sessions. In order to reduce task demands items in all three tasks were
designed to be of fixed choice requiring limited verbal instructions. In addition, no
verbal response was needed from participants who were required only to produce a
behavioural response e.g. the placement of the picture that best answered the question
onto a Velcro board. This procedure served a number of purposes: 1) it avoided the
children with autism being disadvantaged due to their relatively poor communication
skills; 2) it focussed participants attention on the task; and 3) it allowed the
experimenter to correctly and clearly identify participants' answers.
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Participants were allowed to complete the tasks at their own pace with the
experimenter recording their choices. If a response was not forthcoming the
experimenter repeated the question/instructions one more time. Positive feedback was
given after every task, e.g. 'that's good, well done'.
5.3. Results
5.3.1. Preliminary Analysis of PIQ
The relationship between PIQ and task performance of each group was analysed for all
tasks. A significant positive relationship between PIQ and task performance was found
in children with autism and the ten-year-old children in the physics condition of the
multiple-choice task (r = .79, p < .001; r = .55, p < .05 respectively). Analysis revealed
that PIQ accounted for 62% and 30% of the overall variance in task performance.
Additionally, independent group analysis revealed a significant negative correlation
between the seven-year-olds' PIQ and their performance on the psychological condition
of the multiple-choice task (r = -.66, p < .05). It was found that PIQ accounted for 43%
of the overall variability in task performance. The relationship between PIQ and task
performance on the multiple-choice task made it necessary to include PIQ as a measure
of co-variance when analysing performance in both conditions of this task.
5.3.2. Task Analyses
Analysis was carried out on the mean performance scores using one-way related
ANOVAs. Analysis of the physics and psychological condition of the multiple-choice
task was carried out using an analysis of covariance [ANCOVA] in order to include PIQ
as a measure of co-variance. The ANCOVA adjusts the means of the dependant
variables (scores on multiple-choice task) to what they would be if all subjects scored
equally on the co-variate of PIQ. Controlling for PIQ in this way provides a more
conservative and powerful test of differences between the groups (see Tabachnick &
Fidell, 1996). For each task post-hoc Bonferroni t-tests with the observed level of
significance altered to account for multiple comparisons were carried out. Results are
presented separately for each task.
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Picture-sequencing Task
Overall there was a significant positive correlation between the psychological and
physical conditions of this task (r = .414, p < .001).
A one-way ANOVA highlighted significant group differences in the man-made artefact
condition (F (4, 89) = 6.02, p < .001). Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests indicated significant
differences between children with autism and the ten-year-olds (t (36) = 1.74, p < .001).
Inspection of the means in Figure 5.1 shows that the children with autism (mean = 1.38)
were more likely to choose the physical picture to complete the picture-sequence than
the ten-year-olds (mean = 3.15).
Figure 5.1: Mean performance of all five groups on both conditions of the picture-
sequencing task
Pre-school 7yrs 1 Oyrs Autism CA match GROUP
N.B. Scores are represented on a scale from 0 (all physical choices) - 4 (all psychological choices)
A one-way ANOVA showed significant group differences in the natural artefact
condition (F (4, 89) = 6.54, p < .001). Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests revealed that significant
differences lay between the children with autism and the CA match group (t (40) = 1.19,
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p < .001) and the ten-year-olds (t (36) = 1.22, p < .001). The means illustrated in Figure
5.1 show that children with autism (mean = 1.43) tended to opt more for the physical
causal picture to complete the picture sequence than the CA matched group (mean =
2.33) and the ten-year-olds (mean = 2.65), with both groups of typically developing
children preferring to complete the sequence with the psychological picture.
Categorisation Task
Overall there was a significant positive correlation between performance on the
psychological and physical conditions of this task (r = .381, p < .001). Further, a
significant correlation was identified between performance on the psychological
categorisation condition and the psychological condition of multiple-choice task (r =
.28, p < .01) and between the physics categorisation condition and the physics condition
of the multiple-choice task (r = .22, p < .01). These results indicate that for each
condition (physics and psychology) the categorisation and multiple-choice tasks may be
tapping knowledge from the relevant domain.
A one-way ANOVA indicated significant group differences in the physical
categorisation condition (F (4, 89) = 14.5, p < .001). Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests indicated
that there were significant differences between the ten-year-old children (mean = 2.76)
and the pre-schoolers (mean = 0.64, t (32) = 2.10, p = .001), the seven-year-olds (mean =
0.67, t (33) = 2.12, p < .001) and the CA match group (mean = 0.67, t (36) = 2.10, p <
.001). The ten-year-old children and the children with autism (mean = 1.28) did not
significantly differ from each other.
Analysis indicated no significant differences in performance of the five groups in the
psychological condition of this task. However, as indicated in Figure 5.2, the ten-year-
old group were more likely to categorise according to psychological features than any
other group.
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Figure 5.2: Mean performance of all five groups on both conditions of the categorisation
task
Multiple-choice Task
Preliminary analysis revealed that the physical and the psychological sub-scales within
the multiple-choice task both have internal consistency therefore could be analysed
separately (Cronbach's Alpha: 0.63 and 0.64 respectively).
Across all groups a significant negative correlation between performances on the two
conditions was identified (r= - .21, p < .05). However, when this was carried out
independently for each group no relationships were revealed.
The ANCOVA results showed a significant regression effect between the co-variant PIQ
and task performance on the physical condition (F (1, 88) = 11.3, p < .001). When this
was controlled a significant main effect of group was found (F (4, 88) = 17.24, p < .001).
The adjusted means for the children with autism and the CA matched group were 7.38
and 3.8 respectively. With regard to the pre-schoolers, seven-year-olds and ten-year-
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olds the adjusted means were 4.11, 3.5 and 5.88 respectively. Bonferroni t-tests
indicated that significant differences lay in task performance between the children with
autism and the CA matched group (t (40) = 4.3, p = .001); the pre-schoolers (t (36) = 3.9,
p < .001) and the seven-year-olds (t (37) = 5.0, p < .001). Differences were also found
between the ten-year-old children and the seven-year-old children (t (37) = 2.9, p <
.001). The adjusted means illustrated that the children with autism performed
significantly better on the physics condition than all groups apart from the ten-year-
olds. It was also the case that the ten-year-old children performed significantly better
than the CA matched group and seven-year-olds.
Figure 5.3: Adjusted mean performance (maximum score = 12) with PIQ controlled in
all five groups on both conditions of the multiple-choice task
Pre-school 7yrs 1 Oyrs Autism CA match
■ PHYSICS
■ PSYCHOLOGY
As already mentioned PIQ was found to correlate with performance on the
psychological condition of the multiple-choice task. However, when analysed using a
related ANCOVA with PIQ as a co-variant, no significant effect was found. Using the
adjusted means the ANCOVA revealed significant group differences in the
psychological condition of this task (F (4, 88) = 18.27, p < .001). The adjusted means for
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the children with autism and the CA matched group were 7.7 and 10.23 respectively.
With regard to the pre-schoolers, seven-year-olds and ten-year-olds the adjusted means
were 9.8, 11.11 and 11.47 respectively. Post hoc Bonferroni t-tests indicated that
significant differences lay between the children with autism and the four comparison
groups: CA match (t (40) = 2.59, p = .001); pre-schoolers (t (36) = 2.17, p < .001); seven-
year-olds (t (37) = 3.5, p < .001) and ten-year-olds (t (36) = 3.81, p < .001). The means
displayed in Figure 5.3 reveal that the children with autism performed significantly
more poorly on this condition than the other groups.
5.4. Discussion
Overall the present study found that children with autism, their CA matched peers,
pre-schoolers, seven-year-old children and ten-year-old children demonstrated
differentiated performance in all three tasks. The picture-sequencing task showed that
when given a choice of two responses, children with autism preferred the physical one.
Further, as predicted, the children with autism in this study performed poorly in the
multiple-choice condition that tapped intuitive psychological knowledge whereas their
performance in the intuitive physics condition was better than that demonstrated by
their CA matched peers, pre-schoolers and seven-year-olds. Performance on each task
will now be discussed in turn.
The results of the picture-sequencing task showed that in the man-made artefact (i.e.
physics) condition children with autism were more likely to opt for the physical picture
to complete the causal sequence than the ten-year-old children who preferred to opt for
the psychological causal picture. In the natural artefact (i.e. psychological) condition,
children with autism were also more likely to choose the physical picture to complete
the picture sequence. This was in contrast to the CA matched group and the ten-year-
old children who tended to opt for the picture depicting psychological causation. Taken
together, these results suggest that children with autism may prefer to reason about
causality in a purely physical way employing this domain in relation to both physical
and psychological phenomena. It should be noted, however, that the stimuli used may
have influenced the findings. The stimuli depicting psychological causation included
the common feature of a hand; by contrast, a range of agents represented physical
causation. Despite this methodological issue, the results of this task show convincingly
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that for children with autism causal cognition in relation to psychology may be guided,
at least in part, by intuitive physics.
The results of the categorisation task showed that in the physical condition of the task
all groups of children tended to categorised according to superficial features. Likewise,
results indicated no differential pattern of response across groups in the psychological
categorisation condition with all groups preferring to categorise according to emotional
features. This was not as expected since children with autism are well documented as
having a difficulty with stimuli of a psychological nature. Previous research had led to
the prediction that they would prefer to categorise according to superficial colour
features. In addition, previous work has shown that pre-school children typically sort
according to superficial features (Gilbert, 1969) and this was not found. Again, these
results may have been influenced by the task stimuli. The cards used in this condition
were of simple drawn faces that depicted basic emotions and this may have lowered
the task demands when compared to studies that use photographs. Furthermore, the
task mirrored some of the tasks that children with autism receive in school. For
example, they are taught to recognised basic emotions such as happy and sad and
observations of work carried out in the language units that the sample was drawn
revealed that sorting schematic representations of basic emotions would have been a
familiar task for them. Therefore, it may have been better to depict more complex
emotions via real photographs in any future extensions of this work.
Performance on both conditions of the multiple-choice task was affected by PIQ. When
PIQ was controlled for in the analysis, it was found that children with autism
performed more poorly than all other groups (even the pre-schoolers) on the intuitive
psychology questions. This supports previous literature charting the difficulty that they
have in reasoning about psychological phenomena such as desire and belief. On the
physical multiple-choice questions children with autism were shown to have
performed significantly better than all other groups apart from the ten-year-old
children. The finding that children with autism perform above their CA matched peers
and similarly to ten-year-olds who were approximately four years older adds strength
to the claim that children with autism have intact and superior knowledge in the
domain of physics. The items in this task were adapted from published sources and
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worked well with the typically developing children. However, more normative data
would be advantageous to further establish their reliability and validity.
It has recently been suggested that ability on intuitive psychology and physics tasks
may represent a cognitive trade off with both domains having the same underlying
mechanism (see Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). In this study, performance between intuitive
psychology and intuitive physics on the multiple-choice task across all groups revealed
a significant inverse relationship (i.e. those higher in intuitive psychology tended to be
lower in intuitive physics and vice versa). This may be evidence that there is a cognitive
trade off between these two reasoning systems. However, when performance was
analysed for each group independently no associations between the two conditions
were identified. Moreover, positive correlation's were found between the psychology
and physics conditions in the picture-sequencing and categorisation tasks. According to
Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) this may suggest that a single cognitive mechanism (as
proposed by domain-general theorists) may represent the two areas of reasoning.
Clearly more investigation of the sort reported here is needed with standardised tasks
in order to shed light on the underlying cognitive architecture of intuitive psychology
and physics.
It has been said that cognition develops from its own foundations (Spelke et al., 1992).
Therefore individuals with autism who demonstrate a lack of psychological knowledge
and an intact understanding of physical phenomena may have a specific underlying
cognitive profile that reflects this. Within the literature many suggestions as to the
precise cognitive structure of autistic spectrum disorders have been debated (see
Chapter 1). Whatever the case may be, it is clear that children with autism do not
effectively reason about psychological phenomena and may compensate by over-
applying their knowledge of intuitive physics to all types of phenomena. The results of
this study indicate that in children with autistic spectrum disorders there is a coupling
of impaired intuitive psychology and intact (and possibly superior) intuitive physics.
5.4.1. Conclusions
This study supports the recurrent finding of impairment in understanding
psychological phenomena among children on the autistic spectrum as well as adding to
118
the findings of Study 1 that they may have an intact and possibly even superior
understanding of intuitive physics (especially in the multiple-choice task). Importantly,
the findings suggest that children with autism may prefer to view the world in a
physical way including phenomena that would be regarded by typically developing
children as pertaining to the domain of psychology.
Based on the findings of Studies 1 and 2 of a potential strength in intuitive physics
among children with autism the following study will provide a deeper investigation
into the nature of physical knowledge in children on the autistic spectrum in order to
give a full account of their understanding in this domain. A key consideration will be to
elucidate more clearly whether intuitive physics in children on the autistic spectrum is
similar or superior to that of typically developing children. The benefits of in-depth
work regarding the precise nature of physical understanding among children on the
autistic spectrum may help to shed light on whether or not they have knowledge that
can be described as 'theoretical'. It has been argued that they may score highly on
multiple-choice tasks asking about physical phenomena without having theoretical
understanding (see Gopnik et al., 2000). As a result the concluding study in this thesis,
reported in Chapter 6, provides a detailed analysis of the judgements and explanations
used by children with Asperger syndrome and a CA and gender matched group of
typically developing children in order to investigate this point further.
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CHAPTER 6
STUDY 3: UNDERSTANDING OF PHYSICAL PHENOMENA IN
CHILDREN WITH ASPERGERS SYNDROME: AN
INVESTIGATION OF CAUSAL PREDICTIONS AND
EXPLANATIONS
6.1. Aims of this Chapter
Studies 1 and 2 found that children with autism display a differentiated level of
understanding with regard to psychological and physical phenomena. In general they
were shown to perform poorly on tasks of a psychological nature but comparatively
well on tasks tapping physical knowledge. The finding that children with autism
perform poorly on intuitive psychology tasks has been widely reported (see Baron-
Cohen, 2000b). However, there have been very few systematic attempts at investigating
the relative strength in understanding physical phenomena among children on the
autistic spectrum. For this reason the focus of this study will be solely on intuitive
physics.
Like the large majority of research investigating children's domain-specific knowledge,
Studies 1 and 2 investigated children's understanding via judgements and predictions.
This is not the tradition in the educational literature on physics understanding. In this
field of work there is a large volume of research that has examined typically developing
children's explanations of a wide variety of physics concepts (e.g. Howe, Rodgers &
Tolmie, 1990; Kaiser, Proffit & McCloskey, 1985; Siegler, 1976). The focus on
explanations may be beneficial owing to the fact that verbal utterances have been
identified as being particularly revealing of children's understanding (see Hood &
Bloom, 1979; Shatz, Wellman & Silber, 1983). In fact, a concern among young children
with causes and explanations has been identified as an early contributor to cognitive
development (Wellman, Hickling & Schultz, 2000). Thus, the study of children's causal
explanations may offer an opportunity to further examine the nature of intuitive
physical reasoning in children on the autistic spectrum. However, given the identified
difficulties with language in children with autism (see Chapter 1) the study reported
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here focussed on individuals with Asperger syndrome in an attempt to investigate both
their predictions and explanations offered with respect to a range of physical concepts.
6.1.1. Children's Explanations
Critics of Piaget's clinical interview method have argued that requiring children to
articulate explanations is especially demanding and will distort rather than display
their understanding (see Bullock et al., 1982). This is perhaps why Piaget found that
typically developing children under the age of seven do not have the capacity to
explain (Piaget, 1926). However, using more child-focussed methods subsequent work
found that children are able to give and understand explanations well before this age
(for a review see Donaldson & Elliot, 1990). Consequently, recent researchers claim that
investigating children's explanations is both easier and more revealing than
traditionally envisaged (Wellman, Hickling & Schultz, 2000). The ability to explain
encompasses both linguistic and cognitive demands, namely the ability to understand
the phenomena under question and the ability to communicate this understanding,
usually by employing the terms 'because' and 'so' (Donaldson & Elliot, 1990). With
regard to domain-specific knowledge it has been noted that work on typically
developing children's explanations is limited (Wellman, Hickling & Schultz, 2000) and
this is also the case for atypically developing children.
Studies from the available literature show that children with autism have difficulties in
offering explanations about intuitive psychological concepts. For example, when
presented with 'emotion-evoking' stories, high-functioning children with autism gave
fewer mental state explanations in relation to typical emotions than both six and ten-
year-old typically developing children (Rieffe, Terwogt & Stockmann, 2000). Likewise,
Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1994) examined the ability of children with autism to
explain human action in psychological terms. They found that in contrast to both a
typically developing and a non-specific mentally disabled group, the children with
autism were less likely to offer mentalistic explanations. This finding was further
supported by Happe (1994b) who reported that in comparison to similar CA and MA
control groups, children with autism were impaired at providing context appropriate
mental state explanations. In addition to showing an impaired performance in offering
psychological explanations, Gopnik et al. (2000) have recently examined the
explanations used by children with autism to reason about biological phenomena.
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Results showed that they offered fewer explanations based on biological processes than
a control group of typically developing children (see Chapter 4 for more details).
Despite the argument that children on the autistic spectrum can reason effectively
about physical phenomena, to date no one has specifically focussed on the explanations
they use in relation to phenomena pertaining to the domain of physics thus there is
clearly a need for research in this area.
With respect to typically developing children it is well documented that young pre¬
schoolers extensively bombard adults with 'why' questions about the physical world.
As a result they obtain direct linguistically encoded information about the physical
world from an early age (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) and it has been suggested that this
may advance the acquisition of physical knowledge (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Gopnik
& Meltzoff, 1997). However, initial work reported that two-year-old children offer
causal explanations that are exclusively psychological in nature and do not talk about
causal events that occurred between physical objects in the world (Hood & Bloom,
1979). This finding has been disputed in a recent study of children's explanations
examined in a naturalistic setting by Wellman, Hickling and Schultz (2000). They
found that from two years of age, children could comment on a variety of topics using
explanations from the physical domain of reasoning. For example, when asked to
reason about a character's behaviour over a variety of topics they produced statements
that appealed to or implied physical forces such as gravity or the wind. Furthermore, it
has recently been found that not only can young children express physical causal
explanations but they can also distinguish them from psychological ones (Hickling &
Wellman, 2001).
Outside these handful of observations very little work has focussed on children's
explanations of physical and other phenomena and, within the domain-specific
literature, there is a strong methodological focus on judgement and prediction tasks
(see Wellman, Hickling & Schultz, 2000). In contrast, the educational literature contains
many studies that have focused on explanations that children offer in relation to
physical phenomena. These studies have been particularly interested in the way in
which children's explanations focus on the variables inherent in the phenomena under
question. It is thought that children's theories may constrain the variables selected (see
Howe, 1998). This work has found that children's explanations can be particularly
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revealing with regard to their level of understanding. For example, as mentioned in
Chapter 3, Siegler (1976) investigated the judgements and explanations offered with
regard to a balance scale. Flis results indicted that children's explanations could be
categorised into four rules. Likewise, studies have focussed on the explanations offered
by children with regard to whether an object will float or sink (i.e. Bidduph, 1983;
Howe et al., 1990; Stephans, Beiswerger & Dyche, 1986). As a result of analysing
children's causal explanations these studies have identified a number of levels of
understanding across children of different ages that progress developmentally (see
Chapter 3 for details). Such patterns of development could not have been uncovered
had it not been for the methodological focus on explanations as opposed to judgement
tasks thus it appears to be the case that explanations may provide a worthwhile
methodological route into assessing children's domain-specific understanding.
6.1.2. The Investigation of Theoretical Knowledge
Within the domain-specific literature the lack of work on children's explanations is
surprising because many have described this understanding as 'theoretical', thereby
emphasising its capacity for explanatory knowledge. What constitutes a theory is as yet
an unresolved issue (see Chapter 1). However, theories are commonly deemed
responsible for allowing the reasoner to identify phenomena and engage the
appropriate causal explanatory framework in order for reasoning to take place
(Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). As a result, intuitive theories have been
described as providing causal understanding of the real world (Johnston & Carey, 1998)
and are utilised in order to predict, interpret and explain (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).
Taking these definitions on board it seems sensible to conclude that analysing
children's explanations may yield a fruitful avenue of investigation into the theoretical
nature of physics knowledge. In keeping with this viewpoint, Gopnik et al. (2000) have
recently claimed that the theoretical understanding of biology may be best assessed
through analysis of explanations in addition to accuracy of predictions about, for
example, categories of living/non-living things. They state that "explanatory accounts
may yield insights into the processes through which theoretical understandings are
tested and revised" (Gopnik et al., 2000; p68). Accordingly they have concluded that the
inability of children with high-functioning autism to give appropriate explanations
regarding the classification of stimuli into non-living and living exemplars highlights
their lack of theoretical understanding in the domain of biology.
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Using explanations alone as a window into children's theoretical knowledge may be
unwarranted. Pine and Messer (2000) suggest that a 'theory' allows children to go
beyond basic observations and serves as an explanatory system. They suggest that
children's theories may be best observed via non-verbal implicit tasks (i.e. judgements
and predictions) and verbally explicit tasks (i.e. explanations). As discussed in Chapter
1, in contrast to explicit knowledge, implicit knowledge cannot be adequately
verbalised and is often viewed as piecemeal, simpler knowledge that is more
perceptually grounded (see Keil, 1999). Many consider implicit non-verbalised
understanding as non-theoretical (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). This assertion stems
from the assumption that if children cannot express a belief then they could not have
such a belief. As a result, the inability of children to express explanations about a wide
range of phenomena has been taken as evidence of a lack of understanding in the areas
under scrutiny (Keil, 1999). However, there is a wide volume of work based on
children's judgements and predictions which claims that young children have domain-
specific theories from an early age (see Wellman & Gelman, 1992). In light of this debate
the investigation of both children's judgements and explanations may provide a useful
combination to further investigate their understanding of intuitive physics. By its very
nature implicit knowledge may be used when offering both predictions and
explanations however, the knowledge utilised when giving explanations can only be
explicit. However, before this methodological consideration will advance the field of
domain-specificity a more detailed examination of explanations from a domain-specific
perspective is needed. This is especially the case with regards to the understanding of
intuitive physics in both typically developing and atypically developing children.
6.1.3. The Present Study
The present study aimed to further investigate intuitive physics knowledge among
children on the autistic spectrum. Participants comprised children with Asperger
syndrome and group matched according to CA and gender. As shown in Chapter 1,
current diagnostic criteria recognise Asperger syndrome as similar to autism in terms of
marked impairments in social skills, but note the difference as being the absence of any
language or cognitive delay (APA, 1994; WHO, 1993). However, despite having
relatively intact language and cognitive abilities, children with Asperger syndrome
have still been found to display a differentiated level of performance between the
domains of psychology and physics whereby superiority in physical understanding is
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evident (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Thus the focus on this group allows the examination
of this strength by examining their explanations of physical phenomena in a relatively
pure form without the presence of other cognitive factors that may influence the
findings (such as poor language skills). It must be noted that although this thesis
conceptualises high-functioning autism and Asperger syndrome as similar variants on
the autistic spectrum (see Chapter 1) it was necessary, in order to compare findings of
the present study with that of Baron-Cohen et al.'s (2001), that this study only included
participants with a clinical diagnosis of Asperger syndrome.
Due to the current lack of research regarding the methodological use of explanations
this study examined group differences in predictions and explanations offered with
respect to four physical concepts. In an attempt to integrate research from the
educational literature, and in keeping with the three main strands of intuitive physics
identified in Chapter 3, this study employed four tasks comprising the concepts of
floating/sinking, balance, projectile motion and vertical movement. In order to reason
effectively about these four concepts, knowledge of more than one physical variable is
required thus a full understanding of these concepts may not therefore be present until
the age of 12 years (see Howe, 1998). The use of these concepts allowed participants to
provide an explanation based on a single variable or a combination of two variables
thus identifying an increasingly sophisticated range of understandings. For the purpose
of this study, a high level understanding of floating/sinking must comprise knowledge
about the size and weight of the object under scrutiny. A high level understanding of
the workings of a balance scale must integrate knowledge of weight and distance. A
high understanding of projectile motion must comprise knowledge of velocity and air
resistance, and a high understanding of vertical movement must comprise knowledge
of friction and mass. Additionally, since PIQ was related to performance on the
multiple-choice task employed in Study 2, and also to ensure that both groups have
comparable verbal IQ scores, an IQ score for each child was generated.
It was hypothesised that if children with Asperger syndrome have an intact domain of
physics then their predictions and explanations given with respect to the four physical
concepts tested in this study would not differ from a CA matched group. However, if
children with Asperger syndrome have a precocious domain of physics (as suggested
by Baron-Cohen, 2000a) then it would be expected that they would exhibit a greater
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number of correct predictions than a CA matched group. In addition their explanations
would be indicative of a greater level of understanding than their CA matched peers




The participants were 20 children from six mainstream schools covering a wide range
of socio-economic catchment areas in Edinburgh and the Lothians. Informed consent
was sought and ethical guidelines were followed (see Appendix A). Participants
comprised two groups: 10 children diagnosed with Asperger syndrome according to
DSM IV or ICD-10 criteria and 10 typically developing children matched according to
CA and gender. Parents reported the diagnosis of the children with Asperger syndrome
and confirmatory checks were made with school records. Research with children on the
autistic spectrum is abundant in Edinburgh and the surrounding districts. This coupled
with an inclusion criteria of only those children with a clinical diagnosis of Asperger
syndrome resulted in difficulty recruiting participants and is reflected in the small
sample size. All participants were administered the Weschler Abbreviated Scale of
Intelligence (Weschler, 2000) in order to yield an IQ score as well as a Verbal IQ [VIQ]
and a PIQ score. The sample characteristics are detailed in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Number [N] of participants, mean CA (years; months), mean IQ, PIQ and
VIQ scores and associated ranges of each group participating in Study 3
Diagnostic N Mean CA IQ* PIQ* VIQ*
Group (range) (range) (range) (range)
Asperger 10 9;0 100.4 100 99.6
Syndrome (7;1-11;3) (85-115) (86-112) (87-121)
[AS]
CA Match 10 9;1 104.1 99.6 105.8




6.2.2. Materials and Coding Schemes
Four tasks pertaining to the physical concepts of floating/sinking, balance, trajectory
and vertical movement were employed. With exception of the vertical movement task,
design was based on previous literature reviewed in Chapter 3.
Procedures were similar across all tasks and required that children offer a prediction
about the phenomenon under investigation (e.g. will this item float or sink?) followed
by an explanation to support their prediction. Subsequently, participants were required
to interact behaviourally with the test materials in order to observe the phenomenon in
question and declare if their prediction was accurate. This stage was included to engage
children's attention and motivate them in the testing situation. All tasks conformed to
the sequence: predict, explain and observe.
Floating!Sinking Task
Participants were presented with a clear tank of water and eight objects/exemplars
embodying four variables. The variables (and objects) chosen were size (large ball and
small ball), weight (sponge and rock), having air inside or not (empty bottle and full
bottle) and flatness (flat piece of plastic and flat piece of metal). Previous work has
shown that children commonly identify these four variables as being relevant to
whether an item floats or sinks (see Biddulph, 1983; Laurendeau & Pinard, 1962). For
each exemplar participants were required to make their predictions with respect to
whether the object would float/sink before being allowed to touch the objects under
investigation. Howe (1998) states that 'kinesthetic awareness' is not the same as having
an understanding of salient variables. Objects were presented individually in a random
sequence. Participants were asked:
Predict: 'Do you think this object will float or sink?'
Explain: 'Why do you think that?'
Observe: 'Put the object in the tank of water'.
For each exemplar participants were categorised as either right or wrong according to
whether they were correct in their prediction about the bouancy of the object under
scrutiny. For all exemplars the explanations offered by participants were categorised
according to four descriptive levels identified by Biddulph (1983) and Howe et al.
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(1990). Additionally a level allowing for children not knowing was included (inter-rater
reliability = 0.93). The five levels representing increasingly sophisticated understanding
were defined as: 1) don't know; 2) irrelevant/wrong object properties, involving incorrect
references to properties such as the shape, orientation, surface feature and constitution
of the object; 3) relevant object properties, involving correct references to properties such
as size and weight; 4) liquid properties, involving references to the property of the water;
and 5) relative density involving reference to the property of the water in relation to the
object.
Balance Task
Participants were randomly presented with eight different balance scale problems
comprising one of three variables found by previous research to be relevant to
children's thinking about a balance scale (e.g. Siegler, 1976; see Chapter 3). Two trials
made reference to the variable weight, two comprised reference to the variable distance
and four comprised reference to weight and distance. The weight variable involved
presenting children with equal or unequal weights on each arm. The distance variable
involved equal number of weights on each arm that were placed at differing distances
from the fulcrum. The weight and distance variable involved two problems, conflict-
weight and conflict-balance. Both cases involved unequal weights on each arm; the
conflict-weight problems involved the balance tipping to the side with the most
number of weights and the conflict-balance problem involved the balance scale
balancing. For each problem participants were initially presented with the 'balance
problem' on a 2D paper version of the balance scale and were asked:
Predict: 'Do you think putting the pegs like this (experimenter places the pegs onto the
2D paper balance) will make that balance scale (experimenter points to balance
scale) balance?'
Explain: 'Why do you think that?'
Observe: 'Place the pegs on the balance scale in the same way'.
For each exemplar participants were categorised as either right or wrong according to
whether they were correct in their prediction about whether the balance scale would or
would not balance. For all exemplars the explanations offered by participants were
categorised according to three descriptive levels found by Siegler (1976). In addition a
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level allowing for children not knowing was included (inter-rater reliability = 0.96). The
four levels representing increasingly sophisticated understanding were defined as: 1)
don't know; 2) weight, whereby explanations were based only on the number of pegs on
each side of the fulcrum; 3) distance, whereby explanations were based only on the
distance the pegs were from the fulcrum; and 4) weight and distance, whereby
explanations were based on the weight on each arm and the distance the pegs were
from the fulcrum.
Trajectory Task
Participants were presented with eight exemplars of a situation whereby the movement
of a ball could be described as occurring. Exemplars were presented in a random
sequence and comprised of two variables: carried and rolled (see Kaiser, Proffitt &
McCloskey, 1985). The carried variable depicted exemplars of a ball being carried by
something that was moving (e.g. a helicopter, an aeroplane, a man running and a man
on a bike). The rolled variable depicted exemplars of a ball rolling from a stationary
object (e.g. a hill, a table, a box and from a curvilinear tube). Exemplars were presented
randomly on individual sheets of A4 paper and participants were instructed to
complete the 2D pictures by drawing the path that the ball would take from starting to
fall/roll until hitting the ground. For feedback the correct path of the ball for each
exemplar was depicted on an A4 sheet of acetate in red ink. For each exemplar
participants were asked:
Predict: 'Where do you think the ball will land when it is dropped from the X/when it
rolls off the X? Using the pencil, draw the path the ball will take when it starts
to drop/roll until it hits the ground'.
Explain: 'Why do you think that?'
Observe: 'Now I'm going to show you the correct path of the ball (experimenter covers
the child's A4 sheet of paper with the acetate of the correct path)'.
Initially for each exemplar participants were categorised as either right or wrong
according to whether they were correct in their prediction about the path of the ball. In
line with Kaiser, Proffitt and McCloskey (1985) to be granted with a correct response
children's drawings had to indicate a parabolic curve i.e. the ball begins to fall forward
and downwards as soon as it leaves the supported surface. To investigate responses to
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this task in more depth, children's predictions were also categorised according to three
descriptive levels of reasoning found by Kaiser, Proffitt and McCloskey (1985). In
addition a level allowing for incorrect responding was included (inter-rater reliability =
0.92). The four levels represented increasingly sophisticated understanding and were
defined as: 1) incorrect; 2) straight down, whereby the ball is depicted as falling straight
down; 3) inverted L-shape, where the ball is depicted as continuing horizontally for some
distance before falling straight down; and 4) parabolic, where ball is depicted as falling
forward and downwards as soon as it leaves the supported surface. For all exemplars
the explanations offered by participants were also categorised according to these four
levels of analysis.
Vertical Movement Task
Participants were presented with eight trials of a toy wooden truck moving down a
wooden ramp. These were presented in a random sequence and each comprised a
combination of two variables, namely weight of the truck and ramp surface. The
exemplars of weight comprised two conditions (e.g. with and without marbles in the
truck) and ramp surface comprised four conditions inducing varying degrees of friction
(e.g. carpet, bubble wrap, sandpaper and shiny card). Before the experimenter allowed
the truck to move down the ramp, participants were instructed to draw a line across a
sheet of paper (present at the bottom of the ramp) where they thought the truck would
stop. For each exemplar participants were asked:
Predict: 'Draw a line on the paper where you think the truck will stop'.
Explain: 'Why do you think that?'
Observe: 'Look at the truck rolling down the ramp'.
For each exemplar participants were categorised as either right or wrong. To be granted
with a correct prediction the toy truck had to be over the line drawn by participants.
For all exemplars the explanations offered by participants were categorised according
to four descriptive levels, three of which were based on the salient variables under
observation. Additionally a level allowing for children not knowing was included
(inter-rater reliability = 0.98). The four levels represented increasingly sophisticated
understanding and were defined as: 1) don't know; 2) surface, where reference was only
made to the surface material on the ramp; 3) weight, where reference was made only to
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the weight of the truck; and 4) surface and weight, where reference was made to both the
surface material of the ramp and the weight of the truck.
6.2.3. Procedure
Participants were administered the IQ test in a single session lasting approximately 30
minutes. One week later the experimental tasks were conducted. Participants were
tested individually in a quiet setting. Tasks were administered randomly and were
presented in a single session typically lasting between 40 and 50 minutes. Between
tasks participants were asked if they would like to take a break however, this rarely
occurred and on the whole participants were highly motivated with the task material.
All sessions were video-recorded.
6.3. Results
Data was analysed using non-parametric statistics since it was not normally distributed
and because of the small sample size. Analysis of the co-variants was considered first
using non-parametric Spearman's Rho correlations. For each significant result the
correlation co-efficient was squared in order to measure the amount of variability in
one variable that is explained by the other. Since data did not fit parametric
assumptions these confounding variables could not be controlled in subsequent
analysis.
Predictions: For each task a descriptive account of the predictions offered by both
groups of children is provided first. Following this the number of correct predictions in
each task given overall by each participant (out of eight) was compared between
groups using a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test for unrelated samples. Each
variable (e.g. size, weight, air inside, flatness) in every task (e.g. floating/sinking) was
also analysed independently by summing scores for trials tapping each variable.
Between group analysis was carried out using Mann-Whitney U-tests.
Explanations: For each task (e.g. balance) a descriptive account of the explanations
offered by both groups of children is provided first. Subsequently the explanations
offered by participants were analysed across variables (e.g. weight, distance,
conflict/weight, conflict/balance). Analysis of each variable independently was not
justified because of the small number of explanations that would have represented each
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level. For each task, analysis of explanations as a function of level required participants
to be given a score indicating a level of correctness regarding their explanations across
the eight exemplars. With regards to the floating/sinking task each participant was
given a score between 8 (i.e. all eight exemplars were answered according to Level 1)
and 40 (i.e. all eight exemplars were answered according to Level 5). For the balance,
trajectory and vertical movement tasks each participant was given a score between 8
(i.e. all eight exemplars answered according to Level 1) and 32 (i.e. all eight exemplars
answered according to Level 4). For each task group differences were investigated
using a Mann-Whitney U-test.
6.3.1 Analysis of Co-variants
The relationship between participant's IQ, VIQ and PIQ scores and task performance
was analysed overall and for each task individually. A significant positive relationship
was found between PIQ and task performance of the children with Asperger syndrome
on the trajectory task (r = 0.67, p < .05). Analysis revealed that PIQ accounted for 44% of
the overall variability in the task performance. A significant positive relationship was
found between PIQ and task performance of the CA matched group over all four tasks
(r = 0.70, p < .05) and on the floating/sinking task (r = 0.70, p < .05). It was found that
PIQ accounted for 49% of the overall variability across all four tasks and 49% of the
overall variability in the floating/sinking task.
Analysis of age and task performance revealed a significant positive relationship
between age and overall task performance across both groups (r = 0.42 p < .05). Age
accounted for 18% of the variation in task performance. Additionally a significant
positive relationship was found between age and performance of the CA matched
group on the trajectory task (r = 0.66 p < .05). With regard to the CA matched group age
was shown to account for 44% of the variability in performance on the trajectory task.
6.3.2. Analysis of Tasks
Floating/Sinking Task
As shown in Table 6.2 the most correct predictions were made with regard to the weight
variable where eight children with Asperger syndrome and seven typically developing
children predicted the correct outcome to both exemplars.
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A Mann-Whitney U-test revealed no significant group difference in the number of
correct predictions given by each group across the eight exemplars in the
floating/sinking task. Each variable was investigated independently whereby
participants were given a score of 0 (both exemplars incorrect), 1 (one exemplar correct)
or 2 (two exemplars correct). For each variable a Mann-Whitney U-test revealed no
significant group differences.
Table 6.2: Number of participants predicting both exemplars incorrectly [0] and number
predicting one [1] and two [2] exemplars correctly for each variable in the
floating/sinking task
Group
Size Weight Air Inside Flatness
0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
AS
N=10
2 5 3 1 1 8 1 5 4 2 5 3
CA
N=10
0 9 1 1 2 7 0 7 3 1 4 5
Table 6.3 shows the number of explanations given as a function of level across the eight
exemplars. The children with Asperger syndrome offered more Level 1 responses than
the CA match group (on 17 and 1 occasion respectively). Overall the CA matched group
tended to only offer Level 2 and 3 explanations (on 49 and 30 occasions respectively).
At Level 2, the level of irrelevant or wrong object properties, there were irrelevant
references to size (e.g. 'small objects float') and weight (e.g. 'heavy things float') as well
as references to wrong object properties (e.g. 'it floats because it's shiny and has sharp
edges'). Level 3 encompassed references to relevant object properties and thus there
was less scope for variability in answers. Across all 20 children, four relevant object
properties were offered for floating (light, small, spread out, having air inside) and
three were offered for sinking (heavy, big, hard). Level 4 explanations required
reference to liquid properties and were offered in reference to three objects by one child
with Asperger syndrome. He stated that objects would sink (float) if they were heavier
(lighter) than the water. None of the children in this study elicited an explanation based
on relative density (i.e. Level 5).
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In order to analyse explanations across the floating/sinking task each participant was
scored according to the level of explanation offered for each exemplar (i.e. sum scores
ranged from 8 to 40). This data was analysed using a Mann-Whitney U-test which
revealed significant group differences (11=14, n= 20, p < .05) whereby the CA matched
group (mean rank = 14.1) were found to offer more advanced explanations than the
children with Asperger syndrome (mean rank = 6.9).
Table 6.3: Number of explanations provided as a function of level across all 8 exemplars
in the floating/sinking task
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Total
Don't Irrelevant/ Relevant Liquid Relative Explanations




AS 17 36 24 3 0 80
N=10
CA 1 49 30 0 0 80
N=10
Balance Task
With regards to the balance task most correct predictions were found with regard to the
zueight variable where eight children with Asperger syndrome and all ten typically
developing children predicted the correct outcome to both problems (see Table 6.4).
Both groups had difficulty with the conflict/balance problems. However, overall the
children with Asperger syndrome performed better on these exemplars with four
children answering one problem correctly, compared with two of their CA matched
peers, and three children answering both problems correctly.
A Mann-Whitney U-test revealed no significant group difference in the number of
correct predictions given across the eight exemplars. In order to analyse variables
independently each participant was given a score of 0 (both exemplars incorrect), 1 (one
exemplar correct) or 2 (two exemplars correct) for each variable. Four Mann-Whitney
U-tests were carried out and a significant group difference was found in the conflict-
balance variable (U = 22, n = 20, p < .05) whereby children with Asperger syndrome
134
(mean rank = 13.3) offered more correct predictions that their CA matched peers (mean
rank = 7.7).
Table 6.4: Number of participants predicting both exemplars incorrectly [0] and number
predicting one [1] and two [2] exemplars correctly for each variable in the balance task
Group
Weight Distance Conflict/ Weight Conflict/Balance
0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
AS
N=10
0 2 8 2 5 3 1 4 5 3 4 3
CA
N=10
0 0 10 3 4 3 0 1 9 8 2 0
Table 6.5 shows the number of explanations given as a function of level across the eight
exemplars. Children with Asperger syndrome produced Level 1 responses on more
occasions than their CA peers. Both groups of children produced Level 2 explanations
most frequently; the children with Asperger syndrome produced a total of 47 and the
CA match group offered 57. Level 3 explanations required children to refer to the
distance each peg was from the fulcrum and was offered as a means of explanation on
three occasions by both groups. The most advanced level (Level 4) required a reference
to both weight and distance and children with Asperger syndrome offered these
explanations less (11 occasions) than their CA matched peers (19 occasions).
In order to analyse explanations across the balance task each participant was scored
according to the level of explanation offered for each exemplar (i.e. scores ranged from
8 to 32). A Mann-Whitney U-test revealed significant group differences (U = 21, n = 20,
p < .05) whereby the CA matched group (mean rank = 13.4) offered more advanced
explanations that the children with Asperger syndrome (mean rank = 7.6).
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Table 6.5: Number of explanations provided as a function of level across all 8 exemplars
in the balance task
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Total
Don't Know Weight Distance Weight & Explanations
Group Distance (8 per child)
AS 19 47 3 11 80
N=10
CA 1 57 3 19 80
N=10
Trajectory Task
As shown in Table 6.6, with respect to the carried variable, one child with Asperger
syndrome and two CA matched children correctly predicted the outcome of all four
exemplars in the trajectory task. In contrast no children correctly predicted the outcome
of all four exemplars in the rolled variable.
A Mann-Whitney U-test revealed no significant group difference in the number of
correct predictions given across the eight exemplars in the trajectory task. In order to
analyse predictions given for each variable independently participants were given a
score of 0 (all four exemplars incorrect), 1 (one exemplar correct), 2 (two exemplars
correct), 3 (three exemplars correct) or 4 (four exemplars correct) for each variable. Two
Mann-Whitney U-tests were employed and results indicated a significant group
difference in the rolled variable (U = 22, n = 20, p < .05) whereby the CA matched peers
(mean rank = 13.05) offered more correct predictions than the children with Asperger
syndrome (mean rank = 7.9).
Table 6.6: Number of participants predicting four exemplars incorrectly [0] and number
predicting one [1], two [2], three [3] and four [4] exemplars correctly for each variable in
the trajectory task
Carried Rolled
Group 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
AS 1 0 4 4 1 0 3 5 2 0
N=10
CA 0 2 3 3 2 0 1 2 7 0
N=10
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To investigate predictions in more depth they were coded according to four levels: 1)
incorrect; 2) straight down; 3) inverted L-shape; and 4) parabolic. As shown in Table
6.7, in comparison to the CA matched group the children with Asperger syndrome
were overall less likely to predict an incorrect trajectory (21 and 29 occasions
respectively). Furthermore, children with Asperger syndrome were more likely to be
incorrect with regard to the rolled variable (14 occasions) than the carried variable (7
occasions) whereas the CA matched group offered wrong predictions similarly for both
variables (14 and 15 occasions respectively). Children with Asperger syndrome were
more likely to offer a straight down prediction with regard to exemplars from the
carried variable (10 occasions) than the rolled variable (4 occasions). Across both groups
children offered straight down predictions with similar frequency. The CA match
group were more likely to offer inverted L-shaped predictions in respect to the carried
variable (6 occasions) unlike the children with Asperger syndrome who offered this
type of prediction in a similar fashion across both variables (on 8 occasions each). Both
groups of children made frequent predictions of a parabolic curve in both variables. In
order to analyse this data inferentially participants were given a score based on the
level of correctness awarded to each prediction (i.e. scores ranges from 8 to 32). Three
Mann-Whitney U-tests were employed (i.e. for each variable and overall). Results
revealed no significant group differences in the level of prediction offered.




















Carried 7 10 8 15 14 9 6 11
Rolled 14 4 8 14 15 9 1 15
Overall 21 14 16 29 29 00T—1 7 26
Key: I = Incorrect; SD = Straig'at down; IL = Inverted L-shape; P = Parabolic
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Table 6.8 shows the number of explanations given as a function of level across the eight
exemplars. Level 1, representing incorrect responses, was offered more frequently by
the CA match group than the children with Asperger syndrome (45 and 33 occasions
respectively). Level 2 explanations incorporating a reference to the ball falling straight
down were given a comparable number of times by the children with Asperger
syndrome (35 occasions) and the CA matched group (34 occasions). Although
participants in both groups predicted that the path of the ball would follow an inverted
L-shape path (see Table 6.7) no explanations were given that offered such a reference
(i.e. Level 3). Children with Asperger syndrome offered Level 4 explanations based on
a parabolic path on 11 more occasions than their CA matched peers. In order to analyse
explanations as a function of level each participant was given a score between 8 and 32.
A Mann-Whitney U-test revealed no significant differences in the level of explanations
offered by each group.
Table 6.8: Number of explanations provided as a function of level across all 8 exemplars
in the trajectory task
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Total
Incorrect Straight Inverted L- Parabolic Explanations
Group Down shape (8 per child)
AS 33 35 0 12 80
N=10
CA 45 34 0 1 80
N=10
VerticalMovement Task
Overall the children performed poorly in the vertical movement task. Table 6.9 shows
the number of participants predicting all four exemplars incorrectly and the number
predicting one, two, three and four exemplars correctly. These response patterns show
that within the iveight variable one child with Asperger syndrome correctly predicted
the outcome of all four exemplars. With regard to the surface variable, no children
correctly predicted the outcome of all four exemplars. A Mann-Whitney U-test revealed
no significant group difference in the number of correct responses given across the
eight exemplars in the vertical movement task.
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In order to analyse response patterns each participant was scored as either 0 (all four
exemplars incorrect), 1 (one exemplar correct), 2 (two exemplars correct), 3 (three
exemplars correct) or 4 (four exemplars correct) for each variable. Two Mann-Whitney
U-tests revealed no significant group differences in the way participants responded to
each variable.
Table 6.9: Number of participants predicting four exemplars incorrectly [0] and number
predicting one [1], two [2], three [3] and four [4] exemplars correctly for each variable in
the vertical movement task
Group
Weight Surface
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
AS
N=10
1 3 5 0 1 1 2 4 3 0
CA
N=10
0 3 4 3 0 1 5 3 1 0
Table 6.10 shows the number of explanations given as a function of level across the
eight exemplars. Children with Asperger syndrome produced Level 1 responses with
more frequency than their CA matched peers (on 23 and 15 occasions respectively).
Level 2 explanations were awarded if a child only referred to the surface of the ramp to
explain the movement of the truck. This type of explanation was given most frequently
by both groups of children: 40 times by the children with Asperger syndrome and 38
times by the CA matched group. Level 3 explanations required children to refer to the
weight of the truck to explain movement and were offered as a means of explanation 11
times by the children with Asperger syndrome and eight times by the CA matched
group. The most advanced level of explanation (Level 4) based on reference to both the
surface of the ramp and the weight of the truck was offered on 6 occasions by the children
with Asperger syndrome and on 19 occasions by the CA matched group.
In order to analyse explanations as a function of level each participant was given a
score of between 8 and 32. A Mann-Whitney U-test revealed no significant differences
in the level of explanations offered by the two groups.
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Table 6.10: Number of explanations provided as a function of level across all 8
















23 40 11 6 80
CA
N=10
15 38 8 19 80
6.4. Discussion
The present study found that overall the prediction scores offered in relation to four
tasks tapping physical understanding did not differ between the children with
Asperger syndrome and a CA matched group. Analysis of each variable independently
showed that with regards to the conflict/balance variable in the balance task children
with Asperger syndrome offered more correct predictions than the CA matched group.
In the trajectory task the CA matched group offered more corrections predictions with
regard to the rolled variable than the children with Asperger syndrome. Analyses of
explanations as a function of level reveal significant differences between groups in the
floating/sinking and balance tasks. Performance across all four tasks was confounded
with PIQ for the CA matched group but only had an effect in the trajectory task among
the children with Asperger syndrome. Although limited this finding adds strength to
the result of Study 2 showing that performance on tasks of intuitive physics is related to
PIQ. However, in Study 3 this was only the case for the typically developing children.
Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) note that intuitive psychology and physics are conceptually
viewed as being independent of IQ nevertheless, it is important that future studies of
intuitive physics take PIQ into consideration. Each task will now be discussed in turn.
The predictions offered with respect to the eight exemplars in the floating/sinking task
did not differ between groups. Likewise there were no group differences in the
response patterns across the four variables. Inspection of the response patterns showed
that the most correct predictions were made with regard to the weight variable where
children were presented with a rock and a sponge. Analysis of explanations as a
function of level revealed that the CA matched group offered significantly more
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advanced explanations across the eight exemplars than the children with Asperger
syndrome. Inspection of the total number of explanations offered across the task
revealed that children with Asperger syndrome were more likely to provide an 'don't
know' response than the CA matched group. In line with previous work (i.e. Biddulph,
1983) the causal explanations offered by both groups were object-based. Consistent
with the pattern found by Howe et al. (1990), both groups of children offered more
explanations based on wrong object properties than relevant object properties. This is
not surprising since the latter are defined by correct answers thus there is less scope for
variability. In a similar vein, both groups of children focussed on similar salient object
properties to correctly explain why an object might float/sink, the most frequent being
weight. Focus on the object-liquid relationship was minimal yet was offered on a few
more occasions by the children with Asperger syndrome. In contrast to some previous
work (i.e. Kohn, 1993; Laurendeau & Pinard, 1962; Rodrigues, 1980; Piaget, 1930), but in
line with other studies (i.e. Biddulph, 1983; Stephans et al., 1986, Howe et al., 1990), no
child in this study made a reference to relative density. Rather than reflecting a lack of
understanding it has been suggested that children's emphasis on object-properties may
be an artefact of the methodology. Howe (1998) suggests that experiments where the
objects are varied but the liquid remains constant may inadvertently focus a child's
attention on object properties. Future research may gain a more reliable insight into
children's understanding of density by including more than one liquid.
With regards to the balance scale task, analysis of children's predictions across the eight
exemplars revealed no significant group difference. When response patterns were
analysed for each variable independently a significant group difference was found in
the conflict-balance variable. Here children with Asperger syndrome were more likely
to predict the correct outcome than the CA matched group. Interestingly the ability to
solve a conflict-balance problem was not evident in Siegler's sample of children until
the age of 16-to-17 years. In line with Siegler (1976) the most correct predictions were
made with regard to the weight variable where both groups frequently predicted that
the arm with the greatest number of weights would descend. However in contrast to
his results, this study reported a lower number of children predicting the correct
outcome with regard to the distance variable and a higher number of correct
predictions with regard to conflict-weight problems. Analysis of explanations as a
function of level revealed that across the task the CA matched group gave more
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advanced explanations than the children with Asperger syndrome. Inspection of the
number of explanations as a function of level revealed that the children with Asperger
syndrome were more likely to produce a 'don't know' response and that the CA
matched group were more likely to offer the most advanced explanation based on both
weight and distance. Thus overall, the children with Asperger syndrome were more
likely to correctly predict the correct outcome of the most difficult problem (i.e. conflict-
balance) than their CA matched peers. However, this more advanced level of
understanding was not reflected in their explanations that are more dependent on
conceptual understanding. With regards to the explanations the results showed that the
CA matched group achieved more advanced scores thus more advanced
understanding.
In the trajectory task the number of correct predictions offered across all eight
exemplars did not significantly differ between groups. When response patterns were
analysed for each variable independently a significant group difference was found in
the rolled variable whereby the CA matched group were more likely to offer correct
predictions than the children with Asperger syndrome. Overall, inspection of response
patterns showed that, in contrast to the findings of McCloskey, Washburn and Felch
(1983), both groups offered slightly more correct predictions with respect to the carried
variable. When children's predictions were re-categorised according to Kaiser, Proffitt
and McCloskey's findings (1985), no group differences were found. The response
patterns showed that children with Asperger syndrome were less likely to predict a
wrong trajectory but were more likely to be wrong with regard to exemplars from the
rolled variable. This is surprising because research suggests that an understanding of
the trajectory of a ball rolling from a stationary object should develop before the
understanding of a ball falling from a carried object (Kaiser, Proffitt & McCloskey,
1985). Children with Asperger syndrome were more likely to offer a straight down
prediction with regard to the carried variable than the rolled one. This may be because
the immediate lack of a supporting surface in carried objects brings children's intuitive
ideas about gravity into play (see Chapter 3). Interestingly, both groups frequently
predicted that the ball would fall in a parabolic path even although research has shown
that undergraduate students often fail to predict parabolic paths (McCloskey, 1983).
However, it should be noted that task methodology could have facilitated performance.
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After each exemplar children were shown the correct trajectory by the experimenter
thus the children may have used this as a template for subsequent predictions.
Analysis of children's causal explanations in the trajectory task revealed no significant
group difference. Inspection of the number of explanations offered by each group as a
function of level showed that the CA matched group were more likely to offer an
incorrect response than the children with Asperger syndrome. Inspection of the data
also revealed that children with Asperger syndrome offered more explanations
referring to a parabolic curve than their CA matched peers. However, on the whole this
level of explanation was comparatively lacking in relation to the high number of
predictions of a parabolic curve. This observation supports the suggestion that task
methodology may have been facilitating children's predictions. However, importantly,
although the feedback given to the children after each exemplar may have promoted
their predictions it would not have helped advance their explanations.
In the vertical movement task the number of correct predictions offered across the eight
exemplars did not differ between groups. This task proved challenging and most
children could only correctly predict the outcome of two exemplars from both
variables. Analysis of children's explanations as a function of level revealed no
significant group difference. Inspection of the number of explanations at each level
revealed that the CA matched group made more advanced explanations based on both
the ramp's surface and the weight of the truck than the children with Asperger
syndrome. Despite Howe's (1998) assertion that children under the age of 12 have no
idea about the forces that oppose motion, explanations that referred to the ramp's
surface to explain the movement of the truck were offered frequently by both groups of
children. References to the weight of the truck were offered on few occasions despite
the absence/presence of the marbles (i.e. weight) being very salient.
Overall, children with Asperger syndrome and a CA match group did not significantly
differ when asked to predict the outcome of physical phenomena. Analysis of children's
explanations found that the CA matched group offered more advanced explanations in
the floating/sinking and balance tasks. However, an overall inspection of the number
of explanations offered as a function of level revealed that children with Asperger
syndrome were very capable of giving explanations based on physical causal
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reasoning. This finding sits in contrast to the results from investigations into the
explanations offered by high-functioning children with autism with regards to
psychological concepts (Happe, 1994b; Loveland, Pearson, Tunali-Kotoski, Ortegon &
Gibbs, 2001; Reiffe et al., 2000; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994). As a result this study
further supports the evidence of a dissociation between the domains of psychology and
physics among children on the autistic spectrum.
This study also highlights potential benefits in using both predictions and explanations
to investigate children's causal understanding. For example, in the balance task
children with Asperger syndrome were more likely to correctly predict the outcome of
the most difficult problem however, analysis of the number of explanations as a
function of level granted the CA matched group with a higher level of understanding.
Likewise, the predictions made by both groups in the vertical movement task did not
differ between groups however inspection of the number of explanations as a function
of level indicated that the CA matched group offered more advanced explanations.
These findings alert caution to studies solely based on predictions; it may be the case
that they cannot fully reflect children's understanding. In a similar vein, the total
number of Level 1 explanations indicated that with regard to the floating/sinking and
balance tasks children with Asperger syndrome were more likely to elicit a 'don't
know' response. Flowever, on the basis of their predictions it cannot be concluded that
they have no understanding of the topics under scrutiny; they performed in a similar
fashion to the CA match group. This raises an important issue regarding the
relationship between implicit and explicit knowledge. It would be erroneous to assert
that failure to offer an explanation equals lack of understanding and a lack of
theoretical knowledge as argued by Gopnik et al. (2000). In the case of children with
Asperger syndrome their lack of social skills may come into play in the testing situation
and inhibit the production of explanations. This may also have accounted for the higher
frequency of Level 1 explanations among children with Asperger syndrome in three of
the tasks. This limitation may be over come by the inclusion of forced-choice
methodology in any future research (for an example of this method see Williams &
Binnie, 2002).
Despite some researchers concerns over children's ability to give explanations (i.e.
Bullock et al., 1982) this study found there to be no difficulty on the part of the child to
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explain. In-keeping with the assertion that investigating children's explanations is both
easy and revealing (Wellman, Hickiling & Schultz, 2000), it was found that on many
occasions children from both groups would often spontaneously explain the reason
behind their prediction before being asked by the experimenter to do so. Furthermore,
this study showed that in contrast to the explanations offered by children with high-
functioning autism with respect to psychological (among others, Happe, 1994b) and
biological phenomena (Gopnik et ah, 2000), their explanations with regard to physical
phenomena were, on the whole, based on the physical domain of understanding. These
conflicting results cannot be explained by verbal abilities since Gopnik et al.'s work
reports a similar mean VIQ score as the present study. As a result, consideration must
be given to the argument that children on the autistic spectrum have a comparative
strength in utilising language to offer explanations about physical phenomena as
opposed to their ability in the domains of biology (e.g. Gopnik et ah, 2000) and
psychology (e.g. Happe, 1994b; Loveland et al., 2001; Reiffe et ah, 2000; Tager-Flusberg
& Sullivan, 1994).
The finding that children with Asperger syndrome can correctly make predictions and
express explanations about physical phenomena is evidence that they have an
understanding of this domain (see Keil, 1999). Many authors subscribe to the view that
the understanding within a domain is theoretical (see Chapter 1) and argue that, in
part, theories are responsible for generating explanations (Wellman, Hickling &
Schultz, 2000). Therefore on the basis of children with Asperger syndrome's ability to
offer explanations about physical phenomena in a similar fashion to a CA match group,
it could be argued that they have a theoretical understanding of physics. The issue of
theoretical knowledge is pertinent to all of the three studies reported in this thesis and
as a result will be discussed further in Chapter 7.
6.4.1. Conclusions
This study comprised an exploration of the predictions and explanations given by
children with Asperger syndrome with regard to four physical concepts. Results
showed that children with Asperger syndrome were overall just as correct in their
predictions about physical phenomena as a comparison group of typically developing
CA and gender matched children. Additionally, on the whole the explanations offered
in support of predictions were similar across groups. These findings are in contrast to
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studies investigating explanations in the domain of psychology among high-
functioning individuals with autism. They also add to the small number of studies
revealing intact intuitive physics among children on the autistic spectrum. However, in
contrast to some research the results fail to support the claim of superior understanding
among this group (as proposed by Baron-Cohen, 2000a; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
In general, the methodology adopted in this study of including a prediction and
explanation component was both useful and revealing and, in combination, these
methods could benefit research on children's understanding. Indeed, it may be the case
that studies must use both methods in atypical and typically developing children in
order to get a fuller description of intuitive physics, one that is comparable with the
literature regarding intuitive psychology. As well as adding to the literature on
children's understanding of physics the combination of these techniques may also
provide a means of gaining information on the theoretical status of physics knowledge
in children on the autistic spectrum and in typically developing children. As
highlighted in Chapter 3 this area of work is at present extremely limited.
The final chapter of this thesis, Chapter 7, draws together the results of the three
empirical studies reported in this thesis in an attempt to resolve two key research
questions. The first question relates to the nature of cognition and whether it can be
described as domain-specific. The second question focuses on whether children on the
autistic spectrum have an intact or superior understanding of intuitive physics. The
empirical answers to these questions, achieved in this thesis, have many practical




7.1. Aims of this Thesis
Utilising the research tradition from the field of developmental psychopathology, it was
the aim of this thesis to further our understanding of the structure of cognition in
typical and atypical children. Cognition is assumed by many theorists to develop in a
domain-specific manner. This stance holds that knowledge is constructed specifically in
relation to the domain in question. In order to investigate this theoretical position, the
empirical work in this thesis has focussed on the dissociation in cognitive functioning
between the domains of psychology and physics present among children on the autistic
spectrum. It is important to note that this thesis took the approach of investigating
high-functioning children with autism. High-functioning autism and Asperger
syndrome are viewed as being similar variants on the autistic spectrum (see Chapter 1)
therefore comparisons amongst the three studies in this thesis can be made. The focus
on this specific group within the autistic spectrum allowed an examination of the
dissociation between psychological and physical understanding in a relatively pure
form without the presence of other cognitive factors that might influence the findings.
However, this sub-group only represents a small minority of individuals diagnosed on
the autistic spectrum and as a result limits the generalisability of the findings reported
here.
It is the purpose of this chapter to draw together the results from the three studies
presented in this thesis. However, this chapter will not reiterate previous discussion
sections. Instead focus will be given to the main findings and these will be integrated
and examined with respect to the domain-specific perspective of cognitive
development. Comparisons will be made between the domains of psychology and
physics. Following this, focus will be given to intuitive physics knowledge and
pertinent issues such as its theoretical status among children on the autistic spectrum
will be discussed. Additionally, consideration will be given to the possible reasons why
children on the autistic spectrum may have a superior ability to reason about physical
compared to psychological phenomena.
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7.2. Theoretical Implications: Evidence for Domain-specific Cognition
The first chapter in this thesis set the research in context by describing the dichotomy
between domain-general and domain-specific theoretical accounts of cognitive
development. To recap: domain-general accounts propose that children's knowledge
develops through a fixed sequence of broad, across task and across domain structures,
resulting in the child's reasoning being uniform and very homogeneously 'stage-x-like'
(Flavell, 2000). In contrast, domain-specific accounts propose that cognitive
development proceeds somewhat independently in different content areas. This
approach predicts that children will reason in a different fashion across domains than a
solely domain-general theory of development would allow. Studies 1 and 2 of this
thesis directly investigated these two accounts by examining cognitive reasoning in the
domains of psychology and physics in children with autism and in typically developing
children.
The results from Studies 1 and 2 showed that children with autism have a cognitive
impairment in the domain of psychology. Study 1 showed that they performed more
poorly than pre-schoolers (who were approximately five years younger) and than
children with Down syndrome (who exhibited a lower mean receptive vocabulary
score) on tasks of false belief and perception. Additionally, Study 2 found that children
with autism performed poorer than four comparison groups (pre-schoolers, seven- and
ten-year-olds, and a CA matched group) on a range of intuitive psychology questions
involving concepts such as the recognition of basic emotions.
As well as impairments in the domain of psychology, Studies 1 and 2 also found that
children with autism demonstrate at least an intact ability, and possibly a superior
ability, to reason about phenomena from the domain of physics in comparison to
typically developing children. In Study 1 they performed at ceiling level on a false
photo task and performed similarly to pre-schoolers and children with Down
syndrome on a task investigating the workings of a balance scale. Furthermore, not
only did Study 2 show that children with autism (with a mean CA of 6.3 years) opted
for the physical causal picture to complete both physical and psychological picture-
sequences. Moreover, Study 2 showed that they outperformed a CA matched group as
well as a group of pre-schoolers and seven-year-olds on a multiple-choice task tapping
a range of physical concepts such as object motion and how things work. In fact,
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findings showed that they performed in a similar fashion to a group of ten-year-old
children (who were approximately four years older).
In addition to the finding of Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 reported that children with
Asperger syndrome offered similar predictions with regard to the four physical
concepts of floating/sinking, balance, trajectory and vertical movement as a CA
matched group. In addition, the explanations they offered to support their predictions
were based on physical causal reasoning. This finding contrasts with work reporting an
inability of high-functioning children with autism to offer explanations about
psychological concepts (e.g. Happe, 1994b; Loveland et al., 2001; Reiffe et al., 2000;
Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994) thus further supporting the evidence of a dissociation
in understanding between the domains of psychology and physics among this group.
Taken together the evidence from the three empirical studies presented in this thesis
shows that in contrast to typically developing children, children on the autistic
spectrum have discontinuous reasoning abilities between at least two domains of
knowledge. These findings support the underlying assumption behind the domain-
specific account of cognitive development.
With respect to the three cognitive theories specifically associated with autism
(discussed in Chapter 1), this thesis lends support to the theory of mind hypothesis
which advocates that the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others is
impaired in children on the autistic spectrum. Inherent in this account is that other
areas of cognitive functioning will be intact, just the pattern of results found in Studies
1 and 2. In contrast, the executive functioning and central coherence accounts of autism
advocate that domain-general cognitive processes are to blame for the impaired ability
to reason about mental states. Both accounts argue that these domain-general deficits
affect learning in all areas and are not supported by findings that children on the
autistic spectrum can reason in a similar fashion about intuitive biology (in Study 1)
and intuitive physics (in Studies 1, 2 and 3) as typically developing children.
However a cautionary note must be made. It is assumed that across domains tasks are
equal in the demands that they place on the abilities embodied in executive functioning
and central coherence. Although great effort was made to take this issue into account
when designing tasks, the three different cognitive accounts of autism were not the
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primary focus of this thesis. Thus it cannot be confidently concluded that tasks
pertaining to the different domains employed in this thesis did indeed place similar
demands on executive functioning and central coherence. For example, in Study 1 the
poorer than expected performance of the children with autism on the perception task
was perhaps a result of the high executive functioning demands inherent in the task
chosen. Along similar lines, previous work has granted children with autism an
understanding of desire (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Tan & Harris, 1991) but when the
executive functioning demands of the task were increased, the performance of the
children with autism was greatly reduced (Russell et al., 1991).
Despite this potential limitation, on the whole the evidence presented in this thesis
shows that children on the autistic spectrum demonstrate an uneven profile of
competence across the domains of psychology and physics. This supports the view that
cognition develops in a domain-specific fashion and raises several theoretical questions
about the nature of core domains. For example, is knowledge within the domain of
physics structured similarly to knowledge in the domain of psychology and moreover,
is it structured similarly among children on the autistic spectrum and typically
developing children? The following section will provide an initial attempt to answer
these questions.
7.3. Comparisons of Intuitive Physics and Psychology
Having found that children on the autistic spectrum and typically developing children
can reason about physical phenomena, questions regarding the structure of this domain
arise. Primarily, consideration must be given to whether the domain of physics bears
any structural similarity to the domain of psychology on which so much research
attention has been based.
Intuitive psychology and physics are seen by many as core domains of cognition that
on the one hand develop alongside one another but on the other are distinctly different
(see Carey & Markman, 1999; Sperber, Premack & Premack, 1995). This characteristic is
best illustrated by Leslie (1994) who views these areas as being driven by two
independently functioning modules (i.e. ToMM and ToBy) that are a part of an infant's
core cognitive architecture. As indicated in Chapter 1, debate reigns over the precise
structure of a domain and the exact processes that guide knowledge acquisition.
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Nevertheless, research has shown that young children construct a number of intuitive
ideas pertaining to these two domains. This knowledge allows typically developing
children to reason about the world before the onset of formal schooling.
The domains of intuitive psychology and physics both encompass core concepts that
are understood rapidly in infancy and apparently without much deliberation. As
shown in Chapter 2, intuitive psychology quickly develops in the pre-school years and
by the age of four years children hold much the same fundamental concepts as adults.
Initially a domain of intuitive psychology encompasses basic building blocks that allow
the infant to engage socially, such as joint attention. As development proceeds more
advanced concepts emerge and at the core of many of these concepts lies the notion of
belief. An understanding of belief is critical for understanding many other concepts
within the domain of psychology, a key example being deception.
As shown in Chapter 3, a domain of intuitive physics also encompasses basic building
blocks. In this case they essentially involve the knowledge that objects exist, and that
they move in accordance with the principles of cohesion, contact and continuity
(Spelke, Phillips & Woodward, 1995). However, it has been noted that more advanced
concepts in the domain of physics are harder to grasp and typically develop at a later
age than many of those from the domain of psychology. It has been stated that
developing an understanding of physical objects and physical causation is a 'complex
endeavour' (Wellman & Gelman, 1992). One reason for this may be because there is no
core concept at the heart of the domain of physics. It appears to be the case that once
children have acquired the basic building blocks of intuitive physics the domain does
not develop into a coherent collection of understandings. Instead it appears to consist of
a collection of independent ideas relating to particular types of physical phenomena.
This can be highlighted by the fact that in Study 2 all participants, even the ten-year-
olds, did not achieve full score in the physics condition whereas in the intuitive
psychology condition near ceiling level was reached in all groups apart from the
children with autism.
Study 3 investigated four concepts from the domain of physics and results showed that
children with Asperger syndrome and their CA matched peers did not perform
consistently across tasks. For example, performance in the vertical movement task
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appeared to be worse in both groups than performance in the floating/sinking task.
This finding lends substance to the fragmented nature of physics and furthermore
suggests that the physical domain of understanding in children with Asperger
syndrome and their CA matched peers is lacking in overall coherence. Many
researchers state that a domain of knowledge by definition must be coherent. However
this issue has been recently been contested by Inagaki and Hatano (2002) who argue
that children's knowledge may be more advanced in some sub-domains (which are
similar to Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) notion of micro-domains) than others, even if those
sub-domains employ the same overarching theories. They do not expect coherence
across sub-domains but do expect it within sub-domains. The findings of this thesis
suggest that this may especially be the case with the domain of physics. In contrast to
the domain of psychology concepts from the physics domain can often be reasoned
about independently. As a result, when investigating the domain of physics it may be
more important to look for coherence within sub-domains rather than across the
overarching domain.
The fragmented nature of the domain of physics may explain why there are more
misconceptions reported in relation to the domain of physics than the domain of
psychology. It has been stated by numerous authors that further learning within a
domain is always constrained by previous knowledge (Pine & Messer, 2000) and thus if
initial understanding is wrong further difficulties will continue to emerge. This seems
especially prevalent in the domain of physics (see Kaiser et al., 1986). Although errors
and misconceptions may also arise in the domain of psychology it is perhaps the case
that among typically developing children they quickly become reconceptualised
because of the continual interaction with people. Moreover, misconceptions in the
domain of psychology will be very striking as is evident when observing children on
the autistic spectrum in a social context. Within the domain of physics, however,
misconceptions can still allow a child to reason and function effectively. For example,
as described in Chapter 3, children appear to hold the theory that regardless of the
presence of other variables, all objects will fall straight down. According to Hood (1995)
this theory, albeit wrong, does in fact serve them quite well. In a similar vein, Kaiser,
Proffitt & McCloskey (2000) have stated that many adults, even those who had taken
high school physics classes, hold many misconceptions in physics (see Chapter 3).
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In contrast to the four-year-old's grasp of intuitive psychology, which is said to be only
qualitatively different to that of an adult (Hala & Carpendale, 1997), it has been argued
that children's ideas about physics are incompatible with adult concepts (Carey &
Gelman, 1991). The evidence suggests that intuitive physics is harder to grasp than
intuitive psychology in typical development. This premise is not incompatible with the
nature of domain-specific cognition since underpinning this theoretical account is the
assumption that domains are structured differently.
Typically the development of intuitive psychological knowledge is quick and easy
whereas the development of intuitive physics is slow and fragmented. The findings of
this thesis suggest a reversal of this pattern among children on the autistic spectrum
however, it must be noted that overall there is a lack of research in both typical and
atypical children concerning the domain of physics, especially with regard to children's
development from basic building blocks to knowledge in the pre-school and school
years. As discussed in Chapter 3 much of the research on physics concepts has been
conducted from an educational perspective, with the focus primarily on children's
understanding in relation to the content of school tuition. In contrast, work from a
domain-specific perspective is more focussed on children's intuitive reasoning about
the world and how this understanding is structured. The following section therefore
addresses the findings of this thesis in terms of pertinent issues within the domain-
specific literature surrounding the status of intuitive physics knowledge particularly in
relation to domains and theoretical knowledge.
7.4. The Status of Intuitive Physics Knowledge: Domains and Theories
Within domain-specific literature a domain of knowledge is thought to function in
order to identify phenomena belonging to a single general kind that share among
themselves a number of relevant properties (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). Once
identified the domain evokes ontological commitments and causal mechanisms
allowing the generation of predictions and explanations about the phenomena in
question. As already stated in Chapter 1, knowledge within a domain is bounded by
constraints therefore it has been suggested that acquired knowledge within a domain
should be similar, if not identical, across individuals (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002).
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The findings presented in this thesis show that children on the autistic spectrum reason
about many physical concepts in a similar (and as will be discussed below, sometimes
more advanced) fashion as typically developing children. For example, Study 1 showed
that typically developing pre-schoolers and children with autism performed similarly
on tasks investigating physical representations and the workings of a balance scale.
Likewise, Study 3 found that children with Asperger syndrome and a CA comparison
group offered similar predictions and explanations with regards to physical concepts
such as floating/sinking and object movement. Overall this evidence tentatively
suggests that both groups of children have a domain of physics encompassing similar
ontological commitments and casual mechanisms.
The notion of domains and theories are closely related: it is commonly agreed that
domains comprise a collection of theories pertaining to the domain in question.
Therefore, having concluded that children on the autistic spectrum have a domain of
physics the question arises as to whether this understanding can be described as
theoretical. Much of the discussion regarding theories in the cognitive developmental
literature has often been vague and unspecified. Evaluating whether children's
knowledge is theoretical is therefore a difficult task, not least because most theorists
differ in terms of the criteria used for such an assessment. Much of this debate revolves
around the notion of implicit and explicit knowledge (see Chapter 1). For example,
according to Karmiloff-Smith (1992) knowledge can only be described as theoretical if it
is represented at level El or higher whereby representations are 'open to conscious
access'. Thus the verbal expression of knowledge is central to Karmiloff-Smith's
definition of a theory. Likewise, Carey (1985; p201) asserts that the ability to explain is
at the core of theories; she states, "it is the explanatory mechanisms that distinguish
theories from other types of conceptual structures". However, others do not view the
articulation of understanding as being the key to theoretical knowledge and instead see
young children's understanding as being coherently organised and theoretical from
birth. This view can be assigned to Leslie (1994) and Spelke (1988) who argue that
theoretical knowledge stems from the activation of genetically specified modules.
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) also describe the understanding that is present in young
infants as theoretical. They suggest that infants are born with starting state theories that
guide children's reasoning from a very early age.
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Rather than adhering to a strict definition, Inagaki and Hatano (2002) have recently
offered a much more speculative approach to the issue of theoretical knowledge. They
suggest that a lax definition of a theory would entail evidence of coherent, reasonable
and differentiated predictions based on proper causal mechanisms attributable to the
domain in question. On this basis, evidence that pre-linguistic infants are sensitive to
complex patterns in the world is enough to claim that they do have intuitive theories.
Thus even although infants cannot make explicit predictions they do show signs of a
basic explanatory causal schema, which according to some, is an essential component of
a theory (e.g. Keil & Wilson, 2000). Inagaki and Hatano (2002) also offer a more
stringent definition of a theory based on children's ability to offer causal explanations
that are relevant and appropriate to phenomena pertaining to a particular domain.
They state this characteristic as being stronger evidence for the possession of a theory.
As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis employed the definition of a theory as being a
coherent well organised system of beliefs empowered in a causal explanatory
framework that allows reasoning about phenomena in a particular domain to take place
(Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). In keeping with this definition and the
argument put forward by Inagaki and Hatano (2002), the results of the three empirical
studies reported in this thesis suggest that children on the autistic spectrum and
typically developing children do have theoretical knowledge pertaining to the domain
of physics. For example, the results of Studies 1, 2 and 3 amply demonstrate that both
groups of children can make predictions based on physical causal mechanisms thus
passing Inagaki and Hatano's lax criteria. Moreover, Study 3 showed that children with
Asperger syndrome and a CA matched group could both offer causal explanations
based on the relevant physical variables inherent in the task. As a result, this finding
provides evidence of children with Asperger syndrome passing the more stringent
requirement for theoretical knowledge.
The identification of theory-like knowledge pertaining to the domain of physics in
children on the autistic spectrum has shown that Gopnik et al.'s (2000) assertion that
children with autism have a deficit with theory building per se needs revision.
However the findings can be used in support of both Leslie's (1994) and Karmiloff-
Smith's hypotheses (1992). Both these accounts suggest that children on the autistic
spectrum have specific cognitive impairments in the domain of psychology (see
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Chapter 2) whereas cognitive reasoning in the domain of physics will be unaffected (see
Chapter 3).
7.5. Superior Intuitive Physics in Children on the Autistic Spectrum
As well as identifying dissociation between reasoning in the domains of psychology
and physics this thesis has also shown that children on the autistic spectrum have a
very good grasp of intuitive physics.
Understanding of intuitive physics among children on the autistic spectrum was
investigated rigorously in Study 2. Findings showed that children with autism
preferred to choose a physical causal explanation in both the physical and
psychological condition of a picture-sequencing task. This suggests that they may
prefer to reason about causality in a purely physical way, employing this domain in
relation to both psychological and physical phenomena. Moreover, Study 2 identified a
superior understanding of physical phenomena among children with autism in the
multiple-choice task compared to a group of typically developing children of the same
CA age. In fact results showed that their performance was more in line with a group of
ten-year-old children who were on average four years older.
In addition to these findings, Study 3 found that children with Asperger syndrome
predicted the outcome of various physical concepts in a similar fashion to a CA and
gender matched control group. Additionally, the explanations used by the children
with Asperger syndrome to support their predictions were firmly grounded in physical
reasoning. However, the content was not superior to that offered by the CA matched
group. The absence of any superior ability on behalf of the children with Asperger
syndrome may have been partly a result of the tasks employed in Study 3 being drawn
from the educational literature and developed for use with typical children. The
children with Asperger syndrome tested in Study 3 were not being taught the
mainstream curriculum and as a result the typically developing CA matched group
may have gained an advantage from carrying out similar tasks as part of their
schoolwork. Likewise their experience of formal science lessons may have given them a
benefit in offering suitable explanations. Nevertheless, the overall findings of the three
studies reported in this thesis support the assertion of Baron-Cohen (2000a) that
children on the autistic spectrum have an intact domain of intuitive physics. Moreover,
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the results of Study 2 go some way to support his claim that their reasoning in relation
to intuitive physics is superior in comparison to their typically developing peers.
The demonstration in Study 2 of a superior physics understanding in children with
autism raises questions regarding the origins of this potential advantage. It has been
suggested that the profile of good physics knowledge among children with autism may
have been selected by hominid evolution since superior physics knowledge may be
advantageous to an individual's inclusive fitness (e.g. tool use, hunting skills) and may
even be preferentially selected despite impairments in the domain of psychology
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Baron-Cohen (2000a) has suggested that such a 'genetic
liability' may manifest itself in either a genetically based impairment in intuitive
psychology or a genetically based talent for intuitive physics.
It is the case that either of these cognitive profiles would lead children with autism to
be much more interested in physical phenomena resulting in the development of
expertise in non-social learning environments. Support for this premise has been found
in a study by Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (1999). They found that children on the
autistic spectrum have interests that overwhelmingly represent activities with physical
phenomena (see Chapter 3 for more details). It may be the case that the children's
interests and obsessions are a product of a superior domain of intuitive physics and in
turn may further foster the understanding of physical phenomena. In domain-specific
literature the contribution of the child's environment is often deemed negligible
(Hatano, 1997). However, it has been suggested that the acquisition of knowledge may
be driven by goal directed activities (Hatano & Inagaki, 1997). With respect to the
domain of biology, Inagaki (1990) found that raising a goldfish significantly increased
children's factual and conceptual knowledge of fish and similar animals. Therefore in a
similar vein, the intense interactions with physical phenomena among children on the
autistic spectrum may lead them to learn efficiently in this domain since they are
actively accumulating physical knowledge. Inagaki (1990) states that familiarity with a
domain increases not only factual knowledge but also the conceptual organisation of
the domain.
There is always the possibility that strengths in reasoning about physical concepts
among children on the autistic spectrum may be a result of an advanced domain-
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general ability. For example, the relationship between superior understanding of
physics and the central coherence hypothesis has been discussed (Baron-Cohen, 2000a;
Baron-Cohen et ah, 2001; Flappe, 2000). It has been suggested that superior
understanding in the domain of physics may be a result of weak central coherence
because this deficit would manifest itself in detailed analysis, just the sort of ability
needed to reason about most physical phenomena. This argument would predict that a
greater attention to detail would be evident not just with physical stimuli but with any
stimuli where detail focus is needed regardless of domain however, this assertion
remains to be tested. With respect to this thesis, the physics tasks employed were not
overtly concerned with local details or segmentation skills but this was not the focus of
thesis and it cannot be confidently concluded that the tasks did not tap such abilities. A
more direct investigation is needed and at present the importance of a link between
weak central coherence and the ability to reason about intuitive physics remains
untested.
It is important to note that a superior ability to reason about physical phenomena
would not be expected in all children diagnosed as having an autistic spectrum
disorder. It is highly likely that individual differences would be evident and
considering the findings of Studies 2 and 3, an understanding of intuitive physics may
be linked to PIQ. It is important that future investigations of intuitive physics take this
into consideration.
7.6. Limitations of this Thesis and Suggestions for Future Research
This thesis highlights the need for caution when ascribing domain-specific knowledge
to children and acknowledges the difficulty in developing equivalent tasks in different
domains and in equating task demands across participant groups. Comparing
performance across domains, especially in atypically developing children, is a difficult
endeavour in view of both the lack of homogeneity within clinical groupings and the
differing diagnostic criteria applied in different countries. However, if we are to gain a
better understanding of children's domain-specific knowledge, its development and its
neurological bases, we need to continue to investigate possible links between these
domains, both in typically and atypically developing children. Inagaki and Hatano
(2002; p3) have recently stated that:
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It is contemporary researchers' hope that we can eventually build an
integrated theory of conceptual development that replaces the Piagetian
theory by closely studying each of these and several other core domains of
thought and finding commonalities and differences among them.
A further note of caution must be made with respect to concluding that the dissociation
between intuitive psychology and physics among children on the autistic spectrum
supports the position of domain-specificity. To conclude with confidence that domain-
general abilities such as executive functioning and central coherence are having no role
in the differentiated cognitive profile in children with autism, the tasks pertaining to
the domain of psychology would need to contain no more demands on executive
functioning or central coherence than tasks pertaining to for example, the domain of
physics. Likewise, tasks on which children with autism perform comparatively well are
not simply lacking executive functions or central coherence demands. These issues
were not the focus of this thesis and thus were not fully considered.
Despite these limitations, this thesis has raised several important issues that deserve
further attention. Firstly, now that a domain of physics has been identified among
children on the autistic spectrum there is real need to systematically investigate
whether this understanding is theoretical. The notion of theoretical knowledge has been
described extensively in relation to the domain of psychology where the 'theory of
mind' paradigm is commonly researched (see Wellman, 1990). Although the position of
theoretical knowledge in the domain of physics has been discussed in this thesis (see
Chapters 3 and 6), there is very little work solely concerned with identifying the content
of this knowledge. In order to shed light on this issue, more descriptive work is needed
on physical concepts in typical and atypically developing children. This is especially
important because the volume of work in the domain of physics is very slim compared
to the literature on intuitive psychology.
In a similar vein, whereas a large proportion of work has focussed on infant's
understanding of physics (see Chapter 3) no work to date has attempted to chart the
developmental pathway from the initial knowledge state concerning physical objects
present in infancy to the development of more advanced physical concepts evident
during the pre-school years. It has been argued that work on infants may help shed
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light on how physical knowledge develops during childhood (see Spelke et al., 1992).
However this assertion has not been reflected in the research undertaken. In particular,
further research should try to employ early infancy techniques such as
habituation/dishabituation in order to tap implicit knowledge in children with autism
in an attempt to identify the basic building blocks identified in Chapter 3 with respect
to typically developing children. However, the problems surrounding the age of
diagnosis of autistic spectrum disorders may make this very difficult.
A preference for phenomena pertaining to the domain of physics among children with
autism was shown in Study 2; in a physical and psychological condition of a picture-
sequencing task they preferred to complete the picture-sequence based on physical
causation. This preference may reflect the fact that in general, physical phenomena are
predictable, especially in comparison to psychological phenomena. It has been
suggested that children on the autistic spectrum crave predictability and sameness in
order to make sense of the world and reduce anxiety (Hutt & Hutt, 1965; 1970).
However, on the strength of the findings from this thesis it could be argued that
children on the autistic spectrum attend to physical phenomena as result of underlying
cognitive functioning involving deficits in intuitive psychology and strengths in
intuitive physics. This argument sits well with observations of children with autism as
'little professors' accumulating more and more information with regard to their current
(more often than not physical) preoccupation (see Baron-Cohen, 2000a). However, this
needs further investigation, perhaps focussing on the behaviour of children on the
autistic spectrum whilst they engage with physical phenomena. Are children with
autism simply attracted to physical phenomena in order to reduce anxiety or are they
conducting 'mini experiments' in an attempt to identify physical causal principles?
It was suggested earlier that the intense interactions with physical phenomena among
children on the autistic spectrum might lead them to learn effectively in this domain. In
order to investigate the role of experiential factors future research might look more
closely at the obsessions and interests among children on the autistic spectrum. It may
be beneficial to quantify them in order to correlate the time spent interacting with
physical phenomena with performance on a battery of physics tasks (such as the
multiple-choice task employed in Study 2). Only this type of analysis would allow a full
investigation into the relationship between cognitive foundations and environmental
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factors. Moreover, this type of research may be useful at both a group and individual
level of analysis.
7.7. Educational Implications
Discussion of domain-specific theories in general and the content of children's
understanding in particular has obvious and significant implications for education.
Studies of children's intuitive understanding have documented more than the few facts
that children accumulate. They reveal fundamental types of understanding in children
and reflect the ways in which children construe the word. An appreciation of how
children's cognitive processes work may be able to help specify the appropriate content
and effective methods of teaching. This is especially important with respect to children
on the autistic spectrum.
Study 2 of this thesis has shown that children on the autistic spectrum have an intact
and possibly superior domain of intuitive physics. This work adds to a small but
growing literature of work on the strength of physical reasoning among this group. It
has been suggested that detailed descriptions of what children know will be effective
for designing a course of instruction because education aims to change an individual's
initial intuitive knowledge to formal knowledge (Hatano & Inagaki, 1996). Thus the
cognitive strength in the domain of physics among children on the autistic spectrum
shown in Study 2 may provide an opportunity for learning about, among other things,
psychological phenomena. For example, Temple Grandin (2000), an individual with
Asperger syndrome, used the metaphor of sliding automatic doors (i.e. physics) to help
her reason about social relationships (i.e. psychology). As this example illustrates, the
ability to reason about physical phenomena may provide a tool for learning. As a result
further investigation into the origins and structure of the domain of physics among
children on the autistic spectrum may yield a positive avenue for educational
interventions.
It has been concluded that "one of the most important findings of the
cognitive/developmental research is that children do not come to science learning as a
'tabula-rasa' but have acquired rich knowledge about the physical world based on their
everyday experiences" (Vosniadou & Ionnides, 1998; pl86). As this quote suggests, the
investigation of intuitive physics knowledge in typically developing children has been
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identified as educationally significant, especially if studied in the early years before
formal education (Howe, 1998). There is no reason why this should not also be the case
for children on the autistic spectrum. It seems obvious that instruction should seize
upon children's early intuitive understanding and exploit it so that children can get a
sense of continuity between their own spontaneous inquiries about the world and those
inquiries that are guided by formal instruction (Keil & Silberstein, 1998). The basis of
children's knowledge must be used to teach children to see which arguments are
plausible on the basis of what they know (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). Thus if research
continues to reveal an advantage among children on the autistic spectrum in
understanding physical phenomena across a range of tasks, then the educational and
therapeutic implications of this must be explored in order to capitalise on this potential
cognitive strength.
7.8. Summary and Concluding Comments
As well as adding strength to domain-specific theoretical accounts of cognitive
development this thesis has provided a much-needed contribution to the literature on
intuitive physics among children on the autistic spectrum and typically developing
children. The employment of tasks traditionally situated within educational contexts
has proven a useful addition to the repertoire of intuitive physics tasks used in child
development research and should be utilised more in the quest for advancing our
understanding of intuitive physics.
At present, many accounts of cognitive development profess that knowledge is
acquired in a domain-specific fashion (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). This thesis supports
this assertion by showing that children on the autistic spectrum have difficulties with
reasoning pertaining to the domain of psychology but not in the domain of physics.
Studies 1 and 2 suggest that children with autism have a cognitive profile that reflects a
deficit in the domain of psychology and an intact domain of physics. Moreover, Study 2
found evidence of a superior ability of children with autism to reason about physical
phenomena. In addition, Study 3 showed that children with Asperger syndrome are
just as correct in their predictions about physical phenomena as a CA matched group.
Furthermore, in contrast to the lack of conceptual knowledge in explanations offered in
the domain of psychology (e.g. Happe, 1994b), Study 3 showed that children with
Asperger syndrome could produce explanations based on physical causal reasoning.
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Taken together these results not only support the claims of discontinuity in
development between intuitive psychology and physics among children on the autistic




ETHICAL ISSUES WHEN CONDUCTING RESEARCH WITH
CHILDREN
A.1. Introduction
Before conducting any research the experimenter is responsible for making a careful
evaluation of its ethical acceptability before the study is designed. This is especially the
case when the research participants are children (Thomas & O'Kane, 1998). Moreover, it
is particularly important when they have learning disabilities. Therefore, addressing
the ethical issues appropriately was of central importance to the studies reported in this
thesis. Two main issues were at large: informed consent and confidentiality.
A.2. Informed Consent
The British Psychological Society's [BPS] code of conduct (2000) was adhered to at all
stages in this research. It states that when conducting research with participants who
may not have the abilities to grant informed consent special safeguarding procedures
are required. As a result, the present research required that prior to data collection 'by
proxy' consent had to be obtained from the parents/guardians of potential participants.
In practise because the research presented in this thesis was conducted in schools,
consent was initially obtained from the local Education authority, the head-teacher and
the class teacher before parents were approached. Despite these safeguards it was
important that gaining consent from these 'adult gatekeepers' did not negate the need
to inform the child and where possible also obtain consent from the child.
In order to grant informed consent parents must be informed by knowledge about the
research. As a result a number of issues must be conveyed by the experimenter to the
parents in order for them to make a reasoned decision about permitting their child's
involvement in the research (Mason, 2000). First and foremost parents must fully
understand how participation will affect their child. In the studies reported in this
thesis a letter provided this information. Written details regarding the purpose of the
study was given alongside details about the process of data collection (i.e. how long it
would take etc.) and the intended outcome of the findings (i.e. PhD thesis, journal
publications). It was important to fully explain to parents that they have a real choice
whether to allow their child to participate or not and make them understand that at any
time they could withdraw their consent (see BPS, 2000; section 6.1). This point is
especially important because the present research was conducted in schools and as a
result many parents may feel obliged to consent. The studies reported in this thesis
adopted an 'opt in' policy whereby the written consent of the parent had to be received
before participation was considered.
In order to receive consent from the children included in this thesis their age and verbal
ability had to be taken into account. It was important that the child fully understood
that they could withdraw at any time. However, because participation in school
activities is usually not optional it was important that the experimenter attended to the
child's body language since a decline in motivation or avoidance of the testing situation
may be a sign of consent being withdrawn.
A.3. Confidentiality
In line with the BPS guidelines every effort was taken to protect the confidentiality of
participants (see BPS, 2000; section 7.1). The present research maintained an
individual's anonymity throughout by rendering anonymous any records that no
longer needed to be personally identifiable. In addition, the individual schools involved
were not disclosed and are only described by geographical area. In the three studies
reported in this thesis, school records often had to be checked in order to confirm a
child's diagnosis. This was never carried out without the consent of the parents and
guidelines concerning confidentiality of the information was adhered to.
The data collected was never identifiable with any individual or school. Paper and
computer files were always appropriately secured and never shared or used for
purposes other than that intended and consented by the parents. Study 3 involved
participants being video recorded. Assurances were given to parents that the
experimenter would be the only viewer of these videos and that they would be
destroyed once the data was transcribed or alternatively if consent was withdrawn.
A.4. Overview
Ethical guidelines cannot provide specific clear appreciation of the dilemmas that
researchers face (Morrow & Richards, 1996) and many ethical considerations will be
context specific. Nevertheless, it is important that researchers in psychology follow the
guidelines issued by the BPS in order to protect both research participants and
themselves.
Bibliography
Bell, J. (1999). Doing your research project: A guide for first-time researchers in education and
social science. Open University Press: Buckingham.
The British Psychological Society. (2000). Code of conduct, ethical principles and guidelines.
The British Psychological Society, Leicester.
Gale, A. (1995). Ethical issues in psychological research (p92-112). In Coleman, A. M. (Eds).
Psychological research methods and statistics. Longman: London.
Greig, A. & Taylor, J. (1999). Doing research with children. Sage: London.
Lewis, A. & Lindsay, G. (2000). Researching children's perspectives. Open University
Press: Buckingham.
Masson, J. (2000). Researching children's perspectives; Legal issues (p34 - 45). In Lewis, A. &
Lindsay, G. (Eds). Researching children's perspectives. Open University Press:
Buckingham.
Morrow, V. & Richards, M. (1996). The ethics of social research with children: An overview.
Children and Society, 10, 90-105.
Thomas, N., & O'Kane, C. (1998). The Ethics of Participatory Research with Children.
Children & Society, 12, 336-348.
APPENDIX B
STUDY 2: THE CONTENT OF THE EIGHT STORIES IN THE
PICTURE-SEQUENCING TASK
FIRST PICTURE PSYCHOLOGICAL PHYSICAL LAST PICTURE
Man-made artefacts:
Bulb on Hand turning off
switch
Element breaking Bulb off
Car at top of hill Hand pushing car Car pushing car Car at bottom of hill
Tap running water Hand turning off tap Burst pipe Tap dripping water
Floating balloon Hand pricking
balloon
Tree pricking balloon Burst balloon
Natural artefacts:
Apple on tree Hand picking apple Apple falling off Apple on ground
Flower standing Hand cutting flower Flower falling over Flower stem cut
Tree standing Hand cutting tree Lightning hitting tree Tree cut into two
Rock at top of hill Hand pushing rock Wind pushing rock Rock at bottom of hill
APPENDIX C
STUDY 2: EXAMPLES OF CATEGORISATION STIMULI FROM
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